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RUSSIA UKRAINE WAR AND NUCLEARIZATION IN GLOBAL TENSION AREAS

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Annotation. Russia-Ukraine War has reignited the debate over nuclear deterrence, put non-proliferation gains at stake and may likely to cause implications for tension areas across the globe. This has further shaken security assurances from United States, Nato in asymmetrical tension areas, and perceived outcomes are exhibiting more alarming and scarier picture. Ukraine was promised security in line with the 1992 Lisbon treaty. The treaty ensured that through giving up its nuclear weapons Ukraine will be granted the means through which it can ensure its borders through conventional ways. In addition to this, it was also provided guarantees of security by UK, the USA and Russia, should it ever face a threat by an external force. However, as recent events have come to unfold. It has become obvious that all such promises of security were of no use, that when Russia decided to take up arms against the state of Ukraine there was not much standing between Ukraine and destruction.

The paper will examine how this war perpetuates and impacts in other tension areas. States like South Korea and Iran who are being promised security might see this as a case study of why it is pertinent for them to turn to nuclearization. Lastly, we shall also see the case study of South Asian theatre where Pakistan, a financially weaker state chose to develop nuclear weapons irrespective of the promises that the western nations made to deter India through nuclearization. And through these measures it has been successful in maintaining deterrence and a relative balance of power with a much bigger adversary. In the most important sense, the paper explores the impact of power equation on arms race and nonproliferation, and it poses new threats to the power balancing in regions across the globe.

Keywords: Non-proliferation, Russia, Ukraine, War, Security Dilemma, Nuclearization, Iran, South Korea, Global Tension Areas.

Basic provisions

The non-proliferation regime is set out to defend the world from overt nuclearization. The world, having understood the threats that come with nuclear weapons and the inflated cost of obtaining and securitizing them, turned to acknowledge the importance of the non-proliferation regime. This view was challenged when Russia invaded Ukraine, violating all agreements in order to annex the Russian speaking areas along the border. The loss of lives and economic damage is only a part of the damage that will be had from this war (around five thousand civilian casualties have been reported according to different sources). One of the most important losses from this war will be

that of the non-proliferation regime. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has had major implications for how the global tension areas approach the nuclear discourse.

Introduction

In this paper this shall be our main concern, to form a comprehensive understanding of the damage that the Russian Invasion of Ukraine will bring to the non-proliferation discourse and how it will change the attitudes and perceptions around the world about their need for proliferation. We shall look at three important junctions across the world that are important litmus tests for this change.

Russian invasion has set off alarms across the world and states actively analyse the situation in order to determine their reorientation in global politics. We shall discuss the case study of Iran, a state that has actively been prevented from achieving nuclear capacity by the United States and allies in line with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and other agreements, the two Koreas one of which has already had the nuclear capacity since 2006, and the other which now understands nuclear weapons as a necessity in order for its own survival. Thirdly, we shall be looking at the India Pakistan case study which shows a nuclear deterrence maintaining a tension area between two asymmetrical powers. The implications of the successful deterrence in southeast Asia coupled with the Russian invasion of Ukraine makes for an interesting case study with implications that have deep running impacts.

Theorizing the Puzzle

In this section let us attempt to formulate a theoretical structure that could help us situate this conflict better. Our story begins with the Lisbon treaty of 1992 through which Ukraine decided to give up its nuclear weapon. The cold war had just ended after the collapse of Soviet Union and the inflated importance of the realist school had failed to provide insight that an internal structural issue could very much lead to the collapse of the great Soviet empire. This failure to predict the end of the cold war in this manner was the single most important failure of the realist school that pushed people away from it.¹

As the liberal school gained traction, the world set out on a large-scale institutional building campaign. Thesis such as Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*, only further projected this view.² The Lisbon treaty, ultimately, was the result of this thinking. The liberal morale, however, continued to fade over the course of the next two decades. The rise of neo conservatives after the 9/11 attacks on Washington and the resulting war on Iraq changed the global attitudes towards the idea of this utopian 'capitalist perpetual peace'. The realist ideas began to gain traction once more.³

¹ Charles W. Kegley, "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities: ISA Presidential Address March 27, 1993 Acapulco, Mexico," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (1993): 131–46.

² Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Simon and Schuster, 2006).

³ *"The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War led scholars to pronounce realist tradition from political realism through neo-realism obsolete and a return to the idealist tradition ... It argues that the events of 9/11*

The debate around the nuclear weapons during the latter half of the twentieth century and the twenty first century thus far is also influenced by this transformation of the larger discourses. The nuclear nonproliferation arguments were also exasperated by this transformation in the international politics. The 1990s saw a massive upsurge in the support of nonproliferation arguments, however, as soon as 2006, North Korea had already tested its nuclear weapons.

This brings us to our next point. One of the most crucial impacts that this war has had is the creation of security dilemma in asymmetrical conflict areas. This is what has happened in the Ukraine theater. Through giving up its weapons in the Lisbon treaty, Ukraine agreed to an asymmetrical security situation, which it hoped would be upheld through the various guarantees provided to it by the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Russia.

This has also created a sense of security dilemmas within other asymmetrical tension areas such as Iran and the Koreas. What this has done is to create a sense of strategic vulnerability. This only implies that in order to assert their sovereignty, states must prepare for much more drastic measures. For the weaker to uphold sovereignty, it must develop absolute weapons for deterrence.

Revival of Nuclear Deterrence

As a result of the 1992 Lisbon treaty Ukraine was provided a set of security measure under the premise that it would give up its nuclear weapons to Russia. Ukraine agreed to this protocol, and it gained economic incentives which boosted its ability to perform in the global market. Ukraine, however, also lost a valuable instrument of deterrence. This was in line with the post cold war perceptions about the new world. The absence of bipolar competition in the global order led states to believe that there can be sustainable peace. They were wrong.

The tensions between Russia and Ukraine have only continued to grow over the past decade and a half. Russia has been involved in cross border radicalization of the Russian speaking territories in East and South Ukraine. Fast forward to 2022, Russia formally invaded Ukraine. As the world watched Russia launched missiles and ground forces towards key Ukrainian cities.

The world prepared for tough decisions from the UK and USA. These decisions however did not come. The UK and USA replied with economic sanctions against Russia. This led to momentary devaluation of the Rubble which sank by 40% at one point only to be stabilized later. There was also the concern of multinational companies pulling out of Russia, according to one estimate, 35% of all foreign companies suspended operations in

showed academia in the International Relations (IR) field that realism remains generally applicable, whereas the idealist tradition is inadequately applicable because of its utopian nature”, Poowin Bunyavejchewin, “Theories of International Politics after the Incident of 9/11: The Richness and Weakness of Realist Tradition in the Twentieth-First Century,”

Russia.⁴ USA announced massive arms support for the Ukrainian army. Over a hundred million was provided to Ukraine and there have been new announcements of over \$450 million military assistance.⁵

Description of materials and methods

To the surprise of the world there is a hesitation on part of NATO to directly intervene in Ukraine. Russia threatened NATO tough repercussions should it choose to intervene. Russia deployed a division of its nuclear capable Iskandar-M missiles in Belarus along the Ukrainian border and with a range of over 400kms this put key Ukrainian cities hostage.⁶ These developments were seen across the entire world as the discourse around the use of nuclear weapons surfaced once more.

This not only had impacts in Ukraine theatre, but it had a bleeding effect on the Non-proliferation discourse as well. The nuclear non-proliferation discourse which argued that there was no need to develop nuclear weapons in order to defend the borders of a sovereign state were brought into question. Provided that Ukraine and the Budapest memorandum had been the go-to case study for the proponents of nuclear non-proliferation. Michael E. O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel argue that the conflict has not had the cost of human lives only, but the non-Proliferation discourse has been one of the most important casualties.⁷ In this paper, we shall look at the impact that these developments have had on global tension areas around the world. We shall look at how this war is contributing to proliferation debate in Iran and how, in ways it shows North Korea to have made the right choice.

The Koreas in Focus

In the first Korean war, General McCarthy of the United States called for using nuclear weapons on the communist forces in order to win the war. US however, very wisely swayed away from any such deployments. Forty years later there were reports of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) already attempting to secure nuclear weapons. In 1994 when there was a visible intention to leave the NPT, the US tried to push hard in order to keep North Korea away from achieving proliferation. They signed an Agreed Framework that was focused on achieving this very purpose. However, this

⁴ For more detail see, DiPippo, G. (2022, June 22). Strangling the Bear? The Sanctions on Russia after Four months

⁵ Details of spendings on the Ukraine war from the United states by, Starr, B., & Liebermann, O. (2022, June 23). Biden administration announces \$450 million in additional military assistance for Ukraine.

⁶ Whitmore, B. argue about the Belarusian involvement with russia in their article, "Putin deploys nuclear-capable missiles to Belarusian border with Ukraine".

⁷ See O'Hanlon, M. E., & Riede, B. (2022, March 29). The Russia-Ukraine war may be bad news for nuclear nonproliferation.

framework could not stand strong and by 2002 DPRK pulled out. In 2006, DPRK tested its first underground plutonium based nuclear warhead.⁸

Since then, there have been multiple attempts by countries across the world to control the north Korean threat and the developments have been interesting. There have been moments of escalation and de-escalation between the two Koreas and between North Korea and the United States. The war in the Russia Ukraine theatre has raised new questions within the Korean theatre that were left unexplored earlier. It has raised concerns about the impacts that the war will have in the discourse in the Korean Peninsula.

Results

There are arguments within South Korea as well that speak about development of indigenous defence capacities independent of the United States, who currently stands as the most important ally to South Korea. Andrew Yeon argues that “The crisis provides the Yoon government greater justification for beefing up South Korean defence and deterrence.” Furthermore, as North Korea continues to beef up its nuclear capacity, the south also sees nuclearization as a viable solution.

Provided how South Korea itself depends upon the US for its defence against the North Koreans. Snyder argues that South Korea must remain aware of the developments in the Russia Ukrainian theatre in view of how to manage threats of aggression concerned in specific with nuclear weapons. He argues “Both North and South Korea will be closely watching the impact of Russian threats regarding the risks of nuclear escalation and their implications for the Korean Peninsula”.⁹ Sangsoo Lee and Carlotta Bischke argue that in the aftermath of the Russia Ukraine war, North Korea will increasingly depend on its nuclear arsenal to secure itself.¹⁰ Such discourses are absolutely dangerous to be brought under discussion and to establish a discourse on this pretext can only lead to further extenuation of already tight situations. These discourses also push the boundaries of an already weak Non-proliferation regime.

There are also arguments concerning the possibility of South Korea deploying tactical nuclear weapons from the US in order to combat the North Korean threat. Additionally, there are some more radical perceptions that South Korea may develop its own indigenous nuclear weapons in order to maintain command and control over such weapons themselves independently of the US. These only reflect a crumbling trust in the US. In the aftermath of the Russian Invasion, as the US and allies failed to flock to protect the Ukrainian state with physical deployments but only through aid. There is a feeling that

⁸ Davenport, K. talks about that Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy. He iterates its impoance and how it has impacted their mutual ties.

⁹ Snyder, S. A. (2022, March 8). Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Implications for the Korean Peninsula. Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/russias-invasion-ukraine-and-implications-korean-peninsula>

¹⁰ “The crisis provides the Yoon government greater justification for beefing up South Korean defense and deterrence. Amid the Ukraine crisis, North Korea has all the more reason to cling to nuclear weapons”. Yeo, A. on How will South Korea’s new president approach Russia’s Ukraine invasion?

there is a need for capacity building within each state about their defensive capabilities. This is exactly what is happening in South Korea.

Discussions

As of now, as the situation stands, it appears that there is a widespread feeling that the North Koreans had made a wise move when they pulled out of the NPT taking their defence into their own hands. Provided this pretext, the North Korean state has survived with little economic development but continues to hold a strong capacity to defend itself.

This also gives us a perspective that the Russia Ukraine war has contributed to the development of nuclear proliferation discourse within the Korean Peninsula. This was an expected logical outcome of a nuclear power attempting to overrun a non-nuclear weapon state. This has created a sense of security dilemma within the region. This strengthens the North Korean view that they need to adhere to their nuclear weapons and incentivizes the South Koreans to secure nuclear weapons for establishment of deterrence. In this way, we see how the Russia Ukraine theatre has contributed to a rising discourse of nuclear proliferation in the Korean Peninsula.

The Iran Nuclear Deal in Focus

Let us now move on to discuss how the Russia Ukraine crisis has shaped the dynamics around the Iran Nuclear deal. The events that have unfolded within Ukraine have created a feeling of regret among the Ukrainians about letting go of their nuclear weapons. These emotions have been felt across the globe and is a point of concern for states that the non-proliferation regime is attempting to sway clear of nuclearization. In the section above, we see how North Korea celebrates their dissent from the Non-proliferation regime as having enabled them to secure their own defence. The emotions in Iran reflect these developments and there is an indication that Iran would very readily move in to secure this discourse in favour of its nuclear programme.

Iran always had a tendency to move towards nuclearization but was swayed away from it through difference incentives from the west but mainly through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This agreement allowed Iran to stall its nuclear programme and focus on other areas in partnership with the United States and allies. This however, changed when the US seeing Iran's inconsistency in adhering to the agreements decided to pull out of the agreement during the Trump administration. Since then, there have been attempts at restarting the deal in order to prevent this proliferation. One of the main parties of this negotiation is, incidentally, Russia.¹¹

Sino Azodi looks into the implication that the Russia Ukraine war has for the Iran theatre. He writes that the Iranian security policy is reorienting itself in light of the way that the west has been unable to respond to Ukraine's plight. The leading policy makers

¹¹ "South Korea must carefully watch the nuclear dimensions of Russian aggression out of concern that those lessons might be applied to the peninsula, both with respect to attacks on civilian nuclear power plants and how to handle and effectively deter threats of nuclear use". Robinson, K. in What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?

and military generals argue that Iran should in no way give up its nuclear programme. The discussions underway for giving up advanced missile systems and other armaments should be put on hold or reconsidered provided the events at hand. He argues that the Iranians ask the question, 'why is that Ukraine is a defenseless country.' In this way there is a spillover of resentment of the non-possession of nuclear weapons by Ukraine to other countries (specially Iran) which will in turn want to move urgently towards their own nuclearization programme.¹²

There are also discussions that this event is a flashpoint for Iran, particularly since, Iran has the ability to choose between the US or Russia, as it sees fit. There is of course a sense of realization that irrespective of the incentives that the west promises, none will come to the aid of Iran should there be raised tension with the regional powers. Iran, therefore, sees nuclearization as an absolute essential requirement for its own survival.

There is also another perspective that should be considered, one that argues that the negotiations between Iran and United States have intensified since the start of the war. Russia, itself a major player in the negotiations of the JCPOA, it appears now is actively attempting to stall the negotiations. There are reports that Russia wants assurances from the west that after any negotiations have become successful, they shall not be stopped from trading with Iran. This comes as a necessary measure provided the extent of sanctions that are currently imposed against the Russian state.¹³

Generally, however, the attitudes of the Iranian leadership appear to be oriented towards maintaining their Indigenous weaponization capacity. Even as talks among the different parties continue, Iran has achieved over 60 percent uranium enrichment. Enrichment that has no civilian uses only points to the tendency of Iran to approach nuclearization. According to several estimates, at present Iran is not far away from achieving weapon grade enrichment of Uranium. However, there are still shaky estimates about how soon Iran can weaponize this capacity.¹⁴

If Iran were to go nuclear this would have massive consequences for the Middle East as it would create a security dilemma for other states who would then attempt to secure their own nuclear weapons. This would lead to a chain of events that would promote proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore under such foresight, the whole idea of Iran's nuclearization should be avoided in the first place. The events in Russia clearly do not add to that but aid in turning the situation to a less preferable position.

¹² For more see, Azodi, S in How Russia's invasion of Ukraine is shaping national security debates in Iran.

¹³ See Erangler, S. in his Iran Nuclear Deal Nears Completion, but Russia Poses Complication for forming a better understanding of how Russia's war in Ukraine is influencing the negotiations from the perspective of the important role that Russia has in these discussions as a purchasing party of Iran's fission material.

¹⁴ Fathollah-Nejad, A talks about the impact that the Russia's invasion will have on Iran and about the progress that has been made in Iran's nuclear programme. For more see his, "Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the nature of Iranian-Russian relations".

Russian invasion has carried with it the essence that nurtures the seeds of conflict around the globe. The world should critically analyze the situation and move appropriately in order to prevent the spillover effect of the Russian conflict which might be had in the form of nuclear proliferation.

The Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

Having gone through the impacts that the Russia Ukraine war has had in Iran and the Koreas, let us look at the success of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan as a case study of why nuclear deterrence appears to be such a wonderful prospect for the weaker states. The concern is that in this theatre, time has shown that nuclear weapons have been a plausible deterrent in keeping two states away from each other. And this is an interesting case study, because at the time both the states acquired their nuclear capacities they were rather equals in their economic and defence capacities but over time their gap has grown drastically. This is pertinent because although the military capacity of India has grown much larger than Pakistan's, provided the presence of nuclear weapons both states have been successful in keeping themselves away from active conflict even though they have been at each other's throat.

The conflict in the South Asian theatre therefore is not active but the tensions continue to rise and fall. This system has remained clear of all influence from the Russia Ukraine war and although both have taken different positions on the matter, the war does not influence the nuclear policies of both states, but Infact asserts the importance of the position held by both the states.

In the South Asian theatre, the possession of nuclear weapons by both parties creates an interesting dynamic that is not necessarily the most stable but most certainly contributes to prevention of large-scale war. This is a point taken up by Sander Ruben who argues that the actual conflict between India and Pakistan has been below the theoretically projected estimations. He argues that there is a tendency between both states to participate in a conventional arms race under the nuclear umbrella, what some theorists call the "stability instability" paradox.¹⁵

There are indications that there is a hesitation to move towards large scale war that may involve the Indian Cold Start Doctrine or Pakistan's response to it, but as the situation shows that, "This is an indication that the nuclear realm is more stable than the sub-nuclear." The relative stability achieved through this nuclear realm is shown through this graph that Sander has presented.

¹⁵ For more, see Krepon, M. The Stability-Instability Paradox in South Asia.




Figure 1 Zulfiqar Khan's model on perceived versus real escalation in the India Pakistan theater

It is interesting because after every point of confrontation, the theoretical models predict an escalated move towards cold start response, but somehow this never happens and in practice, the response is usually much tame and reconciliatory. That is exactly what is shown in this graph. A line that moves from militant attack to massive retaliation is never followed but instead ends up on small scale limited responses.¹⁶ This doctrinal overestimation can only be explained by the understanding that in practice nuclear deterrence is a much more effective tool for prevention of conflict.

Zulfiqar Khan also has much to add to the success that is achieved in Southeast Asia because of nuclear deterrence. He argues that since 1998 when both the countries achieved nuclear capability, Pakistan, a weaker state has been able to keep itself clear of India owing to the effective nuclear deterrence. He writes, “War is still the most potent instrument in the hands of states, but now, under the nuclear overhang, it is expected to achieve political objectives without firing a single shot.” In situations such as these if the nuclear deterrent were not present it would be expected from India to overrun Pakistan’s political apparatus and establish itself as a regional hegemon. However, provided the means of deterrence that Pakistan possesses, it has been able to keep a much larger foe at bay and has been able to maintain its relative independence. It is however, because of this uncomfortable position that there are tensions within the region.

These tensions, however, have never really contributed to an active threat of use of nuclear weapons against each other. Realizing the potential of the threat both of these states were already on the table for “bilateral Confidence and Security-Building Measures

¹⁶ See Aarten, S. Deterrence (In)stability Between India and Pakistan.

(CSBMs)” by February 1999.¹⁷ Thereby decreasing the threat of a full out nuclear war between the two parties.

Let us now assess this situation in terms of what happened in Ukraine. In 1992 when Ukraine signed the Lisbon treaty it probably undervalued the importance of the realist understanding of the situation and instead chose to establish a dependence on other states. There are now clear indications that Ukraine regrets having made this decision and in retrospect it would have been better should it have maintained control over its nuclear weapons. Ukraine has been able to develop its economic sector rather excellently, but it has undermined its ability to defend itself.¹⁸

The Russia Ukraine position represents the Southeast Asian position without nuclear weapons. Should Pakistan have chosen to keep itself away from the development of nuclear weapons when it was provided with incentives not to do so by the US and other western powers. Such a deal most certainly would have allowed Pakistan to flourish economically as Ukraine has using the incentives it was provided at the Budapest Memorandum. The negative impacts of taking such incentives are now clearer than ever with the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. A weaker state that had no nuclear weapons has no means to deter a much stronger adversary. In this way the situation reflects just how important it is to maintain nuclear weapons in order to prevent conventional catastrophes. Had Ukraine maintained its hold over its share of nuclear weapons, such a move would have been unimaginable by the Russian forces.

Through this we do form an understanding of the important role that nuclear weapons play in order to maintain deterrence and thereby decreasing the extent of conflict, but it also shows the negative impacts that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has had for the rest of the world. The Invasion further entrenches the idea that nuclear weapons are the only way through which war could have been avoided and therefore provides an incentive for governments around the world to question whether non-proliferation is truly in their interest.

Conclusion

In this paper we have gone through the impact of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on different regions across the globe. It was the concern of this paper to look into the damaging impact of the invasion on the non-proliferation regime. We have come to form an understanding of the kind of reaction that has been generated by this war. We looked at the changes in attitudes in the Korean region where the north Koreans are feeling more confident about their decisions, and the south Koreans are now considering developing their own defence capacities. There is also indication that the south may consider having US nuclear weapons placed in its territory. We also saw Iran finding more reason to

¹⁷ For a better understanding of the Changing Dynamics of India-Pakistan Deterrence see Khan, Z. (2013).

¹⁸ Kelly, M. L. briefly explores the history of the Ukraine’s nuclear weapons in *Why Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons — and what that means in an invasion by Russia*.

develop its indigenous nuclear weapons programme and how the negotiations for a non-proliferation settlement are becoming more difficult. Lastly, we also looked at the deterrence in the Indo-Pak theatre. The nuclear deterrence in Southeast Asia has been the biggest reason contributing to no large-scale war between the two adversaries. There are sub nuclear confrontations provided the nature of their border and relations, but none has thus far developed into a large-scale head-to-head conflict. We have seen this through the work of Sander who shows that in practice, the response to militances and border exchanges of fire, there is a low tendency for the conflict to develop into something large provided the nuclear overhang.

All this discussion has been made in order for us to be able to appreciate the impact of the Russia Ukraine war on regions that appear to be absolutely disconnected to the conflict. The impact mainly rises from the change in attitudes of the states and a changed understanding of what the United States as a superpower can do for its ally should there be an intrusion from an adversarial state. The implications from this event are catastrophic and can in no way be understated.

The most pertinent implication of this conflict is the fact that by deteriorating the mutual trust, Russia has evoked within all states a feeling that they cannot depend on anyone to come to their protection, thereby rekindling the importance of the realist school. And this is important because the non-proliferation regime is mainly fuelled by the liberal idea that there will be no conflict that requires a nuclear deterrence. For all who claimed such, the invasion in Ukraine was the shock that shattered their dome. The world will head towards nuclear proliferation if this conflict is not appropriately responded to by the parties of the Lisbon treaty simply for the reason that it sets a wrong precedent.

The way forward from this conflict is an interesting case. Ukraine is not a lost cause and to say that there has been no help from the parties concerned would be an overstatement. But has the response to the crisis, provided that Ukraine is a former nuclear weapons state, been appropriate? That is a question many can debate over. But surely if Ukraine has lost ground to Russia, then the response has not been adequate given that the response should have been of a nature that it decried the importance of nuclear weapons, since this is in fact a case for nuclear non-proliferation by the international community. If a state, even Iran was to ask if the security provided to them in replacement to nuclear non-proliferation would be adequate to substantiate the requirement for the nuclear weapons in the first place, the answer most certainly would not be a yes. And to any observer, that appears to be a weakening of the non-proliferation regime and unless the non-proliferation regime can do just that, the world is in for a show of what states can do in order to protect themselves and their interests.

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РОССИЯ -УКРАИНА ВОЙНА И НУКЛЕАРИЗАЦИЯ В ЗОНАХ МИРОВОЙ НАПРЯЖЕННОСТИ

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Аннотация. Война между Россией и Украиной вновь разожгла дебаты о ядерном сдерживании, поставила на карту достижения в области нераспространения и, вероятно, может привести к последствиям в зонах напряженности по всему миру. Это еще больше поколебало гарантии безопасности со стороны Соединенных Штатов и НАТО в зонах асимметричной напряженности, и предполагаемые результаты демонстрируют более тревожную и пугающую картину. Украине была обещана безопасность в соответствии с Лиссабонским договором 1992 года. Договор гарантировал, что, отказавшись от своего ядерного оружия, Украина получит средства, с помощью которых она сможет обеспечить свои границы обычными способами. В дополнение к этому, Великобритания, США и Россия предоставили ему гарантии безопасности в случае, если он когда-либо столкнется с угрозой со стороны внешней силы.

Однако, как только разворачиваются последние события. Стало очевидно, что все эти обещания безопасности бесполезны, что, когда Россия решила взяться за оружие против государства Украина, между Украиной и разрушением не так уж много стояло.

В документе будет рассмотрено, как эта война увековечивает и влияет на другие области напряженности. Такие государства, как Южная Корея и Иран, которым обещают безопасность, могут рассматривать это как пример того, почему им уместно обратиться к ядерной политике. Наконец, мы также увидим тематическое исследование театра военных действий в Южной Азии, где Пакистан, более слабое в финансовом отношении государство, решил разработать ядерное оружие вопреки обещаниям, которые западные страны дали для сдерживания Индии посредством ядерной программы. И с помощью этих мер ему удалось сохранить сдерживание и относительный баланс сил с гораздо более крупным противником. В наиболее важном смысле статья исследует влияние уравнения сил на гонку вооружений и нераспространение, а также ставит новые угрозы балансу сил в регионах по всему миру.

Ключевые слова: нераспространение, Россия, Украина, война, дилемма безопасности, нуклеаризация, Иран, Южная Корея, зоны глобальной напряженности.

РЕСЕЙ - УКРАИНА СОҒЫС ЖӘНЕ ӘЛЕМДІК ШИЕЛЕНІС АЙМАҚТАРЫНДАҒЫ ЯДРОЛЫҚ ҚАРУЛАНДЫРУ

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Аңдатпа. Ресей мен Украина арасындағы соғыс ядролық қаруды тежеу жөніндегі пікірталастарды қайта жандандырды, таратпау саласындағы табыстарды қауіп төндіріп және дүние жүзіндегі ыстық нүктелерде салдары болуы мүмкін. Бұл асимметриялық шиеленіс аймақтарында Америка Құрама Штаттары мен НАТО-ның қауіпсіздік кепілдігін одан әрі бұзды және күтілетін нәтижелер алаңдатарлық және қорқынышты көріністі көрсетеді. 1992 жылғы Лиссабон келісімі бойынша Украинаға қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз етуге уәде берілді.

Келісім ядролық қарудан бас тарту арқылы Украина өз шекараларын әдеттегідей қамтамасыз ете алатын құралдарды алатынына кепілдік берді. Бұған қоса, Ұлыбритания, АҚШ және Ресей оған сыртқы күштерден қауіп төнген жағдайда қауіпсіздік кепілдігін берді.

Дегенмен, соңғы оқиғалардың беті ашылды. Қауіпсіздік туралы мұндай уәделердің бәрі пайдасыз екені, Ресей Украина мемлекетіне қарсы қару алуға шешім қабылдаған кезде Украина мен жойылу арасында көп нәрсе болмағаны белгілі болды.

Қағаз бұл соғыстың қалай жалғасатынын және басқа шиеленіс аймақтарына қалай әсер ететінін қарастырады. Қауіпсіздікке уәде етілген Оңтүстік Корея мен Иран сияқты мемлекеттер мұны неліктен ядролық қарулануға бет бұрғанын нақты мысал ретінде қарастыруы мүмкін. Соңында, біз сондай-ақ Батыс елдерінің Үндістанды ядролық қаруландыру арқылы тежеу үшін берген уәделеріне қарамастан, қаржылық жағынан әлсіз мемлекет Пәкістан ядролық қару жасауды таңдаған Оңтүстік Азия театрының жағдайын көреміз. Осы шаралар арқылы ол әлдеқайда үлкен қарсыласпен тежеу және салыстырмалы күш тепе-теңдігін сақтауда сәтті болды. Ең маңызды мағынада, жұмыс күш теңдеуінің қарулану жарысы мен таратпауға әсерін зерттейді және ол бүкіл әлемдегі аймақтардағы қуат теңгеріміне жаңа қауіп төндіреді.

Тірек сөздер: Ядролық қаруды таратпау, Ресей, Украина, соғыс, қауіпсіздік дилеммасы, ядролық қаруландыру, Иран, Оңтүстік Корея, жаһандық шиеленіс аймақтары

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