

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ELITE: OBAMA, TRUMP AND BIDEN'S POLICY TOWARDS MIDDLE EAST

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Annotation. This article gives an analysis of American foreign policy elite' activity on the sample of Obama, Trump and Biden's policy in Middle East. Nowadays, we are facing a serious challenges in geopolitical system in terms global criss under pandemic situation and multi conflictual cases. In this sense, it is questionable to say that American primacy is stable. Many American experts believe that the US State Department needs large-scale reforms in order to become a toolkit, not a propaganda mouthpiece in foreign policy. The future of American foreign policy towards the Middle East region will depend on whether Washington can work out a balanced position that will allow them to remain one of the guarantors of stability and the solution of crisis problems.

Key words: foreign policy, elite, American policy, Middle East, region, geopolitical challenges, strategy, solutions.

Basic provisions. By his actions, Biden formalizes and completes the process that has been going on in US foreign policy for more than a decade. The fact that the two wars started by Bush Jr. - the Iraqi and the Afghan ones - must be ended was first mentioned by Barack Obama. The agreement with the Taliban, which provided for the complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021, was signed by Donald Trump. Both Obama and Trump have tried, albeit in different ways, to divert Washington's attention to America's domestic problems.

This change in American foreign policy should not be illusory. Despite all the delays and mistakes in the last stages, leaving Afghanistan was a strategically correct decision. And of course, it does not mean that the United States has lost its status as a global superpower - American influence in the world just continues to slowly decline. It does not mean the departure and collapse of the system of American alliances.

Introduction. US Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East David Schenker at a video seminar at the Washington Institute for the Middle East impressed many with his political frankness. He believes that "a gross political blunder of the administration of former US President Barack Obama allowed Russia to consolidate its position in Syria and the Middle East." According to him, "the Obama administration, at its own peril and risk, welcomed the arrival of Russia in Syria, thinking that this would put Moscow in a difficult position, and Russia turned the tide of the war, and the Assad regime remains there to this day[1, p.15]. On March 9, 2017, the American University of Iraq in Sulaymaniyah hosted the American philosopher and political scientist F. Fukuyama at a forum dedicated to the future of the region in the

post-IS period. During his dialogue with the former Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the founder of the American University of Iraq, Barham Salih, it became clear that F. Fukuyama visited Iraq for the first time. At the beginning of the conversation, a discussion about the famous "end of history" unfolded. Fukuyama determined that "the end of history" did not mean that events stopped happening. The main point of his concept was the ways of development and modernization of societies. In other words, is there any alternative to a liberal political order with a market-oriented economy? According to F. Fukuyama, with some assumptions there is only one alternative - an authoritarian and capitalist regime in China. Nevertheless, returning to the early works of F. Fukuyama, it is worth remembering that for him there is no other promising idea of a global scale, except for the concept of liberal democracy[2].

Description of materials and methods. This article examines and studies the positions of America's foreign policy elite, namely the positions of the former and current President in matters of burning topics in the system of international relations. The concept of US Foreign Policy, the Charters of international organizations, the opinions of the expert community were studied, the opinion of the famous F. Fukuyama was analyzed, based on his comparative analysis after the end of the Cold War and the problems of the present. The following methods were also used: content analysis, historical, structural-functional, forecasting method, systemic.

Results. Speaking at the forum, F. Fukuyama noted the difference between the current state of affairs in the world and the 1990s. - the period of the third wave of democratization. Despite the fact that the 1990s. they saw it positively in the context of the spread of democracy, nevertheless, even then the main problem was its "quality". Ultimately, this led to some deviation towards certain forms of an authoritarian state, which, according to F. Fukuyama, is observed in states such as Russia, Turkey and, more recently, even in the United States. F. Fukuyama also suggested that the Middle East is at the stage at which Europe was in the 19th century. The region is undergoing a process of urbanization and technological development. All this is accompanied by a lack of awareness of one's identity. Today, this process in the Middle East is "invaded" by Islamism, including radical Islamism, which convinces people that they are part of the ummah from China to Europe. Discussants could not ignore the issue of the war in Iraq in 2003. F. Fukuyama's pre-war position, which was expressed in the need to overthrow S. Hussein, as well as his criticism of the actions of the American administration during and after the war, are well known [1]. Another thing is noteworthy: at the forum in Sulaymaniyah, Francis Fukuyama again admitted that the main issue that worried him even before the invasion of Iraq was state building, which he pays special attention to in his works. He understood that in the event of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the United States would become responsible for what is happening in Iraq. And in this context, the researcher noted the unwillingness of the United States to invest in the creation of a democratic Iraq, or at least an Iraqi state as such. The latter is also important for the fight against terrorism, since it is impossible to fight this phenomenon without the state. Later, in his speech, F. Fukuyama emphasized that in the fight against terrorism, the state needs to attract

the population to its side, since it is an impossible task to win the war against terrorism in conditions when terrorists are assisted by ordinary citizens.

F. Fukuyama identified three important components of political development. The first is the state itself, that is, a monopoly on power and violence. By this he understands not only the need to resolve security issues, but also to provide services to the population. The second is the rule of law, which limits the ruler. The third is some form of democratic accountability. Regarding the last point, there are no differences in the positions of F. Fukuyama and the majority of Western political scientists. They believe that countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq hold elections quite smoothly, as a result of which legitimate rulers come to power. Problems, in their opinion, arise during the construction of institutions. And here, for F. Fukuyama, the issue of corruption comes first in relation to the issue of democracy itself. However, let us assume that in the conditions of foreign occupation and the incompetent implementation of the decisions taken by the occupiers themselves, firstly, the legitimate power a priori cannot be elected, and secondly, the previous government will in every possible way strive to regain what was lost, while the need to participate in public life will force entire groups of the marginalized population to resort to corruption schemes. Speaking about corruption, it should be noted that the occupiers themselves not only create the necessary conditions for it, but also directly participate in it and benefit for themselves[2].

F. Fukuyama did not forget about Russia either. Let's dwell on two important points of the political scientist's speech. He sees no problem in the fact that Russia is not a democratic state. The main problem in Russia, according to F. Fukuyama, is the patrimonial type of state, nepotism, nepotism and cronyism. He believes that political leaders are incapable of serving the broad public interest, while such a political elite is engaged in the consumption of resources for their own enrichment.

Indeed, the appearance of the Russian military in Syria in September 2015 and their participation in hostilities against various terrorist groups on the side of government forces and pro-government paramilitary groups was not a secret for the United States and Israel. The administration of US President Barack Obama understood perfectly well that the Russian military for the first time in post-Soviet history took part in hostilities outside the former USSR, and this would seriously change the situation in the Middle East. But, according to the American edition of Politico, "there was also the expectation that Russia would get bogged down in the" Syrian swamp[3, p.58] "this would hamper its activity in the Ukrainian direction." American strategists entered Syria and Ukraine into one operation. In these two countries, Russia was supposed to pursue a policy "aimed at destruction and destabilization," while the United States and its Western partners wanted to act as intermediaries to "resolve those crises" that Moscow allegedly "provoked".

Another major move that Obama took and which many conspiracy theorists called a "constructed trap" was the adoption, together with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, of a nuclear agreement with Iran. The main condition: Tehran renounces nuclear weapons in exchange for the West's abandonment of the sanctions regime. And a geopolitical achievement: in the Middle East, an Iranian

project is being put on the scene, which was opposed to the neo-Ottoman doctrine promoted by Turkey[4, p.78]. Before that, Ankara was dragged into the so-called "Arab spring", dragged into the Syrian crisis, which seriously actualized the Kurdish problem in the region. "My hope is that we can continue talking with Iran to encourage it to behave differently in the region," Obama said. "Be less aggressive, less hostile and more cooperative." By that time, according to the American magazine Atlantic, "Obama was disappointed with his collaboration with Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whom he called a" loser and authoritarian leader. "

At the same time, Obama developed rather strained relations with the Saudi Arabian authorities and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who, in his opinion, sought to use the American resource in the region primarily "exclusively in their geopolitical interests," and Washington "lacks in the Middle East of a few smart autocrats. " No matter how one treats and evaluates the designated subjects in Obama's policy in the Middle East, the State Department and the White House apparatus of that time worked with a serious intellectual and analytical load[5, p.133]. According to Trump's arrival in the White House, the situation both in the Middle East in general and in Syria in particular has become extremely "confusing" for American politicians, especially after the US withdrawn from the nuclear agreement with Iran. For Washington, the "center of the war" began to constantly shift - now from Syria to Iraq, then back, then theoretically the "Iranian front" emerged.

At the same time, Russia has successfully built relations with traditional American partners: it has strengthened Turkey's cooperation in the economy, defense and nuclear energy, strengthened its dialogue with Egypt, and began to coordinate energy policy with Saudi Arabia. "For 45 years it has been a cornerstone of American policy to keep Russia out of the Middle East," Schenker says. "Now there is no such thing." The intrigue is precisely that the State Department began to talk about the loss of influence in the Middle East at the time of the US immersion in protest riots, the rampage of the coronavirus pandemic, which are perceived by many countries in the region as "symbols of the collapse of the United States as a world empire. " Now, says Schenker, "the countries of the Middle East must make some kind of choice between the US, Russia and China." But the Israeli edition of The Jerusalem Post suggests that Iran and Turkey will need to be added to this list, which for their own reasons will celebrate the collapse of the United States as part of an unjust world order. But is the Middle East really interested in the American disappearance? This is a rhetorical question. According to the American publication Foreign Affairs, there are regional leaders who fear the emergence of chaos after the US withdraws, distance from international cooperation and the possibility of a peaceful settlement of differences wouldn't it be easier to determine otherwise the correspondence between American aspirations and their real capabilities, turning diplomacy, not the army, into a powerful instrument, but without such diplomats as Schenker? It is no coincidence that many American experts believe that the State Department needs large-scale reforms in order to become a toolkit[6, p.136], not a propaganda mouthpiece in foreign policy. The American political leadership has a variety of other non-military means at its disposal to save the day. But they will not be enough to overcome the upcoming challenges if the United

States abandons the radical restructuring of its policy in the Middle East, creates new, more economical and less risky opportunities for realizing its interests in this region.

Discussion. The president-elect of the United States, Joe Biden, clearly demonstrates that he is not only a team player who has already defined the contours of his future administration, but that the entire United States will return to the bosom of the "team", playing as part of a long trajectory. regional alliances, under his leadership. In the case of Syria, J. Biden and his designated secretary of state Anthony Blinken and national security adviser Jake Sullivan also take a clear position: The United States must maintain its presence in the east of the Euphrates to support local partners in their It fights against the resurgence of IS (the organization is recognized as a terrorist, its activities are prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation) and must continue to seek real political concessions from Bashar al-Assad. However, it is precisely the commitment to reactivate support for partners in the Middle East that is on the Syrian record that factor that complicates the search for a solution to the Syrian dilemma: most of them have different positions in the conflict. They are not interested in deepening, but in weakening the contradictions with Washington on a wide range of issues, which may lead to new commitments on the SAR, but not necessarily those that Damascus and Moscow have[7].

There is a widespread view in the community of experts and the media that the United States under President J. Biden will not spend all political capital on the Syrian docket, despite the continued small presence of the US military and the contractors in the RAE, but will be busy repairing relationships with allies and more global agreements. In addition, Joe Biden also has a desire to optimize his presence in the Middle East, demilitarize foreign policy, and bring the "overwhelming majority" of American troops home, but not in such a grotesque way as D. Trump's: it only caused new crises. True, it should be noted that the task of reinvigorating diplomacy and strengthening multilateral alliances will require Biden's team to extensively review D. Trump's decisions and, as a consequence, actively engage in the Middle East, where various avenues have sufficient intersections. For example, the echoes of a prolonged political storm in Lebanon are directly audible in the SAR and affect the devaluation of the Syrian pound. Iraq, which has halted its political life in anticipation of parliamentary elections, is in principle not opposed to providing a transit route for the supply of Syrian goods to the Persian Gulf, circumventing sanctions. The problem of the Palestinians, which has finally exacerbated D. Trump, "straddling" the objective process of normalization of Israel's relations with the Arab countries, also has a Syrian dimension due to the ongoing contacts of Damascus with the factions. of the enclave under the supervision of Iran. And the need to adjust relations with Turkey, which, according to Washington, violated NATO solidarity with the acquisition of the S-400 air defense system, rests on the need to support Ankara's policy in Idlib and resolve the issue of the participation of Kurdish factions. in political negotiations. This last problem during the presidency of D. Trump was also complicated by the fact that, due to the misguided behavior of the owner of the White House, the development of politics in the Syrian leadership fell on the shoulders of the military, not the politicians. Thus, hypothetically, Biden will have a fairly wide range of instruments of pressure on Syria,

in which an open-ended conflict will work for Washington's position, and not for Damascus's allies, who previously, without encountering much resistance, considered this model as a scenario of "progressive integration" Syria back to the Arab world[8].

Joe Biden's counterterrorism strategy is backed by more than five years of experience working with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Although it is not without its shortcomings due to the prevalence of the Kurdish component in the alliance, it once again demonstrated the advantage of the "tactical advantage" approach (giving partners the opportunity to overcome local threats while solving their own problems. Biden has also said more than once that US actions should focus on ensuring that al-Qaeda remnants (the organization was outlawed, its activities are prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation) and the state Islamic could not restore themselves. Combined with the optimization of the US presence in Iraq, it is hardly possible to withdraw troops while maintaining the support of local allies from the air, although such a scenario is still being discussed in the American community of experts[9]. The strategy of "quasi-Syrian surveillance" from bases in Jordan, Iraq, etc. it is impossible without a presence on the ground that, with minimal effort, claims to restrict access to the region: in the event of troop withdrawal, the United States, even with its dominance in the air, is unlikely to receive unhindered access to Syrian airspace. Judging by the general dynamics on the ground, interested players perceive Donald Trump's lame duck period as a time to improve their positions. Getting more exchange options is the best option in conditions in which the team of the new head of the White House has already made it clear that dialogue with B. Assad is impossible, and the promotion of a decorative political process under the guise of royal will. not be recognized. For example, Tehran has high hopes that Joe Biden's presidency will initiate a new stage of dialogue with Washington and even the renewal of the 2015 nuclear deal. At the same time, Iranians cannot help but understand that the revision of the The deal will have to include some kind of guarantee of an Iranian intervention at least not as prominent in Syrian politics. In this context, Iran has cautiously increased its bets in recent months, intensifying, for example, the recruitment of Syrians into the units of the Shiite International in the Trans-Euphrates region; in general, you are doing what you can refuse under certain conditions. At the same time, Tehran has a sufficient amount of assets for any exchange: over the years, it has formed a multi-level presence in Syria, which is expressed not only in the strengthening of the 4th mechanized division under the leadership of the president's brother. Maher Assad. and the Republican Guard and pro-Iranian brigades rooted in them, but also in the implementation of important long-term economic projects such as the construction of power plants with a transmission network in various provinces of Syria. Moscow seems to have also decided to abandon the "strategic pause" in eastern Syria, caused not so much by its involvement in Operation White Desert to combat IS sabotage groups (actually began with the death of the Russians on 18 August), because of the desire not to be associated with the subversion of Syrian intelligence in territories under the control of AANES (Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria). Despite the periodic "en route" races of the Russian and American patrols, obviously the hiatus in the last half of the year was due to the fact that Moscow did not want to be associated

with a player trying to undermine semi-autonomy in Trans. -Euphrates, to once again act as a mediator and become a beneficiary in a more favorable market environment. However, in the near future, most likely, formally as part of the continuation of the next stage of the operation, the presence of the Russian army will be expanded for the group formed of Syrian troops "Zaevfratye", especially since the militants ISIS also increased its activity, and this led to the establishment of a curfew in several areas of the M20 motorway. Interesting and active, deployed in recent months in the Trans-Euphrates under the direction of AANES. Laconically, it can be described as a consolidation of forces with the prospect of uniting the Northwest and Northeast delegations, but with an open opportunity for compromise[10].

This process is important as it is Joe Biden who is reasonably expected to revive the so-called Kurdish-Kurdish dialogue, between representatives of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), interacting with Turkey and gravitating towards the Iraqi Barzani clan and the parties. of the Kurdish National Unity, a structure that joined in May 2020 d. in Qamishli, 25 Kurdish political organizations and movements, including the Democratic Union. Formally, the parties reached an agreement on the formation of the 40-person Kurdish supreme bargaining body, but it has not yet been included in the political formula with many disagreements on the form of relations with the Kurdistan Workers' Party. Here the United States and Turkey, despite all their differences, can still find a common denominator. For example, if Turkey's political leadership supports the initiatives of its own special services, in particular the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), targeting a restricted division of powers between the two conditional blocs: the KNS and the Democratic Union, and Washington will strengthen the further process of limiting the influence of the PKK in eastern Syria, that is, it will contribute to a decrease in the proportion of non-Syrian fighters in Kurdish units and will convince the Syrians, if not to completely abandon their affiliation with the government. match, but at least get rid of the corresponding symbols[11].

The conference of the political wing of the SDF - the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) - held at the end of November 2020, after 13 public consultations, drew attention not only because of AANES 'attempt to legitimize itself once again and announce reforms, but He also intervened in the event together with the real opposition of the representatives of the Cairo and Moscow platforms. In January 2016, Moscow tried to include the SDC in Qadri Jamil's "Moscow group" (then members of the "Riyadh group" spoke out against the representatives of the Kurds on the Cairo platform), but in the end, At that time, the co-president of the Democratic Union Saleh Muslim, who arrived in the Swiss capital, did not enter into negotiations due to pressure from Ankara. At the beginning of 2020, the news station reported on the possibility of including the SDC in the Cairo platform to work on the Constitutional Committee, and on August 31, after the visit of the SDC head, Ilham Ahmed and Kadri Jamil to the Russian Federation and the signing of a memorandum of understanding between them, again in Moscow. Obviously, Moscow is trying to win over as many ethno-denominational groups as possible from the Trans-Euphrates territory. In general, it was thanks to the invitation in January 2018 to the National Dialogue Congress in Sochi of the decorative Council of Sheikhs of the tribes of northeastern Syria, who defected to the side of B.

Assad and Iran, representatives of tribes like Nawaf. al-Bashir and Mamduh al-Fadaus, mediated by Ahmad Jarba Russia now appeals with the thesis that all ethnic groups and confessions of the SAR are involved in the political process and the work of the Constitutional Committee. However, due to opposition from Damascus, which prevented the start of works on this structure and cannot seriously accept even a decorative opposition in the system, any serious changes to the Constitution and the regime are extremely doubtful. Furthermore, after the exacerbation of the situation in Idlib in February-March, Ankara, in one way or another, takes into account attempts to balance the Russian Federation between Turkey and its regional opponents, who, incidentally, tried to reduce the Turkish influence in the opposition Committee group. The introduction of the "Caesar Law" strengthened the negotiating position of the SDF alliance, in the hands of which not only oil is concentrated, but also the main cereal crops. Damascus allies cannot base their Syrian policy on the possible withdrawal of the United States; This covers up all the flaws in the management model of the territories controlled by the SDF and complicates relations with the tribes, and even more so with the Kurds, who for various reasons are quite skeptical about Moscow's multi-vector policy, perceiving it as an attempt. of "sitting in two chairs". Russia's proposal to the tribes for an agreement along the lines of "Southwest reconciliation" and the expectation that US control over northeastern Syria will be weakened due to factional differences is not justified[12].

Representatives from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have visited SDF-controlled territory on several occasions. But due to the turbulence of Donald Trump's position on Syria, these contacts, along with Abu Dhabi and Cairo's official relations with Damascus, were not perceived as support for the "alternative Syria", but as a goal for a Complex political architecture along the Line of the Damascus regions. The arrival of J. Biden is likely to change the situation: given the possible sanctions for cooperation with Damascus and Turkey's participation in one of the schemes for the sale of Syrian oil through Iraqi Kurdistan, the United Arab Emirates, Arabia Saudi and Europe, may well provide a certain guarantee of the continued strengthening of the Arab component in it (even in the case of a negative scenario, the withdrawal of the United States from these regions). Interestingly, this may affect the reduction of tensions in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their struggle to influence the opposition in the Constitutional Committee and affect the latter's support for the Turkish buffer zones: it is unlikely that these territories affect the balance. power in the regional rivalry, but they can lay the groundwork for special services negotiations to protect the Sunni population. Obviously, this will bring additional problems to Moscow, but with one caveat: increased pressure will not only create the need for even greater involvement in the Syrian conflict for crisis management, but will also increase the capacity of the Russian Federation. to carry out maneuvers in the country. Syria's intra-elite alignment: Such a situation will start the reform process even if the obvious resistance lasts to the B. Assad regime. Hypothetically, Moscow could operate in the east of the SAR and even offer the West an option in which its activities could be excluded from "Caesar's law". In other words, not promoting the direct sale of energy resources to the regime through

the Qatari brothers themselves, concentrating funds in "gray areas" with limited influence from the regime and thus stimulating the reconstruction of Syria. At the same time, there is an understanding among regional actors that, first of all, Moscow, by playing combinations, has always taken a position aimed at further legitimization of the B. Assad regime. And secondly, Russia is interested in using the SAR to expand its influence in Africa and the Middle East, so it uses crises itself to advance its interests, but at the same time there are doubts that there is consensus: when and in what measure. It is worth supporting specific political leaders and ethno-denominational groups[13].

Conclusion. In conclusion, as for US allies in regions that are not considered vital to US interests, they should learn that US support is conditional on those interests and other factors. In fact, this is nothing new - any leader in the Middle East will tell you that. Although for now, Washington assures that it will support its partners in the high-risk zone in every possible way, such as Ukraine and Taiwan. The option of transition to isolationism in the United States is not considered. With all the focus on domestic issues, global dominance, or at least primacy, has become an integral part of the US national identity. Liberal-democratic ideology will also continue to be the main driving force behind American foreign policy. The US will not become a "normal" country that simply follows the rules of realpolitik. Rather, Washington will use values as a tool to rally allies and fight adversaries. It is to the advantage of the White House that Russia and China are considered malicious countries not only by the entire foreign policy elite of America itself, but also by American allies, most of whom have enough of their own fears about Moscow or Beijing. In general, the Biden Doctrine implies the rejection of commitments that Washington no longer considers promising or even feasible. The US is redirecting more resources to domestic problems, trying to rally the collective West around it, and stressing that China and Russia are its main adversaries. The most important of these elements is internal. Both the success of the Biden administration and the very future of the United States will depend on rebuilding America, not Afghanistan. It is necessary to mention in this country something more than a military enemy and have an ally and partner in solving the most urgent and difficult problems, such as the coronavirus pandemic. The future of American foreign policy towards the Middle East region will depend on whether the United States can develop a balanced position that will allow it to remain one of the guarantors of stability and resolution of crisis problems.

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АҚШ-ТЫҢ СЫРТҚЫ САЯСИ ЭЛИТАСЫ: ОБАМА, ТРАМП ЖӘНЕ БАЙДЕННІҢ ТАЯУ ШЫҒЫСҚА ҚАТЫСТЫ САЯСАТЫ

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Аңдатпа. Бұл мақалада Обама, Трамп және Байденнің Таяу Шығыстағы саясатының мысалында американдық сыртқы саяси элитаның қызметіне талдау жасалады. Қазіргі уақытта, біз жаһандық дағдарыс, пандемия және көп жанжалды жағдайлар жағдайында геосаяси жүйеде елеулі сын-қатерлерге тап болып отырмыз. Бұл тұрғыда Американың біріншілігі тұрақты деп айту күмәнді. Көптеген американдық сарапшылар АҚШ Мемлекеттік департаментіне сыртқы саясатты насихаттау үшін емес, құрал болу үшін ауқымды реформалар қажет деп санайды. Американың Таяу Шығыс аймағына қатысты сыртқы саясатының болашағы Вашингтонның тұрақтылық пен дағдарыс мәселелерін шешудің кепілі болып қалуына мүмкіндік беретін салмақты ұстанымды дамыта алатынына байланысты болады.

Тірек сөзлер: сыртқы саясат, элита, Американдық саясат, Таяу Шығыс, аймақ, геосаяси сын-қатерлер, стратегия, шешімдер.

ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ЭЛИТА США: ПОЛИТИКА ОБАМЫ, ТРАМПА И БАЙДЕНА В ОТНОШЕНИИ БЛИЖНЕГО ВОСТОКА

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Аннотация: В данной статье проводится анализ деятельности американской внешнеполитической элиты на примере политики Обамы, Трампа и Байдена на Ближнем

Востоке. В настоящее время, мы сталкиваемся с серьезными вызовами в геополитической системе в условиях глобального кризиса, пандемии и многоконфликтных ситуаций. В этом смысле сомнительно утверждать, что первенство Америки стабильно. Многие американские эксперты считают, что Госдепартамент США нуждается в масштабных реформах, чтобы стать инструментом, а не рупором пропаганды во внешней политике. Будущее американской внешней политики в отношении ближневосточного региона будет зависеть от того, сможет ли Вашингтон выработать взвешенную позицию, которая позволит ему оставаться одним из гарантов стабильности и решения кризисных проблем.

Ключевые слова: внешняя политика, элита, американская политика, Ближний Восток, регион, геополитические вызовы, стратегия, решения.

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