

## EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF HYBRID WAR AND THE TERM IN WESTERN POLITICAL AND MILITARY THOUGHT

\*Yavor Raychev<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>PhD, Sofia University 'St. Kliment Ohridski', analyst of contemporary political events, Bulgaria, e-mail: raychev@[gmail.com](mailto:raychev@gmail.com)

**Annotation.** The article describe main characteristics of hybrid societies and war is accepted as normal in most hybrid societies, unlike in the West. The author give his own view to the practice forms of pre-state warfare which recognizes few of the modern limitations of war there is often no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, kidnapping takes place, massacres occur.

The article describes various definitions of the problems of a hybrid society and how they resort to international laws of war, completely rejecting them either to justify their actions or because they do not apply to them because they are Christian or Western. Examples are also given of how these societies decide the connections necessary to communicate with other modern states. It also talks about decentralized and clan hybrid societies, the hybrid power generated by hybrid societies.

The article describes how a hybrid war arises, guerrilla actions, tools of psychological influence on the mood of people and decision makers and their goals that change public attitudes, causing distrust in their own government, and so on.

Examples are also given of how the "hybrid war" is aimed not only at replacing the "chips of the Bulgarians", but also at creating a new political discourse.

**Keywords:** hybrid, warfare, international, modern institutions, society, non-combatants, kidnapping, war.

### Basic provisions

#### 1. William Nemeth

One of the first authors to use the term was William Nemeth in his work 'Future war and Chechnya: A case of hybrid warfare'. He looks for explanation of the hybrid behavior of developing states and finds it in the great differences in technological sophistication and rejection of Western models of social development: 'today while the developed world moves toward increasing technological sophistication and societal integration, the developing world has little chance of even attaining the current level of western technological sophistication. A result is that the developing world is not only retrenching from the state system, which was imposed on it as a product of decolonization, but also rejecting western social development' (Nemeth, 2002). This raises the question how the developing societies, called by him 'hybrid', and their military forces will interact with the Western states (Nemeth, 2002).

### Introduction.

The main characteristics of hybrid societies are as follows: they might appear anarchic and unjust when viewed from outside through Western lenses, but they are not anarchic at all, because are guided by specific traditional norms and customs, some of which might be based on religion, others on traditional practices; war is accepted as normal in most hybrid societies, unlike in the West. They practice forms of pre-state warfare

which recognizes few of the modern limitations of war there is often no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, kidnapping takes place, massacres occur. Hybrid societies resort on the international laws of war reject it completely, to either justify their actions or as it does not apply to them, because it is Christian or Western; despite their rejection of Western values and technological advancements institutions, they manage to exploit them very well when this suits their needs. These societies decide which aspects of the modernity they want to include in their lives. In consequence, they often have modern institutions needed to communicate with other modern states; the decentralized and clan-based hybrid societies are likely to come up with similar form of military organization, which is hard to understand and may place Western forces at disadvantage combatting it; the hybrid force produced by hybrid societies have strengths which are considered different than the traditional concept of military strengths. They include strong believe in their ideas, charismatic leader, decentralized tactics, and ability to absorb high level of punishment without breaking; in strictly military aspects, hybrid forces demonstrated their ability effectively to use Western technology beyond the intended parameters to fit specific needs (for example RPGs are used as rocket mortars rather than anti-tank weapons.) The Western way is the opposite new system is developed to fit specific requirements. Operationally, hybrid military forces are superior to Western forces within their limited operational spectrum.

Nemeth relates his theory with Lind's stating that hybrid societies are violent by themselves. His work is based on the example of Chechens, but this is the case of many other societies, especially in the Middle East, Northern Africa and Central Asia. Nemeth seems to develop a model, which fits very well the situation of the Islamic societies - Chechens, Palestinians, and Libyans, Taliban, ISIS and others. The recent events with the so-called Arab Spring and the subsequent events in the Civil war in Libya, Syria and its spin-overs in Iraq and Lebanon, the emergence of ISIS demonstrated well its explanatory capabilities. However, the Russian actions in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and so forth, cannot be explained using this theoretical framework. It needed to be developed and it was developed by US Lieutenant Frank Hoffman.

## 2. Frank Hoffman

Hoffman's theoretical construct, while built on both the concept of compound war and Nemeth's hybrid war, marks important evolution of thought and since 2006 when he first mentioned it, until now, it is a standard of understanding the hybrid force and the synergetic

effects that they provide. Most of the works on hybrid war since then discuss in one way or another Hoffman's framework, agreeing, disagreeing or trying to expand it. This paper is no exception, what explains the time and space dedicated to this author.

In 2006 Lt. Col. Frank G. Hoffman, USMC Reserve (ret.) published a 17-page article in which the reasons for the change of the discourse on the war and warfare are clearly stated. His starting point is the inadequacy of the military strategy of the most powerful state - USA – which previewed to radically displace conventional forces and sharply shift investment priorities to transform American military capabilities, placing

particular emphasis on missile defense, space assets, precision weaponry, and information technology. (Hoffman F. G., 2007).

The defeat of the greatest military power in the world on 9/11 by a terrorist organization is due to the fact that 'both civilian and military officials were misreading what really constituted threats to American national security interests, oriented as they were to idealized and outdated versions of warfare.' (Hoffman, 2007)

USA army was not able to update to the changing forms of the war this is the message of Hoffman: 'This transformation has proven to be irrelevant to the national security threats we face for the foreseeable future. Instead, we now have the emergence of what the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London has recently irregular warfare' named 'complex nontraditional modes of warfare that are causing violent perturbations to the existing world order.' (Hoffman F., 2006). Hoffman considers that the greatest mistake of the USA government was that it concentrated on the technological dimension of warfare, 'despite historical studies showing that MAs and qualitative changes in military effectiveness are usually the product of new combinations of novel technologies, innovative concepts, and appropriate organizational frame-works. True military innovation is linked to the identification of a real operational challenge. 'Military revolutions' are also historically related to strategic threats. (Hoffman, 2006). USA army and militaries underestimated the political and social dynamics generated by the forces of globalization and didn't preview the appearance of the irregular warfare which could be interpreted as a natural reaction to globalization and America's overwhelming military superiority. This circumstance led to creation of new arms against Western societies - arms that should 'translate rage into catastrophic levels of violence.'

**Description of materials and methods.** Hoffman argues that the regular and irregular forces in compound wars occur in different theatres or in different formations where the forces are used to distract, disperse, sabotage irregular and so forth, to make the victory of the regular forces possible in a decisive battle. In such scenario there is synergy between the conventional and unconventional forces, but there is also division of roles and tasks. Regular forces do not engage in irregular tactics and vice versa. In contrast, in hybrid wars the difference between regular and irregular forces and their tasks can be blurred into one force in the same battle space which can deliver multiple layers of threat: 'Compound wars offered synergy and combinations at the strategic level, but not the complexity, fusion, and simultaneity we anticipate at the operational and even tactical levels in wars where one or both sides is blending and fusing the full range of methods and modes of conflict into the battlespace. Irregular forces in cases of compound wars operated largely as a distraction or economy of force measure in a separate theater or adjacent operating area including the rear echelon. Because it is based on operationally separate forces, the compound concept did not capture the merger or blurring modes of war identified in past case studies such as Hezbollah in the second Lebanon war of 2006 or future projections.' (Hoffman, 2009)

It is characteristic for the hybrid war the blurring of borders between different modes of war and of belligerent parties. Hybrid war can be conducted by state and non-state actors; it incorporates several modes of warfare, namely conventional capabilities,

irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Their hybrid character comes from the fact that certain activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects' (Hoffman, 2007).

Hoffman's definition of hybrid warfare emphasizes the organizational aspect and means, as well as a hierarchical political structure, coupled with decentralized cells or networked tactical units. To such a hybrid structure, hybrid means correspond, where lethality of state conflict will be successfully combined with fanatic attitudes and high motivation of irregular warfare and when high-tech military capabilities will be aimed together with financial targets. The including in the future war of more irregular formations like Hezbollah and Hamas will compel some regular armies to adapt their way of action to the rules or lack of rules of the partisan war or guerilla.

Just as Mary Kaldor, Hoffman theorized that hybrid war can be conducted by state and non-state actors and will include several ways of warfare: conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, indiscriminate violence and coercion and criminal disorder.

The reason for this is not only to defeat the enemy which in some cases might not be possible, on the field of battle but also to erode the political and social support of the enemy towards a specific action (such can be the case of the hybrid war against USA in Iraq or Afghanistan, where continuous losses eroded the support for the operations within USA despite USA not being defeated).

Hoffman recognizes that the nature of the new irregular warfare is not completely clear, because the nature of the modern conflict is still vague. In the next long quotation, he, for the first time in his analysis here uses the term 'hybrid': "More likely we will face hybrid capabilities custom-designed by our adversaries to thwart U.S. vulnerabilities. One of the few areas of consensus among military analysts is that we are sure to see the further blurring of warfare categories. This would include states' blending high-tech capabilities such as anti-satellite weapons with terrorism and cyber-warfare directed against financial targets. For the purposes of this article, I assume that the future will be 'a world of asymmetric and ethno political warfare in which machetes and Microsoft merge...' (Hoffman, 2009) He accepts the Andrew Krepinevich' view that future adversaries will not remain low-tech. Instead, opponents will be capable of what could be called 'advanced irregular warfare', with access to encrypted command systems, man-portable air defense missiles (MANPADS), and other modern lethal systems.' (Hoffman, 2009)

The main features, according to Hoffman, of the hybrid war will be:

Enemies will be protean in their structure and their tactics and may even be leaderless. They may elect a more cellular structure, with greater autonomy and less connectivity than formal networks.

They may employ hybrid structures where specific capabilities or financial support is provided to local cells to augment their functional capability for a single mission. They will likely mix legitimate commercial work with criminal energy.

Cunning savagery and organizational adaptation be the only constant. The future adversaries is also different than the current ones:

They will almost always play to their own strengths, certainly never of the developed in military sense states. They will avoid predictability or linear operations. They will seek to minimize risks to their forces, while seeking maximum impact on the target population or government.

They appear to be increasingly adaptive and sophisticated, able to outpace state-based militaries in the dialectic and competitive learning cycle inherent to wars. Future wars will involve protracted and extremely lethal conflicts of the most savage violence in short, complex irregular warfare. (Hoffman, 2009)

The need to start forming itself for such a complex irregular warfare is more than evident. New tasks require new way of military training focused to teach soldiers 'how, rather than what, to think', since defeating adaptive enemies requires the Army to outthink the enemy. The vision statement aptly notes the need for greater agility and versatility, which it says will be gained by emphasizing modularity at the brigade level and combined arms at the lower levels.

Even though Hoffman devoted much attention to purely military questions, eventually he returns to the political implications of the new warfare. To the question why USA, with their huge financial and economic power, have proved to be less effective than Osama bin Laden, he gives explicit answer: because 'America was arming itself for the wrong kinds of war. (Hoffman, 2009) It was still living with its ideas of Cold War era, conventional in nature, and that assuming that ' interstate warfare remains irregular warfare does not pose high costs or strategic defeat.' These erroneous assumptions should be process abandoned once forever. In some way, the of re-adaptation has started: 'The next RMA, complex irregular warfare, presents a mode of warfare that contests America's overwhelming conventional military capability. It effectively dissipates the hybrid behind the concept that we could 'redefine war on our Own terms' with our technology. (White House Press Release, 2001). Hoffman notices that this is a constant trend rather than a transitional phenomenon which will continue to thwart America's core interests and world order over the next generation. Finally, Hoffman states that the hybrid warfare does not mean low-tech warfare. Technology will become strong arm in the hands of the hybrid warriors.

In December 2007, Hoffman published another, much longer article, called 'Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars'. He started stating that the development of warfare is still consistent with the ideas of the classical military theorist Clausewitz. The war today is more dangerous due to globalization and is shaped by 'the likes of Osama bin Laden and the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan'. Hoffman develops further his previous positions about the blurred nature of the modern war, which became evident since the events in Beirut in 1983, and the inability of the modern war thinkers to accept this change and to elaborate a new security policy, able address successfully threats like 9/11, coming from stateless entities that refuse to do conventional warfare, for which the US army has perfect preparation.

**Results.** In attempt to predict the future warfare, Hoffman calls future wars 'smarter' and argues that the use of a single tool would be an exception rather than a rule. He confirms his earlier view that states will not be the only players in them: 'hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities,

irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder'.

The predicted battlefield is the cities in the developing world, where the hybrid offender can take advantage over the conventional superiority of the US army. The enemy is expected not to follow any rules of war to avoid predictability seeking advantage. Instead of precision strike weaponry, to minimize the human losses, it will use 'crude barbarity' and film it for the needs of the propaganda. From the perspective of today, this prediction turned to be very accurate seeing the experience of the most recent conflicts in the Middle East the two Libyan civil wars (in 2011 and 2017 and still ongoing), the Syrian Civil war, the military operations of Israel (the Gaza War from 2008-2009, Operation Pillar of Defense, Operation Protective Edge), the war against ISIS, etc., and accurate as well in other conflicts, such as the War in Donbass. It appears that the future conflicts will be indeed more similar to the War in Chechnya than to the Arab Israeli War in 1967.

A fruitful aspect of Hoffman's work is his evaluation of already existing concepts, starting with the 4th Generation Warfare model, proposed by Lind. He argues that despite the lack of prescription the theory offers, the idea of impacting enemy's political cohesion and political will through indirect methods different than direct military engagement on the field, has its merits, together with the blurring character of the war. He concluded that the 4th Generation Warfare is consistent with Clausewitz's postulates for the war which is 'more than chameleon' and the 'war as continuation of policy'.

On the Compound Warfare theory, proposed by Thomas Huber, Hoffman is more critical. He asserts that the theory does not hold up to its own definition of regular and irregular forces fighting alongside. Hoffman argues that we have witnessed a strategic coordination between the two, and in the rare cases when both fought together, the irregular forces were not employed as such, but rather as 'second-rate' conventional forces. Because of this, Hoffman concluded that while the Compound Warfare illustrates the synergy between the regular and irregular forces, it does not provide insight on the blurring character of the modern, contemporary wars. The idea of synergetic benefits is still used by Hoffman in his own definition of hybrid wars, but at lower and more integrated level.

The theory of 'unrestricted warfare', which was proposed by the two Chinese colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, is more accepted by Hoffman. Hoffman agrees particularly with the idea that the war fought today and, in the future, will be 'beyond-limit' and the triumph depends on the ability to combine different resources, such as information warfare, financial warfare, trade warfare and others. The two crucial components of this theory omnidimensionality and combinations of different resources appears to be particularly relevant for Hoffman as well.

Thus said, Hoffman elaborates his third definition of 'hybrid war' in the following way: 'we have to conclude that the future does not portend a suite of distinct challengers with alternative or different methods but their convergence into multi-modal or hybrid wars.' There are several new aspects in this definition. First, the term 'hybrid' captures both their organization and their means. Organizationally, they may have hierarchical

political structure, coupled with decentralized cells, or networked tactical units. Their means will also be hybrid in form and application. In such conflicts, future adversaries (states, state-sponsored groups, or self-funded actors) will exploit access to modern military capabilities including encrypted command systems, man-portable air to surface missiles, and other modern lethal systems, as well as promote protracted insurgencies that employ ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and coercive assassinations'. The author remains heavily influenced by the challenges the US Army had to face up to that date, namely the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent problems related to the management of the post-war countries and it is not surprising that he gives as example precisely Hezbollah, Hamas and Fedayeen. Nevertheless, his reasoning is not limited only to similar cases: 'hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including convention: capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder'. The blurred border between the regular and the irregular forces is predicted to be a main trait of the hybrid wars. However, it is expected that the role of the irregular force in the conflict will no longer be the organization of subversive actions, to provoke a specific reaction in the enemy force, to protract the conflict or to extend the cost of his security. On the contrary, this type of force is expected to have a decisive impact in the conflict. Clearly, both state and non-state actors can employ this strategy.

Important aspect of the definition of Hoffman is that it still assumes the ultimate purpose of the hybrid war to achieve political goals. This is compatible with Clausewitz main idea of war and makes it different than other forms of violence, such as criminality. To be more specific, criminality is possible as irregular component of the hybrid war, used to sustain the war itself and to create disorder and disruption of the targeted nation. Such relation can be found in other criminal activities such as narcotics trafficking, smuggling and so forth.

**Discussion.** Hoffman makes clear statement that the rise of hybrid wars will not 'defeat' the old-style warfare or won't change the conventional warfare by new one. In his view, the hybrid wars will play important role in enemy tactics since they will try to exploit any vulnerability with barbaric violence. The enemy will be able to adapt fast, employing new high-tech weaponry. Rather than denying access to the American troops, the enemy will attempt to make the US intervention unsuccessful by increasing the costs for US, disrupt the freedom of action and ultimately objective of the intervention. To do this, the deny the enemy will have to operate in largely populated cities rather than distant and hard to reach areas like mountains.

In the opinion of Hoffman, the rise of hybrid wars will have direct and concrete implications for the US military (or for any modern army in the West), which could be summarized in the next way:

1. Reshaping the military training to create multi-purpose troops, capable of adapting their mode of operations against potent adversaries. Trainings in education about the hybrid threats are required. The needed skills to face them are fast decision-making, ability to respond quickly to the unknown, adaptation. They should be 'hybrid warriors' able to operate and win on any type of battlespace, being able to defeat what is not yet known.

2. Improving the intelligence.
3. Developing interagency approach is seen as important to face the hybrid adversary. One of the tasks would be to improve the governance capability within the failed states. The civil personnel are expected to work under the protection of the army, when it is needed. There should be new procedures for integrating military and non-military programs and activities.
4. Changing the military doctrine, which reflects the rise of hybrid wars.
5. Reaching out the masses through the media to generate support and to expose the enemy propaganda, as in many cases the perception of what happened matters more than what has happened.

In another article from 2009 called 'Hybrid Warfare and Challenges' Hoffman makes the prediction that future conflicts will not be easily categorized into conventional or irregular. He notes that even conflicts between states, even if far less likely to happen, are not by any means obsolete, and cannot be expected to be completely conventional. Because of the blurring character of the future wars, the debate about the preparation of the army for either stability operations or counterinsurgency versus big wars could be completely misleading and false dilemma.

### 3. Other authors

Interesting perspective on the hybrid wars came by David Kilcullen in his book 'The accidental guerrilla' (Kilcullen, 2009). Basing his ideas on the experience of the war in Iraq, Kilcullen described four strategic problems - capacity-building, terrorism, insurgency and communal conflicts that overlap. By capacity-building problem, he meant the difficulties of USA and its allies to build capacity in Iraqi national forces to provide and guarantee security. He referred not just to the supply of arms and military equipment in general, but also to training and logistical support. He found the hybrid war very suitable to explain modern conflicts and took the classical theories that sustain that hybrid warfare includes a combination of irregular warfare, civil war, insurgency, and terrorism that coupled with the local situation can provide a serious hybrid threat.

The USA retired colonel John J. McCuen in his article 'Hybrid War', focused more on the practical aspects of what he understood as hybrid wars and how to fight them (McCuen, 2008). He proposed that: 'Although conventional in form, the decisive battles in today's hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battle- grounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population, and the international community population [...] hybrid conflicts there- fore are full spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for, control and support of the combat zone's indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community' (McCuen, 2008). Giving the example of Vietnam, Greece, Somalia, and Lebanon, he concluded that USA has still to learn how to achieve success on all three battlegrounds. He assumed that conventional wars are likely to develop asymmetric components especially in cases of occupation of the territory of one country by another and proposed that USA army adopt a more 'holistic approach' to the war. His article, written in the spirit of



American conservatism, has an important contribution in comparison with authors mentioned before: he introduces the terms 'home front' and 'international community' as important components to guarantee support for the conducted war domestically and internationally.

Nathan Freier on the other hand, introduced a 'quad-chart' (Freier,2007) in which he predicts the threats that USA is future. These threats are likely to face in the traditional, irregular, catastrophic terrorism and disruptive threats which make use of new technology to negate US military superiority. According to him, the mentioned threats will never come in pure form, instead the blend of threats that will occur will be 'hybrid This threat is a combination a of irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and hybrid threats. In it are included also non-military and non-violent means, such as political or economic.

All of the above-mentioned scholars describe the hybrid war basing themselves on very specific cases where usually a big and powerful army attacks weaker one. For Nemeth this is the case of Chechens and the Russian Army. For Hoffman this is the case of the Lebanon conflict and the actions of Hezbollah against Israeli Army. Majority of the Israeli military theories speak about the same problem. McCuen mentioned the challenges of the US army as well in Iraq and Afghanistan, stressing the importance of the political will for engaging and winning a war, based on the support home and on international level. Nevertheless, this understanding of the hybrid war has changed dramatically after the Russian intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.

#### View of Bulgarian experts on hybrid war

This paragraph contains the definitions of leading Bulgarian experts on hybrid war interviewed by me in the course of my study. As can be seen, their definitions lie somewhere between the Russian and Western views, which is natural given the country's communist past and the subsequent thirty-year period of democratic change in which Bulgaria joined NATO and the EU. A closer look shows that in terms of value, the views of Bulgarian experts are identical to those of the Western ones, but are 'technically' closer to the Russian ones insofar as they include propaganda, information warfare and psychological influences as an integral part of its toolbox. The following comments illustrate my point.

'To me, this is a modern way of war that does not deal with the conventional means of warfare, such as weapons and shooting but crudely, propaganda.'

'Hybrid war in modern conditions and understandings is a complexity of actions, a toolkit that combines different forms of pressure, different forms of media suggestion, creation of false news, misinformation, counter-disinformation. Hybrid war is a postmodern understanding of the phrase that war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means. Figuratively, hybrid war as an image can be likened to fencing, in which single touch on the enemy's body in the designated places gives you a point without, of course, him being physically injured or harmed in any other way. Hybrid war is not so symbolic, but it is symbolic in terms of the notion of casualties or any physical damage that usually occurs during a real war. However, hybrid warfare, when successfully implemented, can have not only similar but also much better results. For example, the occupation and annexation of Crimea is a classic example of a hybrid

war, based on analyzes of Russian military intelligence and other analytical expertise that has allowed the whole operation to be developed.'

**Conclusion.** In conclusion, I do not know a commonly accepted definition of hybrid warfare. Without pretending to be exhaustive, I would state the following: HW is a concept that emphasizes: new methods and technologies of willpower and where the purpose is not to capture and administer foreign territory.

'Hybrid war is not like the well-known hot war. In a hybrid war, there are usually no human casualties. The purpose of hybrid warfare is to disrupt the enemy's control systems. To compromise the form of government. To create a political and economic environment favorable to the country aggressor. Many times, the goal of hybrid warfare is to change people's thinking, their value system, and direct them in the right direction for action.

'I don't have my own definition, and as far as know, there is none in the scientific literature either. For me, hybrid warfare is an unconventional way of recruiting and overpowering an adversary by using non-military but still powerful means, including information.

First of all, it is a war that involves all possible instruments of influence in different combinations. The presence of information technologies that achieve the desired effect is imperative. Hybrid war is combination of tools and soft and hard power, the full range of tools, in a unique, custom-tailored way. In one country, it can be a military asset, in another no, but in any case, high technology and information strategies are present.

A hybrid war occurs when a country is ready to use the full range of means at its disposal, including a regular army, guerrilla actions, instruments for psychological impact on people's moods and decision makers. The center of gravity for a hybrid war in any case falls on the population of the attacked state, unlike in the conventional war. The aim is to change public attitudes, to introduce distrust in one's own government and so forth. The hybrid war also involves the use of criminal organizations, and there are elements of cyberwarfare. In short, all conventional and unconventional means of disrupting the economy and political stability of the intended state are used. Hybrid war is an amalgam of all kinds of wars. This is about achieving political goals.'

'The hybrid threat imposes dependence on party and state institutions such as the Bulgarian prosecutor's office, investigative or anti-corruption bodies. This is a diffused war with psychological, political and cyberattacks, creating insecurity and similar other negative results.'

'The hybrid war not only aims to replace the 'chip of the Bulgarians', but also to create a political new discourse which, unfortunately, gradually succeeded in replacing reality with the Russian point of view of processes and events in Europe and the world in the twentieth century, with mythologies and propaganda.'

## REFERENCES

- [1] Nemeth, Future war and Chechnya: A case of Hybrid warfare, 2002)
- [2] Hoffman F.G., Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. 2007 – P.395

- [3] Hoffman F.G., *Complex Irregular Warfare: The next Revolution in Military Affairs*. Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2006. – P. 395
- [4] Hoffman F.G. *Hybrid warfare and Challenges*. 2009. – P.196
- [5] White House Press Release, R.b. 2001, February 13 *whitehouse.gov*. Retrieved November 24, 2018, from *whitehouse.gov*
- [6] McCuen J. *Hybrid Wars* (March-April 2008) *Military Review*, 2008, p.107-113.
- [7] Freier N. *Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, Traditional and Hybrid Challenges*, 2007

## ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ ИДЕИ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И ТЕРМИНА В ЗАПАДНОЙ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ И ВОЕННОЙ МЫСЛИ

\*Явор Райчев<sup>1</sup>

\*<sup>1</sup>Доктор философии, Софийский университет «Св. Климент Охридски»,  
аналитик современных политических событий, Болгария, e-mail:  
[raychev@gmail.com](mailto:raychev@gmail.com)

**Аннотация:** В статье описываются основные характеристики гибридных обществ, и война считается нормой в большинстве гибридных обществ, в отличие от Запада. Автор дает свой собственный взгляд на практические формы до государственной войны, который признает некоторые из современных ограничений войны: часто нет различия между комбатантами и не комбатантами, имеют место похищения людей, происходят массовые убийства.

В статье описываются различные дефиниции проблем гибридного общества и как они прибегают к международным законам войны, полностью отвергая их либо для оправдания своих действий, либо потому, что они к ним неприменимы, потому что они христианские или западные. Также приводятся примеры как эти общества решают связи необходимые для связи с другими современными государствами. Также говорится о децентрализованных и клановых гибридных обществ, гибридная сила, создаваемая гибридными обществами.

В статье описываются как гибридная война возникает, партизанские действия, инструменты психологического воздействия на настроения людей и лиц, принимающих решения и их цели которые изменять общественное отношение, вызывающее недоверие к собственному правительству и так далее.

Также приводятся примеры как «гибридная война» направлена не только на замену «фишки болгар», но и на создание нового политического дискурса.

**Ключевые слова:** гибрид, война, интернационал, современные институты, общество, не комбатанты, похищение людей, война.

## БАТЫС САЯСИ ЖӘНЕ ӘСКЕРИ ОЙЛАРДАҒЫ ҚАУПСІЗДІК ИДЕЯСЫ ЭВОЛЮЦИЯСЫ ЖӘНЕ ТЕРМИНДЕРІ

\*Явор Райчев<sup>1</sup>

\*<sup>1</sup>PhD, София университеті ‘St. Климент Охридски, Қазіргі саяси оқиғалардың  
талдаушысы, Болгария, [raychev@gmail.com](mailto:raychev@gmail.com)

**Андатпа.** Мақалада гибриді қоғамдардың негізгі сипаттамалары сипатталған және соғыс Батыстағыдан айырмашылығы гибриді қоғамдардың көпшілігінде қалыпты жағдай ретінде қабылданады. Автор мемлекетке дейінгі соғыстың практикалық формаларына өзіндік көзқарасын береді, ол соғыстың қазіргі заманғы шектеулерінің аздығын мойындайды,

көбінесе жауынгерлер мен жауынгер еместер арасында ешқандай айырмашылық жоқ, адам ұрлау орын алады, қырғындар орын алады.

Мақалада гибридтік қоғамның проблемаларының әртүрлі анықтамалары және олардың халықаралық соғыс заңдарына қалай жүгінетіні сипатталған, олар өз әрекеттерін ақтау үшін немесе олар христиан немесе батыс болғандықтан оларға қолданылмайды. Сондай-ақ осы қоғамдардың басқа заманауи мемлекеттермен байланысу үшін қажетті байланыстарды қалай шешетіні туралы мысалдар келтірілген. Ол сондай-ақ орталықтандырылмаған және кландық гибридті қоғамдар, гибридті қоғамдар тудыратын гибридті қуат туралы айтады.

Мақалада гибридтік соғыстың қалай туындайтыны, партизандық әрекеттер, адамдардың және шешім қабылдаушылардың көңіл-күйіне психологиялық әсер ету құралдары және олардың қоғамдық көзқарасты өзгертетін, өз үкіметіне сенімсіздік тудыратын мақсаттары және т.б.

Сондай-ақ «гибридтік соғыстың» «болгарлардың чиптерін» ауыстыруға ғана емес, сонымен қатар жаңа саяси дискурс құруға бағытталғаны туралы мысалдар келтірілген.

**Тірек сөздер:** гибрид, соғыс, халықаралық, заманауи институттар, қоғам, жауынгерлік емес адамдар, адам ұрлау, соғыс.

*Статья поступила 15.12.2022*