

BORDER SECURITY AND OIL WAR IN THE LATIN AMERICAN/CARIBBEAN REGION: A CASE STUDY OF THE GUYANA/VENEZUELA DISPUTE

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Abstract. This article explores the recent developments in the ongoing dispute between Guyana and Venezuela which has intensified as a result of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between then British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void. The Essequibo region is a disputed territory of 61,650 square miles (159,500 km²) west of the Essequibo River. It is claimed by both Guyana and Venezuela, but it has been administered and controlled by Guyana since the 1899 Paris Arbitral Award. The boundary dispute was inherited from the colonial powers (Spain in the case of Venezuela, and the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in the case of Guyana) and has been complicated by the independence of Guyana from the United Kingdom in 1966. The author analyses the impact of this dispute and draws attention to the disregard of international law and to the infringement of territorial sovereignty and integrity by one state on another. The purpose of the paper is to chronicle the facts and circumstances relating to this dispute with the specific intent of examining why Venezuela engaged in actions contrary to the ICJ ruling of December 1, 2023 and what are some of the possible responses to these actions taken by the current Venezuelan government.

Keywords: Venezuela, Guyana, territorial sovereignty, International Court of Justice (ICJ), border security, oil war, dispute, conflict

Introduction

At the current time, Latin American/Caribbean countries are facing more than a dozen unresolved territorial and boundary disputes. Since the start of the 21st century, five disputes have resulted in the use of force, and two others in its deployment. These incidents have involved ten of the nineteen independent countries of South and Central America. Anglophone and Dutch Caribbean countries as well as the United States and Canada also face several unresolved disputes, although these are rarely or never militarized. In 1995, Ecuador and Peru went to war, resulting in more than a thousand deaths and injuries and significant economic loss.

Results

The number of country dyads affected by territorial disputes in the second half of the twentieth century was about the same in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and East and Southeast Asia; only Africa had a larger number of such conflict dyads. And yet, by international standards the Americas were comparatively free from interstate war during the twentieth century [1]. Latin Americans for the

most part do not fear aggression from their neighbors. They do not expect their countries to go to war with each other and are surprised when interstate violence breaks out at the border (1).

In examining the Latin American and Caribbean region, it is clear that it is marked by the following characteristics:

- Territorial, boundary, and other disputes endure.
- Interstate conflict over boundaries is relatively frequent.
- Disputes sometimes escalate to military conflict because states recurrently employ low levels of force to shape aspects of bilateral relations.
- Such escalation rarely reaches full-scale war.
- Interstate war is infrequent indeed.

In this third decade of the 21st century the following countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are engaged militarized disputes:

- Guatemala and Belize
- Guyana and Suriname
- Venezuela and Guyana
- Venezuela and Trinidad-Tobago
- Venezuela and Colombia
- Nicaragua and Colombia
- Nicaragua and Costa Rica
- Nicaragua and El Salvador
- Nicaragua and Honduras
- Honduras and El Salvador
- Honduras and Guatemala

Discussion

While there have been many reasons to explain what could have fostered these militarized border and territorial disputes, in the case of the Venezuela/ Guyana dispute it is known that during Venezuela's 1982 presidential election campaign, the party in control of the presidency took advantage of the expiration of the Protocol of Port of Spain that had "frozen" Venezuela's dispute with Guyana to refurbish its nationalist credentials (2). Over the years, most Venezuelan democratic governments did not resort to that strategy in their relations with Guyana and as Guyana democratized in the early 1990s, it sought to draw nearer to Venezuela. The intensification of the Venezuela-Guyana dispute in the late 1990s and today in 2023 seems to be as a result of domestic politics in Venezuela. Undoubtedly, from the Venezuelan side, domestic politics has been one of the main motivations for this long-lingering militarized dispute behavior and this particular conflict has typically lingered because there is domestic political support for continuing to contest the disputed territory [2].

Consequently, the Venezuelan government has authorized such actions to update their nationalist credentials, help their party in a difficult national election scheduled for 2024, placate officers in the armed forces, and rally popular support when they have lost it for other reasons. Militarizing disputes can be a cost-effective means of communicating international resolve and gaining support at home

Background to the Guyana/Venezuela dispute: A chronological journey: 1899-1990

The border dispute between Guyana and Venezuela has a long and complex history. The dispute dates back to 1899 when an international tribunal handed down an arbitral award that found that the Essequibo region lies on British Guiana's side of the border with Venezuela (3). (It must be recalled that Guyana only achieved its political independence from the United Kingdom in 1966. Prior to that, Guyana was known as British Guiana.) However, the Venezuelan government has since claimed that the award is null and void, and the dispute has continued to this day with the Venezuelan government actually making a direct move to annex the entire the Essequibo Region in December 2023.

The disputed area between the two States lies roughly between the Orinoco and the Essequibo Rivers. Venezuela lays claim to this territory as successor to the Spanish Empire, from which it declared independence in 1810, on the basis that the Spanish established sovereignty in the late-16th century by discovering, settling and exercising political control over the region. The British, on the other hand, claim to have acquired the territory from the Dutch by a formal cession under the terms of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814. According to the British, Dutch subjects had settled in the area in 1616 and continued trading on the Essequibo and other rivers in the vicinity in the following decades. Dutch sovereignty over these settlements was recognized by Spain in 1648 when, as part of the Peace of Westphalia, the Spanish and Dutch signed the Peace of Münster to end the Eighty Years War between them. Under Article 5 of the Peace of Münster, Spain agreed that the Dutch would retain all of the 'lordships, cities, castles, fortresses, trades and lands in the... West Indies' under their possession at that time, but the treaty did not specify the boundary dividing their respective possessions in the region [3].

From the 1650s onwards, the Dutch expanded their settlements and trading activities in the area, and the Dutch West India Company controlled the coast between the Essequibo and Orinoco rivers. The British seized the Dutch settlements in 1803, and in 1814 the Dutch formally ceded to them the colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice, though, again, the boundaries of these colonies remained undefined. In 1831, the British consolidated these settlements as British Guiana (4).

In 1840, Britain commissioned a German surveyor, Robert Schomburgk, who had previously explored the area, to delineate the boundaries of British Guiana (the 'Schomburgk Line'). Venezuela disputed Schomburgk's line, and in 1850 the parties agreed not to occupy the disputed area. Despite this, in the late 19th century, British citizens settled in the area, prompting renewed protests by the Venezuelan government, which later broke off diplomatic relations and sought assistance from the United States. In 1897, the parties agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration. A tribunal was constituted with two British members, two Americans, and the Russian jurist Fiodor de Martens as president. The tribunal sat in Paris and, during the proceedings, Venezuela was represented by American counsel. The tribunal issued a short, unanimous award in 1899, offering merely a description of the course of the boundary line, without giving any reasons for the decision. The award granted Britain almost 90% of the disputed territory, but assigned to Venezuela a valuable

portion at the mouth of the Orinoco River. Under Article XIII of the Treaty of Arbitration, the parties had agreed to consider the result of the arbitration as ‘a full, perfect, and final settlement’ of the issue, and Venezuela did not protest the award after it was delivered. The border was subsequently fixed by the Anglo-Venezuelan Boundary Commission in 1905.

Claims of impropriety and the Geneva Agreement

On 8 February 1944, Severo Mallet-Prevost, a junior lawyer in the Venezuelan legal team before the Paris Tribunal, wrote a letter which was posthumously published in the American Journal of International Law in 1949 ((1949) 43 AJIL 523). The letter contained allegations of impropriety by the tribunal, claiming that the award was the result of a secret deal between the president of the tribunal and the British arbitrators. In 1962, Venezuela declared that it would no longer abide by the 1899 Award on the basis that it was null and void. It claimed that the decision had not been based on a fair arbitral process, but was the result of a political deal made behind Venezuela’s back. The claim was communicated in writing to the UK and was also made, publicly, in the UNGA. The two States held talks and in 1966 signed an agreement to resolve the controversy (the ‘Geneva Agreement’). Article I of the Geneva Agreement provided for the establishment of a mixed commission, tasked with seeking ‘satisfactory solutions for the practical arrangement’ of the dispute. Furthermore, pursuant to Article IV, in the event that the mixed commission failed to reach a solution after four years, the parties would be required to select one the means of peaceful dispute settlement in Article 33 of the Charter to resolve the conflict. In accordance with Article VIII of the Agreement, Guyana became a party to the treaty when it gained independence in 1966.

The mixed commission referred to in Article I of the Geneva Agreement was established in 1966 and, after holding 16 sessions, its term expired in 1970 without a resolution to the dispute. In that same year, the parties agreed the Protocol of Port-of-Spain, which suspended the operation of Article IV of the Agreement for 12 years. The Protocol expired at the end of its term in 1982, after Venezuela decided not to renew the agreement. For almost eight years, the matter remained silent until the beginning of 1990.

In 1990, in accordance with Article IV (2) of the Geneva Agreement, the parties sought the Good Offices of the UN Secretary General in an effort to move the dispute forward (5). In 2016, the UNSG announced that absent significant progress towards a solution of the controversy by the end of 2017, and unless both parties jointly request that he refrain from doing so, he would choose the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the next means of settlement. As noted, after a series of unsuccessful meetings between the parties, the UNSG announced his decision to submit the dispute to the ICJ in January 2018 [4].

In 2018, Guyana filed an application against Venezuela before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the two states’ long-standing dispute over the Essequibo region. The ICJ’s decision, it was thought could be the final act in this dispute that has divided the neighboring countries for nearly 125 years. The dispute included both procedural and substantive elements. Procedurally, the parties disagreed as to whether the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the dispute. . As for

the substantive aspect of the dispute, the parties disagreed as to the alleged nullity and invalidity of the arbitral award handed down in 1899.

Though the court had accepted the case it made little headway with Maduro, who ironically is facing an ICJ probe for crimes against humanity and refuses to recognize the court's jurisdiction. Since 2015 Maduro has regularly vowed to reconquer the commodity-rich Essequibo. Caracas frequently deploys ground forces to the border with Guyana and conducts military exercises in the region. In early 2018, Brazil's military revealed it had discovered plans for Venezuela's invasion of Guyana, which would see Caracas use force to annex the Essequibo. Brazil's then-President Michel Temer pledged to defend Guyana if Venezuela invaded, but it is difficult to see if Brasilia could deploy sufficient forces in a timely manner to repel Venezuela's attack (6).

The United Nations' highest court (The ICJ) ruled in December 2020 that it will intervene to settle the dispute and by November 2022, the ICJ concluded its preliminary hearing on the objections raised by Venezuela, where Caracas argued that Guyana's case should be dismissed.

As indicated previously, this dispute includes both substantive and procedural elements. Substantively, this is not a straightforward territorial dispute. Venezuela claims nearly 62,000 square miles or roughly three-quarters of Guyana's territory, including territorial waters containing the Stabroek Block (7) Despite attempts by international bodies to resolve the dispute, including the ICJ, tensions continued to escalate with Venezuela's recent saber-rattling [5].

The Current Position: 2023 and Beyond

Caracas' territorial claim on Guyana flared in intensity after Exxon's swathe of more than 30 world-class oil discoveries in Guyana's offshore Stabroek Block. A significant portion of that block lies in the territorial waters of the region disputed by Venezuela. Exxon's discoveries have found over 11 billion barrels of recoverable oil resources and catapulted Guyana on the path to becoming a leading regional oil producer and exporter. By the end of January 2023, Guyana was pumping 393,000 barrels of oil per day, all of which was coming from the Exxon operating Stabroek Block. That has transformed the former British colony into the sixth largest petroleum producer in Latin America and the Caribbean, with output forecast to exceed one million barrels daily by 2027, which will make Guyana the third largest oil producer in the region.

The Stabroek Block oil discoveries have transformed Guyana from an economic backwater into a major global petroleum producer and launched the impoverished South American country into the economic stratosphere. Guyana now possesses one of the world's fastest-growing economies, with IMF data showing 2022 GDP expanded by a stunning 57.8% and is expected to grow by another 25% during 2023. Georgetown's oil revenues are surging in value. Information from the Bank of Guyana, the country's central bank, shows the former British colony earned \$1.4 billion from royalties and oil sales in 2022, which was more than double the \$608 million received in 2021. It is anticipated by Guyana's government and industry analysts that oil revenue will exceed \$1.6 billion during 2023 and climb to over \$7.5 billion by the end of the decade.

As a result, it is easy to understand Maduro's interest in Essequibo at a time when Venezuela's economic crisis has finally bottomed, and Caracas is desperate to rebuild a shattered oil industry and pump more petroleum. The intensity of the saber-rattling by Venezuela's autocratic leader is rising, with the dispute a handy distraction for Venezuela's people from the country's economic and humanitarian crisis.

Towards the beginning of November, a consultative referendum was initiated by the government of Nicolás Maduro regarding Venezuela's claim of Guyana Essequibo (8). On 19 November, a referendum "rehearsal" was held in Venezuela. On 29 November, a electoral rehearsal was also organized for high school students between the ages of 12 and 18. It was announced that more than 350,000 military personnel would guard the electoral process nationwide.

In a move to stop the referendum, the Guyanese government took the matter to the ICJ and on December 1, 2023, the ICJ ruled that while it had no power to stop the actual referendum, Venezuela must not take any action to seize the mineral and forest-rich county of Essequibo in Guyana based on its upcoming December 3 referendum. It stated quite clearly that Venezuela should "refrain from taking any action which would modify that situation that currently prevails."

The referendum took place on 3 December 2023 in Venezuela. The population of the territory in question was not consulted and did not vote as voting only took place within Venezuela. During the referendum on 3 December, low turnout and presence at polling stations were reported. [According to the National Electoral Council (CNE), turnout was close to 50% and the result was overwhelmingly in support of annexation (90%). Following the referendum, Venezuela's president ordered the creation of a new state called "Guayana Esequiba" on Tuesday December 5, 2023. Talking to legislators, President Nicolás Maduro showed a "new map" of Venezuela including the disputed territory and said all residents from the area would be granted Venezuelan nationality. This of course was a clear attempt of infringement on Guyana's territorial integrity and sovereignty and a scant disregard for international law. He said the map would be distributed throughout all schools and public buildings in the country.

Maduro also signed a "presidential decree" creating the "High Commission for the Defense of Guayana Esequiba. The measures announced include the approval of oil, gas and mining exploration licenses. Maduro ordered the state oil company PDVSA to create a special department, "PDVSA-Essequibo," to manage the activities in the region which are to start immediately. The president also asked legislators to draw up a law banning the hiring of any companies that have worked with Guyana in areas of disputed water and giving companies currently in the region three months to leave the area. This threat was seen as an attempt against the political independence of Guyana. The measures also included a census among residents of that territory in order to facilitate the attribution of the Venezuelan nationality.

Response by Guyana

In response to the actions by President Maduro following the referendum, Guyanese President Irfaan Ali called the Venezuelan moves "an imminent threat" and a "desperate attempt." He also indicated that Guyana was engaging with

international allies, including the US, in “defense cooperation,” noting a “very elaborate cooperation pact” between the two countries. The Guyanese government has also received the full support of the multilateral institutions such as the Caribbean Community, (CARICOM) the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Commonwealth of Nations [6].

Vice President of Guyana Dr Bharat Jagdeo has stated that he does not know if the Venezuelan authorities are miscalculating based on what happened in Crimea and other places, but it would be a grave miscalculation on their part. According to Jagdeo, “We can’t just think that this is internal politics (in Venezuela) without taking all possible measures to protect our country, including working with others,” he added, citing a visit in early December by US military officials to discuss ongoing joint training exercises (9).

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has also given Guyana the assurance that Brazil stands strongly with Guyana and that they would not seek any reckless behavior by Venezuela. Brazil in recent days moved troops along a border that it shares with the Essequibo region in a defensive measure.

What’s Next?

If Venezuela launched a military assault to annex the Essequibo, there is very little that Guyana could do to repel such an event. This will also mean not adhering to the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of December 1, 2023 that Venezuela must not take any decision that modifies Guyana’s control over the Essequibo region (10).

Venezuela’s military apparatus outnumbers the Guyana Defense Force by at least a whopping 100 to 1 in personnel while Caracas possesses modern fighters and naval craft to which Guyana has no viable response (11) Maduro’s close ties with the Kremlin means Venezuela has received extensive military aid from Russia, including modern weapons systems, such as small arms, tanks and fighter bomber aircraft, and training by Russian advisers. While Russia promised in 2022 that military aid to Venezuela will not be used against Colombia, no such assurances have been made regarding Guyana. The overarching consensus is that without U.S. intervention, a Venezuelan invasion of the Essequibo will be successful.

The risks of the border dispute boiling over and exploding into conflict are very real. Heightened tensions between Caracas and Washington over sanctions and U.S. Department of Justice indictments against Maduro, as well as members of his government, increase the risk of conflict erupting. Maduro also uses the dispute as a means of distracting Venezuelans from the suffering they are enduring because of his policies, with the dispute one of the only points on which he and Venezuela’s opposition agree. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, despite the international outcry, has emboldened authoritarian illiberal rulers like Maduro to see the application of force as a viable tool to achieve their goals.

In the meantime, the U.S. is putting on a show of force in the skies above Guyana, as the Biden administration said it was standing with the country amid growing fears that Venezuela was about to launch an invasion. Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro raised the stakes on December 6, 2023 by ordering maps to be

withdrawn and telling state companies to exploit contested oil and mineral deposits [7].

The U.S. on December 7, 2023 announced joint military drills with Guyana as tensions mount with its South American neighbor to the west, Venezuela [8]. The exercise, billed as U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) flight operations within Guyana, “builds upon routine engagement and operations to enhance security partnership between the United States and Guyana, and to strengthen regional cooperation,” the U.S. Embassy in Guyana said in a statement. “In addition to this exercise, USSOUTHCOM will continue its collaboration with the [Guyana Defense Forces] GDF in the areas of disaster preparedness, aerial and maritime security, and countering transnational criminal organizations.”

Conclusion

Writing for Foreign Policy last year, ahead of the announcement of the referendum, Paul J. Angelo of the Council on Foreign Relations and Wazim Mowla, the assistant director for the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, called the border dispute a “powder keg,” arguing that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “defiance of international norms” with the invasion of Ukraine “could give new wings to Maduro’s territorial ambitions” (12)

As domestic pressure will likely increase on Maduro to act on the results of the referendum, especially in the lead-up to the presidential election next year, Maduro might be tempted to provoke skirmishes along the border. The belligerence is on both sides of the border, and since neither of them can afford to back down, that is where you get into the slightly dangerous territory of potential military clashes.

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- [8] ‘Any aggressive acts by Venezuela will not go unpunished’: Jagdeo warns. <https://www.kaieteurnews.com/2023/11/24/any>

ENDNOTES

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(2) In 1982, Venezuela was under the government of Luis Herrera Campins. He was the President of Venezuela from 1979 to 1984. COPEI, also referred to as the Social Christian Party (Spanish: Partido Socialcristiano) or Green Party (Spanish: Partido Verde), is a Christian democratic party in Venezuela. The acronym stands for Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (English: Independent Political Electoral Organization Committee), but this provisional full name has fallen out of use.

(3) Essequibo, also known as Guayana Esequiba or Esequibo, is the disputed territory of 159,500 km² (61,600sq. miles) west of the Essequibo River that is administered and controlled by Guyana but claimed by Venezuela. The area has long been the subject of disputed boundaries between Venezuela and the colony of British Guyana and continued by Guyana after independence. Essequibo is larger than Greece and rich in minerals.

(4) From the end of the 15th century until the 20th century the European nations of Spain, France, Holland and Great Britain rivalled each other for territory in the Caribbean region, with several countries having one of these colonial powers as their rulers at a particular point in history.

(5) The Good Offices of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) refer to the steps taken publicly and in private, drawing upon their independence, impartiality, and integrity, to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating, or spreading. The UNSG is responsible for using their good offices to prevent and limit conflict as part of their role as a diplomat and advocate, civil servant and CEO, and spokesperson for the interests of the world's peoples, in particular the poor and vulnerable among them¹. The Secretary-General is also empowered to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in their opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The Secretary-General's role is defined by the Charter of the United Nations, which describes the Secretary-General as the "chief administrative officer" of the Organization, who shall act in that capacity and perform "such other functions as are entrusted" to them by the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and other United Nations organs.

(6) Everything You Need to Know About the Guyana-Venezuela Border Dispute // <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/everything-know-guyana-venezuela-border-200000120.html>

(7) The Starbroek Block is an offshore oil and gas block in Guyana, located off the Atlantic coast. It is a 6.6-million-acre reservoir that contains multiple prospects and play types representing additional multibillion barrel unrisks exploration potential¹. The block is operated by ExxonMobil Corporation (45%) and co-owned by Hess Corporation (30%) and CNOOC International (25%)¹. The block has been the site of several significant oil discoveries, including the Liza 1 well, which was announced in May 2015¹. In July 2018, ExxonMobil raised its estimate of discovered recoverable resources in the Starbroek Block to 4 billion barrels of oil¹. As of April 2022, the estimated recoverable resource for the Starbroek Block has increased to nearly 11 billion oil-equivalent barrels.

(8) On December 3, 2023, a referendum was held in Venezuela regarding the country's claim to the disputed territory of Guayana Esequiba, which is currently controlled by neighboring Guyana¹. The referendum consisted of five questions, including whether to reject the 1899 Paris Arbitration Award, which seeks to deprive Venezuela of its Guayana Esequiba, and whether to support the 1966 Geneva Agreement as the only valid legal instrument to reach a practical and satisfactory solution for Venezuela and Guyana regarding the controversy over the territory of Guayana Esequiba. The referendum also asked whether to oppose Guyana's claim to unilaterally dispose of a sea pending delimitation, illegally and in violation of international law, and whether to agree with the creation of the Guayana Esequiba state and the development of an accelerated plan for comprehensive care for the current and future population of that territory, which includes, among others, the granting of citizenship and identity card¹ The referendum was declared to have

a turnout of 51.01% 1. According to the Venezuelan electoral authorities, 95% of voters approved of the nation's territorial claim on a huge chunk of neighboring oil-rich Guyana.

(9) Global web icon. Kaieteur News

<https://www.kaieteurnews.com/2023/11/24/any...>

(10) The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on December 1, 2023 that Venezuela must not take any decision that modified Guyana's control over the Essequibo region. This was in relation to its planned referendum on Sunday December 3, 2023 where one of its questions was tantamount to the annexation of Guyana's Essequibo county. The court said that the decision has a binding effect on the parties and creates a legal obligation. The session was held under the presidency of Judge Joan E. Donoghue, President of the Court who delivered the order in the Hague, Netherlands. The court also said that neither Venezuela nor Guyana should take any measure to aggravate conditions related to the 1899 arbitral award case currently before the court.

(11) Guyana has a small military force, with an estimated 3,800 active personnel. The country's defense budget is also relatively small, at around \$30 million per year. In contrast, Venezuela has a much larger military, with an estimated 123,000 active personnel and a defense budget of around \$2.3 billion per year. Caracas is the capital city of Venezuela.

(12) Venezuela's president orders creation of new state and map including land from Guyana. Osmar Hernández, Fernando Almánzar and Mia Alberti, Wed December 6, 2023. <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/06/americas/venezuelas-president-orders-creation-of-new-state-and-map-including-land-from-guyana/index.html>.

ЛАТЫН АМЕРИКАСЫ/КАРИБ АЙМАҒЫНДАҒЫ ШЕКАРАЛЫҚ ҚАУІПСІЗДІК ЖӘНЕ МҰНАЙ СОҒЫСЫ: ГАЙАНА/ВЕНЕСУЭЛА АРАСЫНДАҒЫ ТАЛАСҚА CASE STUDY

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Аңдатпа. Бұл мақала Гайана мен Венесуэла арасындағы 1899 жылғы сол кездегі Британдық Гвиана мен Венесуэла арасындағы шекара туралы Арбитраждық шешімнің күшін жойды деген Венесуэла дауының нәтижесінде күшейген Гайана мен Венесуэла арасындағы жалғасып жатқан даудың соңғы оқиғаларын зерттейді. Эссекибо аймағы - Эссекибо өзенінен батысқа қарай 61 650 шаршы мильді (159 500 км²) құрайтын даулы аумақ. Оны Гайана да, Венесуэла да талап етеді, бірақ оны 1899 жылғы Париж арбитражының шешімінен бері Гайана басқарып, бақылап келеді. Шекаралық дау отаршыл державалардан мұраға қалды (Венесуэла жағында Испания, Гайана жағында Нидерланды және Ұлыбритания) және 1966 жылы Гайаның Біріккен Корольдіктен тәуелсіздік алуымен қиындады. Авторлар бұл даудың салдары және халықаралық құқықты елемеушілікке және бір мемлекеттің екінші мемлекеттің аумақтық егемендігі мен тұтастығын бұзуына назар аударады. Жұмыстың мақсаты - Венесуэланың 2023 жылғы 1 желтоқсандағы ICJ шешіміне қайшы әрекеттерге нәліктен қатысқанын және осы әрекеттерге қандай жауаптар болуы мүмкін екенін зерттеу мақсатында осы дауға қатысты фактілер мен жағдайларды көрсету.

Тірек сөздер: Венесуэла, Гайана, аумақтық егемендік, Халықаралық сот, шекара қауіпсіздігі, мұнай соғысы, дау, қақтығыстар

БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ ГРАНИЦ И НЕФТЯНАЯ ВОЙНА В РЕГИОНЕ ЛАТИНСКОЙ АМЕРИКИ И КАРИБСКОГО БАССЕЙНА: CASE STUDY СПОРА МЕЖДУ ГАЙАНОЙ И ВЕНЕСУЭЛОЙ

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Аннотация. В этой статье исследуются недавние события в продолжающемся споре между Гайаной и Венесуэлой, который усилился в результате утверждения Венесуэлы о том, что Арбитражное решение 1899 года о границе между тогдашней Британской Гвианой и Венесуэлой является недействительным. Регион Эссекибо представляет собой спорную территорию площадью 61 650 квадратных миль (159 500 км²) к западу от реки Эссекибо. На него претендуют как Гайана, так и Венесуэла, но после вынесения Парижского арбитражного решения 1899 года он находится под управлением и контролем Гайаны. Пограничный спор был унаследован от колониальных держав (Испании в случае Венесуэлы и Нидерландов, и Великобритании в случае Гайаны) и осложнился обретением Гайаной независимости от Соединенного Королевства в 1966 году. Автор анализирует последствия этого спора и обращает внимание на игнорирование международного права и на посягательство на территориальный суверенитет и целостность одного государства другим. Целью статьи является хроника фактов и обстоятельств, связанных с этим спором, с конкретной целью изучить, почему Венесуэла предприняла действия, противоречащие постановлению Международного Суда от 1 декабря 2023 года, и каковы некоторые из возможных ответов на эти действия, предпринятые Венесуэлой. нынешнее правительство Венесуэлы.

Ключевые слова: Венесуэла, Гайана, территориальный суверенитет, Международный Суд, безопасность границ, нефтяная война, спор, конфликты

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