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INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT AND STATE FINANCING FOR RESEARCH ON CONFLICTS: EFFORTS TO SUSTAIN LONG-TERM PEACE POST-2020

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Abstract. Purpose of the Research: This article is dedicated to analyzing Kazakhstan's state policy in managing intercommunal conflicts after 2020. This period is marked by a significant increase in government spending on research initiatives and the establishment of specialized state institutions aimed at sustaining long-term peace. The study focuses on changes in financial and institutional spheres designed to prevent and resolve conflicts.

The research employs a qualitative approach, including an analysis of state policies through the examination of regulatory documents and strategic development programs. Additionally, in-depth interviews with public officials were conducted, providing insights into the practical implementation of these policies. To enhance the qualitative analysis, quantitative data—particularly information on grants allocated by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education—was utilized. This helped analyze shifts in the distribution and volume of funding aimed at fostering peace and harmony in Kazakhstani society.

The unique value of this study lies in the use of new data that has not previously been introduced into academic discourse. These data provide a fresh perspective on the Kazakhstani government's approaches to managing intercommunal relations. Moreover, the authors emphasize the comprehensive nature of changes occurring in the post-crisis period, including institutional and financial redistribution.

Key words: State financing, multiethnic country, intercultural understanding, conflict research, long-term peacebuilding, Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, Institutional Changes, funding schemes

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Introduction

The research revealed that prior to 2020, the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (APK) was essentially the sole institution responsible for managing intercommunal relations. After 2020, Kazakhstani authorities undertook significant steps to diversify approaches to knowledge production and create new management mechanisms. Research funding was increased, and state agencies were established to handle risk management and monitoring. However, the authors note that despite these progressive measures, implementation effectiveness remains limited due to a

number of structural and organizational challenges that require further improvement.

Kazakhstan has been known on the international stage as a nation where all ethnic groups coexist peacefully [1]. Historically, the land of labor camps and exile settlements during the Soviet period, the Republic of Kazakhstan accumulated more than 130 ethnic groups [2]. According to the official statistics over 70% of total population is Kazakh and more than 20% of population belongs to the largest minority of Slavic descent [3]. All of the ethnicities are dispersed throughout the country without possessing “historical” territories of origin within the state. During the Nazarbayev’s regime, Kazakhstan practiced the Nation-Cultural Autonomy model in order to deal with potential interethnic conflicts.

The most important distinction about the NCA model is that it professes collective rights, which are executed as an option of a personal choice. Theoretically, the NCA model is based on several assumptions [4]. The first major pillar is the ‘personality principle,’ which holds that totalities of persons are divisible only according to personal, not territorial characteristics. It assumes that the membership of public enterprises should be determined by individuals freely selecting their ethnicity and voluntarily enrolling in a national register. Second, NCA assumes that the state must allow representatives of national groups to set up cultural public corporations. Once formed, these institutions assume full control over schooling in relevant language and other issues of specific concern to the group. Third, this two-tier structure eliminates competition among national communities by ensuring a strict separation of competences, with a mutually agreed joint juridical apparatus to oversee adjudication of controversial issues. In other words, conflict of cultural identities is solved within and by the community itself and the government interferes only if national community challenges overall constitutional principles. Lastly, based on the premise that the most controversial issues in multicultural societies are language, education and the recognition of cultural rights in public domain, NCA model requires all citizens to declare their nationality when they reach the voting age. Members of each community, whatever their territory of residence in the country, form a single public body or association endowed with constitutionally enshrined rights to deal with all national-cultural affairs.

However, over the past two decades, ethnic conflicts in rural areas of southern regions of Kazakhstan have sometimes erupted. These areas, especially around Almaty and South Kazakhstan regions, are densely populated and multilingual, creating fertile ground for the inter-ethnic conflicts that translate into communal violence. One of the most devastating cases of violence took place in 2020 in Korday leaving 10 dead, hundreds injured, producing countless property losses before the National Guard intervened.

Description of Materials and Methods

This event disrupted the operation of the NCA model and pushed the government to reconsider the existing policies and institutions. Despite the authorities’ attempts to cover up interethnic problems, both foreign and domestic

researchers have shown great interest in studying the various angles of interactions and perceptions among ethnic groups and their relationships with authorities at different levels. Although much has been written about the violence in local and international academic circles [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. The literature zoomed in on the causes of violence [5], on the theories applied [6], and actors involved [7]. For example, researchers criticized an ethnic hierarchy established by the Soviet national policy, which laid the foundation for the nation-building processes in many post-Soviet republics [10]. The Soviet Union widely promoted the principle of dividing people into nations and ethnic groups with titular nation forming the foundation of the official state [11]. This policy logically led to mistrust between people of different ethnic backgrounds.

Another reason for tense interethnic conflicts came from the official discourse. Kudaibergenova [12] concluded that the authorities used the concept of a civic nation for external audiences while practicing celebration of ethnic nation-building rhetoric domestically. The use of "double-talk" to address the target audiences also bred mistrust. Growing numbers of national-patriots felt supported by the government and advocated their own agenda in all state institutions, believing they have the right to punish the others for not respecting their natural rights as "hosts" vis-à-vis the "guests" [13, 14]. Some researchers, such as Ileulova and Kaznacheev predicted an increase in the communal violence if the absence of clear state policy and a worsening socio-economic situation in the country continues. Kaznacheev also stressed that in conditions of social tensions, ethnic minorities often become targets for the impoverished majority. His idea was supported by Lim [5] and Tutumlu & Imyarova [7], who argued that poverty in rural areas is the main reason for ethnic conflicts. The unemployed majority feel discriminated against the successful minorities.

Another body of literature blames conflicts on generational differences. It examines the interconnection between youth and their perceptions of reality. This new generation, born after 1991, has no memory and knowledge on how the multiethnic Kazakhstan was formed [15]. Instead, they believe they inherited Kazakhstan as their ancestral land. Consequently, they try to impose their own formal and informal rules on others. However, how the NCA model evolved after the clashes and what specific changes took place remains unclear.

Results

In this article, which is largely vested in data collected from a research project on intercommunal violence sponsored by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, we provide an overview of the new conflict management strategies and policies adopted by the government of Kazakhstan after the 2020. We concentrate on the funding schemes, the new institutions that were established, and the policies that introduced various reconciliation activities at the communal level. We argue that although much has been done to refocus the NCA model towards more sustainable practices, we find that the model can benefit from re-evaluation of policy assumptions and better linkages between government institutions and practices on the ground.

We rely on the qualitative methodology that also utilizes the quantitative data on the evolution of funding schemes. We unpack our analysis in three parts. We first show how the NCA model operated before 2020. We then illustrate the changes that took place after it and offer a critical perspective on the effectiveness of these reforms and institutional practices.

Discussion

Conflict management before 2020: denial. The Kazakhstani NCA model reconciled minority rights by proclaiming strong civic identity of ‘Kazakhstani’-ness. Minorities were encouraged to retain their culture, but also think of themselves different from, say, Russia, Azerbaijan or other republics where they potentially be a majority. They were invited to embrace the overarching hierarchy of national identity, largely built around aspects of Kazakh culture and Kazakh language [8], while retaining their cultural differences in the private realm. With this said, the government was not preventing them from exercising collective rights, should the demand from individual citizens exist. The attributes chosen for practice and protection were restricted, as the substantial expression of cultural differences beyond the folkloric and gastronomic functions were limited [9]. Ethnic communities were unable to promote a worldview that may contradict the official principles of nation-building. This model of Kazakhstani-ness was copied from the Soviet model of identity. In Soviet times all minorities had their own cultural peculiarities, which were celebrated and helped minorities to advance through an elaborate affirmative action program [16].

The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (APK or Assembly) was an organization that on the one hand, ensured cultural representation of the minorities and recognition in public sphere, but on the other hand, secured them under the auspices of the overarching Kazakhstani identity. As such, it was conceived as the main instrument of conflict resolution and representation. Established in 1995, the purpose of this organization revolved around two principles,

- Representation of interests of all ethnic groups in strict respect of the rights and freedoms of citizens irrespective of their ethnic affiliation.
- Implementation of the state national policy, ensuring socio-political stability in the country and improving the efficiency of cooperation between state institutions and civil society in the sphere of interethnic relations according to Law of the Assembly of People of the Kazakhstan dated 20 December, 2008 No. 70-IV.

These principles of the Assembly reflected the mainstream approach to conflict management that dominated before the 2020: the showcasing of ethnic and religious harmony. The focus on ‘harmony,’ by definition, denied the existence of conflict. Minorities on the ground performed this image no matter what type of violence they faced. The reported information about violence was frequently depoliticized, where violence was presented as insignificant and as a private domestic brawl of rural youth.

The focus on harmony in the NCA model established elaborate systems of the Assembly representatives at the local level. Although serving as a consultative body, members of the Assembly were nominated by the representatives from local

“Ethnocultural Associations” (ECAs). These enterprises in turn formed their own regional (oblastnye) assemblies headed by regional governors (akims). The organization of the model worked in the following manner: citizens voluntarily engaged in their cultural activities. At present, there are registered 371 ECAs that can be republican, regional, and local, working in close interaction with and under local state institutions. Only 16 ethnic groups have both republican and regional ECA, 21 groups have only regional ECA, and seven groups and subgroups have regional ECA. The most populous ethnic group without a republican ECA is the Dungans, while the smallest group with a republican ECA is the Jewish community. In total, only 40 ethnic groups have registered their republican and regional ECA. All of them must undergo public accreditation every three years. Public accreditation signifies the recognition of ethnocultural associations' activities based on the criteria and requirements of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan (About the Assembly of People of RK). Accreditation is granted for three years by a special commission from the members of APK. Besides an elaborate network of Ethnocultural Associations, the Assembly also has a Secretariat that is accountable to the Presidential Administration, Council of Experts, own Public Fund, and various Associations, including those of Entrepreneurs, Public Consent, Center of Interfaith and Interethnic Relations, and the Council of Deputies. The reach of the APK was wide and strong – from the local to the national level.

The focus on harmony and the denialist stance on the communal conflicts, diverted the majority of activities on concerts and performances during the public celebrations. Most activities of the Assemblies are sponsored with allocations from the state budget and other contributions. It is challenging to determine the exact sum of money allocated to the Assembly each year due to the lack of precise figures. Journalists claim that approximately 2 billion tenge is spent on APK, with most of this money going towards concerts [17]. According to the plan for realizing the Concept of Development before 2025, 119 million tenge was allocated in 2019 to conduct republican festivals of ethnic theatres (Ibid). Additionally, 15.2 million tenge was spent on other ethnic festivals that master Kazakh art (dombra, kobyz, dances) [17]. In 2019, a concert devoted to the session of APK cost 70.9 million tenge, with plans to increase this amount to 74.2 million tenge in the following year [18].

Concerts were organized by the Houses of Friendship, remnants of Soviet legacy and part of the APK at the local level. They hosted different representatives of Ethnocultural Associations in a single physical building in each oblast, region, and districts. The Houses of Friendship played several important functions in conflict management strategy. First, they hosted all minorities under a single roof, which enabled vibrant interaction and cooperation of these entities between each other. In addition, the Houses also had a visible focal point for the minority groups to come and convey their desires to their trusted representative, who, together with other members of the ethno-cultural center would mobilize the members towards a conflict resolution process. At the local level, state policy on interethnic relations was often banalized, taking on a folkloric and gastronomic character during the

celebrations. The APK was typically visible during the national holidays, where different ethnic groups showcase their traditional costumes, food, and dances.

Banalization is precisely the process of recognizing cultural attributes of ethnic groups stripped from any philosophical aspirations. At the end, culture boiled down to folklorization of a national histories and identities. Each ethnicity had a chance to celebrate their ethnic tales, dances, and national dishes as seen throughout public celebrations of Nauryz. Yurts showcased as booths for the sale of traditional food, clothes, and ethnic souvenirs to the general public. The hard topics of politics and philosophy were abandoned. In addition, newspapers and books of ethnic communities that printed poems and interviews with cultural leaders remain strictly in line with the framework of government strategies since they are sponsored by the government. As Brubaker points out, a “nation [becomes] a category of practice, and not a category of analysis [19].”

The key institutions that were primarily created for conflict resolution were the Council of Elders and Council of Mothers. The Council of Elders usually comprised of the most respected retired residents, this Council was supposed to ensure interethnic peace in their communities. However, they lacked the real power to prevent or resolve disputes. Our data shows that in some villages they were sidelined and played a largely ceremonial role. Additionally, our interviews show that some members complained that youth were more inclined to seek advice from the internet rather than from the elders, unlike the previous generations who were more respectful of the elders' opinions. The second institution that was responsible for the conflict management on the ground, was the Council of Mothers. The Council relied heavily by local akimats in helping to maintain interethnic harmony. However, they faced similar challenges as the Council of Elders. The youth were not treating them as legitimate actors in conflicts.

By 2020, the National-Cultural Autonomy model was no longer sustainable in preventing conflicts. Leaders of ethnocultural associations were supposed to be elected, but they are often appointed by the akimat (local administration), resulting in many lacking popularities within their communities. Similar story described the heads and staff of the Houses of Friendship who were also carefully selected and empowered to act as the government's supporters. While the APK and local councils fostered representation by ensuring social harmony, their roles were often limited to ceremonial functions or monitoring, rather than addressing the underlying causes of tensions. Therefore, the denialist stance had substantial drawbacks. The lack of dedicated institutions and reliable research hampered effective conflict prevention and resolution.

Conflict management after 2020: new beginnings through state funding & institutional development. The clashes of 2020 began after two incidents disseminated via social media platforms. One depicted brawl between local youth and law enforcement, while the other showcased a physical confrontation between two groups of motorists, allegedly resulting in an elderly individual sustaining a fracture. These recordings, purportedly captured by law enforcement, proliferated across social media, particularly within the Kaznet sphere, inciting calls for

retribution against outsiders who were seen to be disrespecting the local population and defying law enforcement.

Empirical studies conducted by Beisembayev Serik indicate that an overwhelming majority (90%) of Kaznet users endorsed violence against the small community [20]. Prominent public figures, including political activists, government officials, and social media influencers, openly advocated for aggression towards it. It is worth noting that subsequent investigations revealed discrepancies between the circulated narratives and actual events. For instance, the alleged severe injury of an elderly person by a youth was disproven by medical evidence, which indicated an accidental fall as the cause of injury. Similarly, the confrontation with law enforcement stemmed from allegations of police misconduct, rather than unprovoked aggression by some individuals. But once started, the conflict was further exacerbated by underlying economic disparities and social grievances.

After the violence, Kazakhstani authorities adopted several reforms in state policy regarding interethnic relations. First, the old institutions shifted the scope of their operations into strengthening cross-communal ties. Second, new institutions that focused on intercommunal and interethnic relations were created. Third, the funding for knowledge production has increased, as well as the solicited variety of research topics. The new conflict management strategy recognized violence as the fact that had to be addressed.

The reforms of old institutions concentrated on fostering recognition of ethnic diversity and the importance of all ethnic groups in the country. The Assembly of People of Kazakhstan was among the first agencies to be reformed. The organization immediately announced efforts to strengthen peace and harmony in Kazakhstani society. At the regional level, the Republican State Enterprise ‘Social Accord’ ["Қоғамдық келісім"] was established on May 2020 to address social conflicts by offering methodological know-how and to the akims of major regions and cities, such as Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent (<https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U2200001014>). They also offer trainings for the representatives of minority groups in charge of the ECAs. The new division of APK, the ‘Social Accord’ Enterprise is also managing the ‘Houses of Friendship.’ At the very local level, the State Enterprise equips these Houses with technical assistance, such as language software, transport and furniture to ensure comfortable learning process for people of all ages and abilities. Financing of the ‘Social Accord’ Enterprise, as well as the Houses of Friendship was provided from the state budget.

Two months after APK reforms, the Committee for the Development of Interethnic Relations within the Ministry of Information and Public Development was formed. Its mandate includes implementing state policy on interethnic relations, engaging with the public, conducting research, and writing policy papers. It also works as a coordinating and monitoring body at the regional level. The head of the Committee, Galym Shoikin, stated that the Committee conducts risk mapping and identifies problem regions in collaboration with local authorities. They regularly monitor issues that may arise in different geographical locations. In addition, the Committee sponsored movie on Korday violence “Lessons from

Korday” and issued special reports on the state channel ‘Khabar’ regarding the importance of ethnic diversity and contribution of various ethnic groups towards independence of the country. Financed from the state budget, the Committee also acts as a liaison with the private sector, such as ‘Atameken’ Union of Private Entrepreneurs and the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan to ensure mutual support and coordination of projects at the regional level. At the local level, the Committee is in charge of information dissemination and coordination of efforts towards interethnic harmony and social integration.

Another institution that was established after 2020 is the Institute of Applied Ethnopolitical Research under the same Ministry of Information and Social Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The purpose of the Institute is to provide expertise and produce knowledge relevant for the state policy-making process regarding ethnic relations. In practice, the Institute is responsible for monitoring risks of violence, development of early-warning systems in conflict-prone regions. They have covered important topics of hate speech, xenophobia, and growing influence of the so called national-patriots.

Local Akimats also revamped their departments responsible for interethnic relations. For example, Akimat of Zhambyl Oblast established an official department representing the Assembly of Peoples on Kazakhstan. This body was not only responsible for spreading information regarding the main decisions of the Assembly and sending the members to it, but also suggesting conflict resolution practices to be discussed in the Assembly to settle interethnic disagreements. The Department was also in charge of collecting information on migration trends, main grievances and potential areas of conflict. Formation of Kazakhstani identity was also noted as an important task to be implemented through the local schools and educational facilities to ensure integration.

Besides the institutional evolution, the government of Kazakhstan sponsored knowledge production about ethnic conflicts. According to the National Center of Science and Technology Evaluation (NCSTE), from 2017 to 2020, very few grants were awarded for researching interethnic relations. Instead, the funding went to the official projects of “Mengilik El” and “Rukhani Zhangyru”, which fostered social harmony, interethnic tolerance, and ethnic consolidation by focusing on studying patterns of migration among the youth and stories of deportations during the Soviet times.


Beginning in 2021, significant funding was allocated to the study of interethnic relations through a scientific approach, with the government enlisting domestic experts from various multidisciplinary fields such as political science, sociology, psychology, history and cultural studies joined by common efforts. This demonstrated that the authorities have a strong commitment to preventing future conflicts. After 2021, the funding increased fivefold, providing greater opportunities to pursue diverse research initiatives based on extensive field trips through the country under the support of local authorities. The research scope became more narrowly focused on understanding and explaining the underlying factors and root causes of conflicts, with a clear emphasis on social disparities, internal and external migration patterns, and economic grievances. A notable shift

also occurred toward exploring specific regional dynamics, with particular attention to demographic factors such as population density, ethnic composition, and economic inequalities mainly in the northern and southern regions of Kazakhstan. Also, the government has encouraged collaboration with internationally recognized institutions and foreign scholars, leveraging their expertise in comparative perspectives to address intercommunal tensions and promote national prosperity. This new approach was both strategic and well-defined, aiming to address both immediate concerns and fostering long-term peace and stability. The comprehensive research findings generated through these efforts now serve as a solid foundation for informed decision-making processes.

Additionally, there was a growing emphasis on monitoring and forecasting ethno-social processes, which came at a crucial time and became a core component of the government's strategies to anticipate, mitigate, and resolve potential threats of emerging conflicts. This evolution reflects a more targeted approach to addressing the complex socio-political dynamics within Kazakhstan. The adoption of well-chosen methodologies, including stakeholder analysis, in-depth interviews with local residents and officials, demographic studies, and social surveys, enabled a deeper understanding of shifting public sentiment, migration patterns, and intergroup perceptions across the country. These tools proved highly effective in forecasting areas of potential tension and providing actionable recommendations to prevent negative scenarios.

Alongside monitoring, risk mapping became an integral strategy, helping to develop comprehensive approaches and necessary tools tailored to each region's specific dynamics. This region-specific adaptation was a particularly wise state policy. Scientific research, in collaboration with local authorities and public activists contributed to the establishment of various local peacebuilding initiatives aimed at promoting intercultural understanding and tolerance. These initiatives, which often focused on conflict resolution through dialogue and educational programs, played a critical role in resolving contradictions within communities.

The evolution of these policies highlights a more proactive and nuanced approach to addressing Kazakhstan's complex and interwoven socio-political landscape, moving beyond reactive measures to create a sustainable framework for long-term social cohesion. The government's strong focus on these vital issues underscores its recognition that peace, mutual respect, and cultural understanding are top priorities in domestic policy.



Graph 1. State Funding for Research on Interethnic Relations, 2020-2023
Source: National Center of Science and Technology Evaluation (2024)

Overall, the reforms of the conflict management strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan after the 2020 were more realistic. They targeted the urgent problems that were unrecognized before, such as the importance of hate speech and the responsibilities of the Mass Media for spreading certain messages and frames. The new institutions were created to monitor grievances and conflicts, which did not exist in the attempts to procure ‘harmony’ and ceremonial performances of unity. In addition, the problem of knowledge production was also recognized after the 2020. Significant increase in state funding for research in conflict-prone areas and for studying the factors and root causes of conflicts improved the conflict management model.

Conclusion

Despite these initiatives, the results from the new and old state institutions have been limited. These institutions continue to face problems with transparency of their research activities. Specifically, the brief look at the new institutions shows that their studies are often classified, with few monographs and papers published and few conferences conducted.

They also fail to engage the communities, often continuing the denialist ‘harmony’ approach that they know best, which also reflects the problem of capacity of staff members in policy implementation. For example, in response to recent interethnic tensions, some APK members have proposed visiting remote rural areas with concerts featuring different ethnic groups and publishing ethnic fairytales to foster greater understanding and unity among Kazakhstan's diverse populations.

Further research needs to be conducted to investigate the importance of mediation mechanisms in conflict prevention, which is a fledgling field. More work needs to be done on the role of social and mass media on conflicts and mobilization strategies to work out conflict prevention strategies.

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ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛДЫҚ БАСҚАРУ ЖӘНЕ ЖАНЖАЛДАРДЫ ЗЕРТТЕУДІ МЕМЛЕКЕТТІК ҚАРЖЫЛАНДЫРУ: 2020 ЖЫЛДАН КЕЙІНГІ ҰЗАҚ МЕРЗІМДІ БЕЙБІТШІЛІКТІ САҚТАУ БОЙЫНША КҮШ-ЖІГЕР

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Аңдатпа. Бұл мақала Қазақстанның 2020 жылдан кейінгі қауымаралық қақтығыстарды басқарудағы мемлекеттік саясатын талдауға арналған. Бұл кезең ғылыми бастамаларға және ұзақ мерзімді бейбітшілікті сақтау міндеті болып табылатын мамандандырылған мемлекеттік мекемелерді құруға мемлекеттік шығындардың едәуір артуымен сипатталады. Зерттеудің негізгі бағыты қақтығыстардың алдын алуға және шешуге бағытталған қаржылық және институционалдық салалардағы өзгерістер болып табылады.

Зерттеудің негізі нормативтік-құқықтық құжаттар мен стратегиялық даму бағдарламаларын зерделеу арқылы мемлекеттік саясатты талдауды қамтитын сапалы тәсілге негізделген. Сонымен қатар, мемлекеттік қызметшілермен терең сұхбат жүргізілді, бұл тәжірибеде саясатты іске асыруға қатысты түсініктер алуға мүмкіндік берді. Сапалық талдауды күшейту үшін сандық деректер, атап айтқанда ғылым және жоғары білім министрлігі бөлетін гранттар туралы ақпарат пайдаланылды. Бұл қазақстандық қоғамда бейбітшілік пен келісімді нығайтуға бағытталған қаржыландырудың бөлінуі мен көлеміндегі өзгерістерді талдауға көмектесті.

Зерттеуге бұрын ғылыми айналымға енгізілмеген жаңа деректерді пайдалану ерекше мән береді. Бұл деректер Қазақстан Үкіметінің қауымаралық қатынастарды Басқару тәсілдеріне жаңа көзқарас ұсынуға мүмкіндік береді. Сонымен қатар, авторлар дағдарыстан кейінгі кезеңдегі өзгерістердің, соның ішінде институционалдық және қаржылық қайта бөлудің кешенді сипатына назар аударады.

Зерттеу көрсеткендей, 2020 жылға дейін Қазақстан халқы Ассамблеясы (ҚХА) іс жүзінде қауымаралық қатынастарды басқаруға жауапты жалғыз институт болды. 2020 жылдан кейін Қазақстан билігі білім өндіру тәсілдерін әртараптандыру және басқарудың жаңа тетіктерін құру жөнінде елеулі қадамдар жасады. Зерттеулерді қаржыландыру ұлғайды, тәуекелдерді басқару мен мониторингке жауапты мемлекеттік органдар құрылды. Алайда, авторлар осы прогрессивті шараларға қарамастан, одан әрі жетілдіруді қажет ететін бірқатар құрылымдық және ұйымдастырушылық мәселелерге байланысты іске асыру тиімділігі шектеулі болып қала беретінін атап өтті.

Тірек сөздер: Мемлекеттік қаржыландыру, көпұлтты мемлекет, этносаралық түсінік, жанжалдарды зерттеу, ұзақ мерзімді бітімгершілік, Қазақстан халқы Ассамблеясы, институционалдық өзгерістер, қаржыландыру схемалары

**ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛЬНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ И
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ФИНАНСИРОВАНИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ
КОНФЛИКТОВ: УСИЛИЯ ПО ПОДДЕРЖАНИЮ
ДОЛГОСРОЧНОГО МИРА ПОСЛЕ 2020 ГОДА**

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Аннотация. Данная статья посвящена анализу государственной политики Казахстана в управлении межобщинными конфликтами после 2020 года. Этот период характеризуется значительным увеличением государственных расходов на исследовательские инициативы и создание специализированных государственных учреждений, задачей которых является поддержание долгосрочного мира. В фокусе исследования находятся изменения в финансовой и институциональной сферах, направленные на предотвращение и разрешение конфликтов.

В основу исследования положен качественный подход, включающий анализ политики через изучение нормативно-правовых документов и стратегических программ развития. Дополнительно проведены глубинные интервью с государственными служащими, что позволило получить инсайты относительно реализации политик на практике. Для усиления качественного анализа использованы количественные данные, в частности информация о грантах, выделяемых Министерством науки и высшего образования. Это помогло проанализировать изменения в распределении и объемах финансирования, направленных на укрепление мира и согласия в казахстанском обществе.

Особую ценность данному исследованию придает использование новых данных, ранее не вводившихся в научный оборот. Эти данные позволяют предложить новый взгляд на подходы правительства Казахстана к управлению межобщинными отношениями. Кроме того, авторы акцентируют внимание на комплексной природе изменений, происходящих в посткризисный период, включая институциональное и финансовое перераспределение.

Исследование показало, что до 2020 года Ассамблея народа Казахстана (АНК) фактически была единственным институтом, ответственным за управление межобщинными отношениями. После 2020 года казахстанские власти предприняли значительные шаги по диверсификации подходов к производству знаний и созданию новых механизмов управления. Увеличилось финансирование исследований, были сформированы государственные органы, ответственные за управление рисками и мониторинг. Однако авторы отмечают, что, несмотря на эти прогрессивные меры, эффективность реализации остаётся ограниченной из-за ряда структурных и организационных проблем, требующих дальнейшего улучшения.

Ключевые слова: Государственное финансирование, многонациональное государство, межэтническое понимание, исследования конфликтов, долгосрочное миростроительство, Ассамблея народа Казахстана, институциональные изменения, схемы финансирования

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