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BETWEEN EMPIRES AND EXILE: UYGHUR MIGRANTS IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA DURING THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

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Abstract. This paper examines the experiences of Uyghur émigrés from Xinjiang who settled in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, with a focus on how they maintained emotional and practical connections to their homeland during the Sino-Soviet rift, particularly from the 1960s to the 1980s. While many Uyghurs fled political repression and collectivization in China during the 1950s and early 1960s, their memories of the subsequent decades are shaped by deep anxiety and fear related to China's growing power and its increasingly hostile stance toward the Soviet Union. The research analyzes how Cold War geopolitics—especially the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations—were experienced and interpreted by Uyghur communities living on the Soviet periphery. As a transnational minority with cultural, linguistic, and familial ties across the Chinese-Soviet border, Uyghurs were uniquely positioned to feel the direct impact of this geopolitical divide. The study places particular emphasis on the 1970s and 1980s, a period marked by intensified Sinophobia within the Soviet Union. Methodologically, the research combines oral history and in-depth interviews, drawing on hundreds of testimonies from witnesses of these events, gathered over years of ethnographic fieldwork in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. This study highlights the practical value of using memory-based narratives to understand how Uyghur communities experienced and adapted to Cold War tensions and displacement. It shows how global politics were internalized through everyday fears, prayers, and satirical cultural expressions. The findings offer insights for current policymakers, educators, and researchers working with displaced or cross-border ethnic groups by illustrating how geopolitical events shape identity, resilience, and political awareness on the ground.

Key words: Uyghur migration, Sino-Soviet rift, Cold War, Sinophobia, oral history, identity, Soviet Central Asia, memory politics

Introduction

In the 1970s, Gulnisa Nazarova, then a young Soviet schoolgirl and now one of the authors of this article, recalls that during her elementary school years in Uzbekistan, she and her classmate Jalil Rasulbaev, whose family had also migrated to Soviet Central Asia in the 1960s, would quietly wish for the continued health of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev while tending sheep in the fields. These were not religious prayers; religion was officially banned in Soviet schools. Their prayers were silent hopes, shaped by a climate of fear and reinforced by

anxious parents and teachers. Even as children, they had been taught to believe that Brezhnev's death would trigger an immediate war with China. For kids like Gulnisa, concern for Brezhnev's well-being was not merely symbolic; it was rooted in an internalized fear of invasion. In their minds, Brezhnev stood as a bulwark against Chinese aggression, and his death would signal disaster. These beliefs were not the product of childish fantasy, but the result of sustained state-sponsored messaging designed to cultivate both loyalty and fear.

This messaging intensified dramatically following the 1969 Sino-Soviet military confrontation on Damansky Island, which marked a turning point in Cold War propaganda. Anti-Maoist rhetoric surged to unprecedented levels as the Soviet state mobilized its ideological apparatus through television, radio, newspapers, and even factory lectures. The aim was to portray China as an imminent, existential threat, thereby consolidating internal unity and reinforcing the legitimacy of the Soviet leadership. This campaign was deeply felt by ordinary citizens, as reflected in numerous oral history interviews. Many respondents vividly recalled this period, often supplementing their memories with references to media content. While retrospective memories are shaped by time and context, such accounts provide a valuable lens through which to reconstruct the emotional and psychological climate of the era.

Crucially, the ideological battle between the USSR and China was not one-sided. Across the border, Chinese media depicted the Soviet Union as a revisionist and imperialist force threatening socialist purity. Both regimes sought to project positive self-images while framing the other as corrupt and dangerous. This mutual demonization turned borderlands – where familial, cultural, and linguistic ties often crossed national lines – into contested ideological spaces. Central Asia became a strategic site in an emerging form of informational warfare.

In response, the Soviet Union invested heavily in its international broadcasting infrastructure. By the late 1960s, it was transmitting content in 82 languages and dialects, including Mandarin, Cantonese, Shanghaiese, Mongolian, and Uyghur. Tashkent, as a major broadcasting hub, played a central role in this campaign by producing Uyghur-language programs aimed at influencing populations with cross-border connections to Xinjiang. As historian Helmut König notes, these efforts were part of a broader Soviet strategy to secure the loyalty of borderland minorities and counteract the soft power of Chinese influence [1]. Thus, the ideological front of the Cold War did not merely divide states – it also penetrated communities, classrooms, and even the private thoughts of children.

Description of Materials and Methods

This research employs a combined methodology of oral history and ethnographic fieldwork, enabling an exploration of both individual memories and the broader socio-political contexts in which those memories were shaped. Grounded in the principle of writing history “from below,” this approach foregrounds the voices of ordinary people and offers a counterpoint to dominant “top-down” narratives typically produced by state institutions and official

historiography. In this sense, it aligns with what Geertz [2] described as seeking “the native point of view.” As Kamp [3] argues, oral history is not merely the recounting of private experience but also involves the narrator’s ability to interpret that experience and re-cast their identity within shifting political contexts. Frisch [4] adds that understanding oral testimony requires asking who is speaking, what kind of experience is being shared, and how it is interpreted – reminding us that memory is inherently selective and shaped by cultural and historical frames.

The empirical material for this study is based on extensive fieldwork conducted between 2016 and 2024 across three Central Asian republics – Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan – with a focus on regions where Uyghur communities have been historically concentrated. This article presents only a small portion of a larger, multi-year research project examining Uyghur migration from China to Central Asia during the Cold War. The broader project investigates the social, political, and emotional trajectories of Uyghur migrants and their descendants, focusing on how their experiences were shaped by geopolitical tensions, border regimes, and shifting national ideologies. In total, over 100 life-history interviews were collected from former migrants and their families. At the time of the interviews, respondents ranged in age from 70 to 91 years old, with birth years spanning from 1935 to 1945. Drawing on these narratives, the research explores how Uyghurs who migrated to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s – and, in some cases, during the 1970s amid the Cultural Revolution – perceived, remembered, and interpreted anti-Chinese sentiment during the period of the Sino-Soviet rift from the 1960s to the 1980s.

Result

These narratives illuminate how Uyghur migrants, despite having fled Chinese rule, remained entangled in ideological tensions that extended beyond national borders. Within the Soviet Union, they continued to feel vulnerable and subjected to scrutiny – not only as former citizens of China but as potential ideological “others.” Their memories reflect how fear, humor, longing, and dislocation shaped a unique post-migration identity, forged in the shadow of competing empires and Cold War politics.

This sense of vulnerability was not simply personal but deeply embedded in the political environment of the time. The ideological and geopolitical rupture between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China – especially after their relations soured in the 1960s and armed conflict erupted along the Ussuri River in 1969 – permeated everyday Soviet life. In border regions like Central Asia, where many Uyghurs had settled, China was not just a distant enemy but a constant feature in official discourse, portrayed both as a military threat and a traitor to socialist ideals. Textbooks, media, and state-led campaigns constructed an atmosphere of suspicion in which China symbolized danger – and even those who had escaped it could not entirely escape its shadow.

Discussion

Echoes of Suspicion: Historical Roots and Persistence of Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Central Asia

In contemporary Central Asia, Sinophobia – fear or hostility toward China – has become a widespread phenomenon. It is primarily driven by concerns over China's territorial ambitions, economic expansion, and its well-documented repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. However, the roots of anti-Chinese sentiment in the region trace back much further. As Alekseeva [5] notes, these sentiments began to take shape in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, closely linked to Russian imperial expansion in the Far East and Siberia. This period also saw increased contact with Chinese migrants who came to the region seeking work and trade [6].

Early portrayals of Chinese people were often steeped in negative stereotypes, reflecting global “Yellow Peril” imagery [7]. These depictions gradually evolved into deeply entrenched conspiracy theories, which became embedded in the political discourse of the region. These narratives exploited underlying fears and uncertainties about China's long-term intentions. According to Fenster [8], conspiracy theories help believers consolidate group identity, discredit opposition, and frame dissent as part of a hidden agenda. Similarly, Wilson [9] characterizes conspiracy-making as a form of “virtual politics” – a performative act used to manipulate political reality. As a result, China has long been viewed in Central Asia not merely as a neighbor but as a hidden threat with ambitions to dominate the region.

This geopolitical anxiety filtered into daily life during the Cold War. Many interviewees recalled how discussions about China permeated household conversations, news broadcasts, and social gatherings. Political fear became a constant background presence, shaping family narratives and intergenerational memory. One Dungan man, who migrated to Kyrgyzstan in 1962 and spoke fluent Uyghur, recalled his service in the Soviet army in Georgia in 1970. When a Russian soldier deserted his unit, investigators discovered that the Dungan officer had been born in China. That fact alone was enough to arouse suspicion. “They questioned how a ‘Chinese’ man could be trusted with command,” he recalled. “They thought I might be a spy.” His unit was ordered to sleep with weapons in hand, ready to mobilize within five minutes in the event of a Chinese attack. His commander even claimed to have participated in the 1969 Damansky Island conflict, boasting that “Soviet forces had used laser weapons during the battle.”

Other testimonies described covert Soviet operations near the Chinese border. One man recalled that his uncle had been trained by Soviet officials in the late 1960s to infiltrate Xinjiang as both an agitator and an informant. His mission was twofold: to reassure local Uyghur populations that the Soviet Union was not preparing for war, and to secretly report on public sentiment. Uyghur men living in Soviet border regions were also reportedly trained as partisans in the event of open conflict with China.

More secretive missions also surfaced in interviews. One respondent described how his relative was sent to Ghulja (Yining) in 1970, where he was

arrested by Chinese authorities and spent ten years in prison. During that time, the family received no information about his fate – only that he had been on a “state mission.” Upon his return to the Soviet Union, he and his family were rewarded with housing and financial assistance. In another story, a man revealed that his uncle was involved in smuggling Chinese currency into Xinjiang to support Soviet-linked underground networks. “I wouldn’t be telling you this if my brother were still alive,” he said. “It was a state secret.”

Fear and hope during this period were not limited to one side of the border. In 1993, Gulnisa’s uncle from Ghulja visited relatives in Kyrgyzstan and spoke about how Uyghurs in the Ili region had long expected the return of their family members who had fled to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s. During the Sino-Soviet conflict, many Han Chinese left towns like Suydun, Qorghas, and Ghulja, afraid of a Soviet invasion. “Many houses stood empty,” he recalled. “They thought the Uyghurs would return with the Soviet Army and reclaim their homes.”

These memories show how deeply the past shapes the way people view their neighbors and others. For the Uyghurs, the return of their loved ones symbolized hope and the possibility of reclaiming what had been lost. However, for those on the other side – especially Han Chinese – it stirred fears of war and instability. Such stories and emotions, passed down from parents to children, continue to influence how communities understand and relate to one another today. In this way, history plays a powerful role in shaping everyday attitudes, fears, and expectations.

Shifting Borders, Shifting Lives: Uyghur Migration and the Rise of Sino-Soviet Hostility

Following Stalin’s death in 1953 and the rise of Nikita Khrushchev, ideological contradictions between the Soviet Union and its former ally, the People’s Republic of China, began to intensify. The rift deepened after Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, which denounced Stalin’s cult of personality. This marked a turning point, as previously close Soviet-Chinese relations gave way to open hostility. Several recurring patterns emerged from the oral history interviews conducted for this study. Many respondents recalled the early 1950s as a period of ideological harmony, when the Soviet Union and China shared common political values and were publicly aligned as brotherly socialist nations [10]. At the time, international observers referred to this alignment as the “red-yellow threat to the free world.” However, even during this period, private skepticism existed. Later reports suggest that Stalin once likened Mao Zedong to a radish – red on the outside, white on the inside [11], hinting at underlying distrust within the alliance.

The escalation of Sino-Soviet tensions in the late 1950s and early 1960s coincided with China’s launch of the Great Leap Forward, an ambitious political and economic campaign aimed at rapid industrialization and collectivization. Fueled by ideological fervor rather than practical economic planning, the campaign resulted in devastating failures. Unrealistic production targets, disregard for basic

agricultural and industrial realities, and the belief that mass enthusiasm could substitute for resources and expertise led to widespread famine, particularly in rural regions. This humanitarian crisis was especially severe in China's borderlands, where desperation prompted a surge in illegal crossings into the Soviet Union. By the early 1960s, the scale of this migration had grown significantly. Uyghurs, along with Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Dungans, fled in large numbers from Xinjiang into neighboring Soviet republics [12], [13], [14] (Kamalov, 2021; Imyarova, 2024). What began as isolated border crossings soon took on the character of a mass migration, facilitated both by deteriorating conditions in China and by the relative openness of the Soviet side during this brief window.

By the late 1960s, relations between the two powers had deteriorated to the point that rumors of a Chinese invasion circulated widely among Soviet citizens. Analysis of oral history interviews reveals the emotional and psychological imprint these fears left on ordinary people. As one respondent recalled, "The Soviet leadership was genuinely worried about a Chinese attack and the possibility of a third world war." Others described the constant atmosphere of anxiety that permeated everyday life, from schools and households to village gossip. Yet, for many Uyghurs in the Soviet Union – particularly those with roots in Xinjiang – this fear of war was accompanied by a conflicted sense of hope. Soviet anti-Chinese propaganda often resonated with Uyghur aspirations for independence or political change in their homeland.

As one interviewee explained, "We wanted this war – we hoped it would bring us independence." Another respondent recounted participating in military training in 1970, under the assumption that Uyghurs would be sent back across the border to fight: "They called it *voennye sbory* [military training]. They told us, You know the land well – you'll go there to fight." Despite decades of political manipulation and unmet promises, many Uyghurs continued to believe that the Soviet Union might support their national cause. This belief, however, was never realized. As sinologist Luzyanin notes, while Moscow occasionally supported Muslim rebels in Xinjiang, it had no intention of enabling Uyghur independence [15]. Supporting an independent Uyghur state would have risked destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, where Uyghur and other Turkic populations already lived in significant numbers. Historically, the Soviet Union had three opportunities to back Uyghur statehood – during the Northern Expedition (1925–27), the 1931–33 uprisings in Xinjiang, and the East Turkestan Republic (1944–45) – but consistently chose not to do so. These decisions reflected a broader Soviet strategy of preserving regional stability and protecting its geopolitical interests above all else.

While this high-stakes political drama unfolded at the state level, its effects were felt unevenly in daily life. Men often recalled these tensions vividly, sometimes describing direct involvement in clandestine activities or military preparedness. In contrast, Uyghur women often did not remember these events with the same intensity or frequency. Many interviewees suggested that this difference stemmed from traditional gender roles. As one man humorously put it: "It's like the old anecdote. A man is asked who is more important in the family

– him or his wife. He says: ‘Of course me. I deal with the big issues: Will China attack the Soviet Union? What will we do if it happens? My wife deals with the little things – like what the children will eat or wear today.’” We might chuckle at this, knowing that the “little things” are clearly the more important, dealing with actual concrete problems rather than abstract possibilities.

Despite the seriousness of the period, humor and satire served as outlets for fear, uncertainty, and political commentary. Gulnisa recalls that during her student years in Russia in the 1980s, she and her classmates sang comedic street songs about *hunweibins* (from hongweibing, “Red Guards”) and imagined battles with Chinese troops. These songs, often sung during student gatherings and drinking parties, included improvised lyrics and dark humor reflecting the tension of the time. One version went:

One hundred Chinese regiments approaching me
Well, let them draw near, my machine gun is ready
I pull the trigger, and all the Chinese will be dead
You can drink a small glass, or you can even drink five

Another ran:

A Hunweibin is coming at me from the bushes
Well, let him come, I have a carbine
I pull the trigger, and the bullet goes into the Hunweibin’s ribs
You can drink a small shot, or you can drink a bucket

Such lyrics illustrate how even students internalized Cold War anxieties, processing them through sarcasm and song. This sense of tension was not limited to private jokes or student circles – it also found expression in the broader popular culture of the time. One example is Vladimir Vysotsky’s satirical piece, “*Letter from the Workers of the Tambov Factory to the Chinese Leaders*,” which criticized the Cultural Revolution and the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. Referencing China’s earlier dependence on Soviet aid during its famine, the lyrics included the lines:

When you washed down rice with water –
We were showing internationalism.
I bet when you chewed Russian bread,
You didn’t talk about opportunism (revisionism)!

You don’t need bombs or shells,
Don’t fan the flames of war –
We will strike you, if needed,
With several nukes more.

These forms of cultural expression – whether in secret missions, rumors, student songs, or state-sanctioned satire – reveal how deeply the Sino-Soviet rift shaped the political imagination and emotional world of Uyghur migrants and other Soviet citizens alike. From covert border operations to dinner table jokes,

from whispered prayers to military drills, life during this period was saturated with the expectation of conflict.

These memories offer insight into how individuals and families navigated the complex landscape of hope, fear, loyalty, and survival, crafting meaning in a world caught between propaganda and lived experience.

Longing, Loyalty, and Loss: Uyghur Migrant Lives in Soviet Central Asia

The oral history interviews conducted for this study provide valuable insight into the lives of Uyghur migrants in the Soviet Union and the degree to which they integrated into local communities across Central Asia. For more than two decades – until 1985 and the onset of perestroika – Uyghurs living in Soviet republics had virtually no contact with relatives in Xinjiang. Most interviewees visited their homeland only after border policies began to loosen in the late 1980s. A few were able to return multiple times and even hosted relatives from China. Despite having adapted to Soviet life, established families, and raised children, they continued to long for their homeland. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this desire to reconnect with Xinjiang intensified, especially as ethnic identity and cultural belonging gained new meaning in the newly independent Central Asian republics. While Soviet ideology had promoted equality among nationalities, many Uyghurs regard that ideal as increasingly distant or illusory in the states of Central Asia.

These collective reflections take on deeper meaning when grounded in individual life stories. One particularly vivid example is the testimony of Pettakh (Fattakh) *aka*, born in 1949. His account provides a detailed and emotionally charged narrative that captures the complexity of Uyghur displacement. Through his experience, we gain a clearer understanding of how political persecution, fear, and cultural erasure shaped not only the decision to flee China, but also the fraught process of rebuilding life in Soviet Central Asia.

“I was born in Korla and started school in 1957 in Maytag, at a school that had been left behind by the Russians. Later, my mother moved us to Chochek, where I continued my studies. We were taught all subjects – except Uyghur history. We had Chinese language classes and endless political education sessions: reading official news, discussing party campaigns. Later, I started working at a newspaper. In 1964, Chochek’s newspapers were printed in Kazakh. During the Cultural Revolution, the paper could run up to 30 pages. We worked 14-hour shifts. By late 1965, authorities began house visits urging people to ‘destroy the old and build the new.’ They seized jewelry and gold, saying it wasn’t for the proletariat. Teenagers from local schools were given power. Even our printing press was confiscated...”

It should be mentioned that Maytag – ‘Oil Mountain’ – is known for its rich petroleum deposits. In 1955, one of the largest oilfields in the PRC was discovered there, and it remains a major center of oil production to this day.

Pettakh *aka*’s testimony underscores several key themes that run throughout this research: the precarity of Uyghur life under Chinese rule, the trauma of forced migration, and the ambiguous reception refugees faced in the Soviet Union. His

early exposure to political indoctrination, the suppression of Uyghur history, and the brutality of the “purifying class ranks” (*sepmi tazilash*) campaign reflect the systemic targeting of minority identities in Maoist China. However, escape did not mean safety. In the USSR, he and his family encountered a different – but no less invasive – system of surveillance and mistrust. Branded as outsiders, suspected of espionage, and labeled “Chinese,” their identity was repeatedly misrecognized, compounding their displacement.

“We were watched constantly. Many suspected us of being Chinese spies. My mother was 50 when we arrived; [she had been] born in 1918. After two years, we received Soviet passports. I was drafted into the army and sent to Aktepe, where I worked as a hospital orderly. I served with Tatars who had arrived in the Soviet Union in 1961. We didn’t speak Russian – it was difficult. We wrote letters home in Arabic script, which scared the officers. They thought we were passing secrets. Later, our unit was transferred to Almaty, closer to the central authorities. There, we joined a construction battalion. People called us ‘Chinese’ and mocked us. They didn’t know how deeply that hurt. I once got into a fight over it and was sent to Balkhash as punishment.”

Pettakh aka’s story also highlights the everyday forms of resilience, adaptability, and quiet resistance that defined Uyghur life in exile. From smuggling themselves across the border to navigating Soviet labor camps and army service, his account reveals how survival was an act of negotiation – between state structures, local prejudice, and personal dignity.

Taken together, these interviews reveal that displacement for Uyghur migrants was not a single rupture, but an ongoing condition shaped by intersecting ideologies, Cold War geopolitics, and the shifting landscapes of belonging. The longing for a lost homeland, pride in endurance, and the pain of marginalization are not just individual memories – they are collectively held experiences that continue to shape Uyghur identity in post-Soviet Central Asia.

Conclusion

The experiences of Uyghur migrants in Soviet Central Asia during the Cold War reveal the profound ways in which global geopolitical tensions penetrated personal lives and reshaped collective identities. Fleeing political repression, famine, and ideological campaigns in Xinjiang, thousands of Uyghurs crossed into the Soviet Union during the 1950s and 1960s, seeking refuge and stability. Yet even in exile, they remained entangled in the shadow of the Sino-Soviet conflict. As a borderland minority, Uyghurs in the USSR were both protected and scrutinized – granted asylum, but never fully trusted.

Through oral history interviews and memory narratives, this article has shown how Cold War ideologies – particularly Soviet Sinophobia – filtered into schools, workplaces, military service, and everyday conversations. Uyghur migrants internalized and reinterpreted these narratives in complex ways: with fear, with hope for liberation, with humor, and with longing for a lost homeland. These emotional registers shaped how they understood their place in Soviet society and their relationship to both China and the USSR.

For many, exile did not mean detachment from the Uyghur homeland – it meant living with a permanent sense of distance, vulnerability, and ambiguity. As Soviet borders reopened in the late 1980s, new connections were forged, but so too were old wounds reopened. In the post-Soviet period, with the rise of nationalism and shifting political landscapes, Uyghur identity has acquired new meanings, rooted not only in ethnic heritage but also in shared memory, survival, and the legacy of Cold War displacement.

By centering the voices of Uyghur migrants themselves, this research offers a human-scale account of Cold War history – one that illuminates how ideology, fear, and aspiration shaped the lives of those caught between competing empires. It is a story of loss and resilience, but also of agency, adaptation, and the enduring power of memory.

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ИМПЕРИЯЛАР МЕН ҚУҒЫН-СҮРГІН АРАСЫНДА: ҚЫТАЙ-КЕҢЕСТІК АЛШАҚТЫҚ КЕЗІНДЕ КЕҢЕСТІК ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯДАҒЫ ҰЙҒЫР МИГРАНТТАРЫ

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Аңдатпа. Бұл мақалада Синьцзяннан шыққан ұйғыр мигранттарының Совет Одағының Орталық Азия республикаларына қоныстану тәжірибесі қарастырылады. Негізгі назар 1960–1980-жылдары Қытай мен Совет Одағы арасындағы шиеленіс кезеңінде олардың отанымен эмоционалдық және практикалық байланыстарды қалай сақтағанына аударылады. 1950-жылдары және 1960-жылдардың басында көптеген ұйғырлар Қытайдағы саяси репрессия мен ұжымдастырудан қашып кетті. Кейінгі онжылдықтардағы олардың естеліктері Қытайдың өсіп келе жатқан ықпалы мен Совет Одағына деген дұшпандық ұстанымынан туындаған аландаушылық пен үрейге толы. Зерттеуде «қырғи-қабақ соғыс» кезеңіндегі геосаяси процестердің, әсіресе қытай-совет қарым-қатынастарының нашарлауының, Совет Одағының шеткері аймақтарында өмір сүрген ұйғыр қауымдастықтары тарапынан қалай қабылданып, түсіндірілгені талданады. Мәдени, тілдік және отбасылық байланыстары екі жақта да болған трансшекаралық этномәдени азшылық ретінде ұйғырлар бұл геосаяси жанжалдың салдарын ерекше сезінді.

Мақалада 1970–1980-жылдарға – Совет Одағындағы синофобия күшейген кезеңге – ерекше мән беріледі. Зерттеу әдістемесі ретінде авторлар ауызша тарих пен тереңдетілген сұхбаттарға сүйенеді. Бұл материалдар Қазақстан, Қырғызстан және Өзбекстанда ұзақ жылдар жүргізілген этнографиялық далалық жұмыстар барысында жиналған. Зерттеу ұйғыр қауымдастықтарының халықаралық шиеленіс, мәжбүрлі көші-қон және саяси адалдықтың өзгерістеріне қалай бейімделгенін түсіну үшін жадыға негізделген нарративтердің практикалық маңызын көрсетеді. Авторлар жаһандық саясаттың күнделікті өмірге қалай ықпал еткенін – қорқыныш, дұға және сатиралық мәдени өрнектер арқылы – сипаттайды. Алынған нәтижелер қазіргі саясаткерлер, мұғалімдер мен зерттеушілер үшін мәжбүрлі мигранттар мен трансшекаралық этникалық топтармен

жұмыс істеуде пайдалы бола алады, себебі олар геосаяси оқиғалардың жеке басының бірегейлігіне, төзімділікке және саяси сананың қалыптасуына қалай әсер ететінін көрсетеді.

Тірек сөздер: ұйғыр миграциясы, қытай-совет қайшылықтары, қырғи-қабақ соғыс, синофобия, ауызша тарих, бірегейлік, Совет Одағының Орталық Азиясы, жады саясаты

МЕЖДУ ИМПЕРИЯМИ И ИЗГНАНИЕМ: МИГРАНТЫ-УЙГУРЫ В СОВЕТСКОЙ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ ВО ВРЕМЯ КИТАЙСКО-СОВЕТСКИХ ПРОТИВОРЕЧИЙ

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Аннотация. В статье рассматривается опыт миграции уйгуров из Синьцзяна, обосновавшихся в советских республиках Центральной Азии, с особым вниманием к тому, каким образом они поддерживали эмоциональные и практические связи с родиной во время китайско-советского разрыва, особенно в 1960–1980-е годы. Многие уйгуры бежали от политических репрессий и коллективизации в Китае в 1950-х – начале 1960-х годов, а их воспоминания о последующих десятилетиях пронизаны тревогой и страхом перед растущим влиянием Китая и его враждебностью по отношению к Советскому Союзу. В исследовании анализируется, как геополитические процессы периода холодной войны – прежде всего ухудшение китайско-советских отношений – воспринимались и интерпретировались уйгурскими сообществами на советской периферии. Как трансграничное этнокультурное меньшинство, связанное с обеими сторонами границы культурно, языково и семейно, уйгуры особенно остро ощущали последствия геополитического конфликта. Особое внимание в статье уделяется 1970–1980-м годам – периоду усиления синофобии в Советском Союзе. Методологически исследование опирается на устную историю и углублённые интервью, собранные в ходе многолетней этнографической работы в Казахстане, Кыргызстане и Узбекистане. В его основе – сотни свидетельств очевидцев описываемых событий. Работа подчёркивает практическую значимость памяти как инструмента изучения того, как уйгурские общины переживали и воспринимали международную напряжённость, вынужденное переселение и сдвиги политической лояльности. Исследование показывает, как глобальная политика оказывала влияние на повседневную жизнь – через страхи, молитвы и сатирические формы культурного выражения. Полученные результаты могут быть полезны политикам, педагогам и исследователям, работающим с вынужденными мигрантами и трансграничными этническими сообществами, поскольку демонстрируют, как геополитика влияет на формирование идентичности, устойчивости и политического сознания на уровне повседневного опыта.

Ключевые слова: миграция уйгуров, китайско-советские противоречия, холодная война, синофобия, устная история, идентичность, Советская Средняя Азия, политика памяти

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