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ЖӘНЕ ӘЛЕМ ТІЛДЕРІ УНИВЕРСИТЕТІ

**ХАБАРШЫСЫ**  
“ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАР ЖӘНЕ  
АЙМАҚТАНУ” СЕРИЯСЫ

**ИЗВЕСТИЯ**  
КАЗАХСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА  
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ И  
МИРОВЫХ ЯЗЫКОВ ИМЕНИ АБЫЛАЙ ХАНА

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Абылай хан атындағы ҚазХҚжӘТУ

# ХАБАРШЫСЫ

«ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАР және  
АЙМАҚТАНУ» сериясы

# ИЗВЕСТИЯ

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ҚАТЫНАСТАР  
РАЗДЕЛ I.  
МИРОВАЯ ПОЛИТИКА И МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ  
I PART.  
WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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**КОНЦЕПТУАЛЬНЫЕ ОСНОВЫ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ  
ЦИФРОВЫХ СМИ В АСПЕКТЕ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ  
БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ**

\* Кагазбаева Э.М.,<sup>1</sup> Алмырза Б.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> кандидат политических наук, доцент, КазУМОиМЯ им. Абылай хана  
Алматы, Казахстан, e-mail: Kagazbaeva.e@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> магистрант 1 курса, КазУМОиМЯ имени Абылай хана, Алматы,  
Казахстан, e-mail: almyrzabekarys@mail.ru

**Аннотация.** В статье рассматриваются основные концепции средств массовой информации и национальной безопасности, а также основные понятия, раскрывающие взаимосвязь цифровых СМИ с национальной безопасностью. Медийное пространство есть часть информационного пространства и представляет собой сферу распространения массовой информации, которая передается субъектами, наделенными обществом полномочиями и правами передачи информации. Концептуальный анализ масс медиа показывает, что интернет стал политическим феноменом.

Однако злонамеренные лица и организации могут использовать распространение информации для подрыва суверенитета и национальной безопасности страны путем распространения ложной информации с помощью традиционных и новых средств массовой информации. Авторы приходят к выводу, что концептуальными основами исследования взаимосвязи цифровых СМИ и национальной безопасности являются следующие теории: теория социальной ответственности, концепция социальных сетей и различные



методологические подходы понимания сущности национальной безопасности.

**Ключевые слова:** цифровые средства массовой информации, национальная безопасность, новая медиа, просьюмеры, сетевой полис, трансмедиа.

### **Основные положения**

Цифровые средства массовой информации приобретают важную роль в развитии сознания граждан, в обеспечении национальной безопасности. Цифровые СМИ привлекают внимание многих людей, особенно молодежи. Его быстрый доступ к информации и способность создавать быстрые связи между людьми и между ними, а также развивать отношения и бизнес, служат дополнительным преимуществом, которое привлекает многих пользователей. Однако преимущества, которые предоставляют социальные сети, были и продолжают неправильно использоваться некоторыми злоумышленниками, такими как террористы и преступники. Эти лица используют это средство для совершения различных видов преступлений. Самое главное, что их действия оказывают серьезные угрозы национальной безопасности.

### **Введение**

В данном исследовании использовалась теория социальной ответственности, которая впервые была представлена в 1947 году и предложена Комиссией Хатчинса по свободе прессы. В нем говорится, что «средства массовой информации должны служить обществу, и для этого они должны оставаться свободными от вмешательства правительств» [1, с. 227]. Теория социальной ответственности определяет руководящие принципы, которым должны следовать средства массовой информации, чтобы выполнять свои обязательства по служению обществу. Средства массовой информации также должны соответствовать высоким стандартам профессионализма и объективности, правдивости и точности. Кроме того, средства массовой информации должны отражать разнообразие культур, которые они представляют.

### **Описание материалов и методов**

Путем сопоставительного метода проведен анализ научных источников отечественных и зарубежных авторов, исследующих данную проблему, охарактеризованы понятия «цифровые средства массовой информации», «национальная безопасность», «новая медиа» и другие.

Использованы материалы цифровых СМИ, нормативно-правовые документы по обеспечению информационной и национальной безопасности, источники из зарубежной и отечественной литературы.

### **Результаты**

Следует заметить, что в диалектической взаимосвязи находятся средства массовой информации и информационное пространство. К примеру, именно информационное пространство определяет внешние условия для деятельности средств массовой информации. Однако само информационное пространство зачастую формируются под влиянием средств массовой информации.

На современном этапе информационное пространство становится сложной системой из-за возникновения многочисленных негосударственных средств массовой информации, из-за множества идеологий и политических направлений. На взгляд, отечественного исследователя, доктора политических наук Алиярова Е.К.: «Воздействие СМИ на формирование информационного пространства происходит опосредованно: через создание в обществе определенной политической, интеллектуальной, духовной, нравственной атмосферы, которая выступает условием и средой протекания информационных процессов.... На современном этапе цивилизационного и общественного развития все субъекты медийного пространства должны активно участвовать в процессе демократических преобразований, поскольку масс-медиа стали общепризнанным инструментом целенаправленного конструирования политических порядков. Роль СМИ важна в силу их воздействия на общественное сознание. С помощью масс-медиа формируются демократические ценности, принципы и демократическая политическая культура, достигается национальная консолидация граждан, происходит приобщение к ценностям мирового порядка» [2, с. 10-11].

Итак, сегодня в медийное пространство входят внешние и внутренние информационные и коммуникационные каналы связи общества и государственных структур. В частности, к ним можно отнести систему средств массовой информации как, прессу, радиовещание, телевидение, естественно и Интернет. К внутренним каналам связи относятся собственные компьютерные сети, интерактивные базы данных, сайт и т.пр.).

Следует отметить, что медийное пространство есть часть информационного пространства и представляет собой сферу распространения массовой информации, которая передается субъектами, наделенными обществом полномочиями и правами передачи информации.

Также сегодня медийное пространство является многофункциональным политическим и социальным институтом, обладающим институциональным статусом политики с большим политическим и социальным потенциалом.

Современная политика со временем приобретает черты, характеризующую ее как медийную политику, поэтому с полным правом медийное пространство можно рассматривать как часть политического пространства. Важное значение для политической жизни приобретают массовые информационно-коммуникационные процессы, так как информация сегодня вступает как важный ресурс и предпосылка действий политических субъектов. Информация легче распространяется, не зная границ, что позволяет качественно взаимодействовать в политической сфере ради достижения определенных целей.

### **Обсуждение**

СМИ - это собирательное понятие, используемое для обозначения телевидения, радио, газет, журналов, фильмов и Интернета. Это представление охватывает только некоторые средства коммуникации и не включает тип распространяемой информации. Денис Маккуайл в своей книге «Теория массовой коммуникации» пишет, что средства массовой информации оказывают значительное влияние на отдельных людей, институты, общество и культуру из-за социальной власти, которой они обладают [3, с. 75]. По мнению исследователя, средства массовой информации могут придавать статус и подтверждать легитимность точно так же, как они могут быть каналами убеждения и мобилизации. СМИ являются инструментом социальной власти, они могут привлекать, влиять и удерживать широкую аудиторию [3, с. 76].

Следует отметить, что цифровые СМИ не могут по своим техническим характеристикам и выполняемым функциям быть приравнены к традиционным СМИ. Так как цифровые СМИ являются самостоятельными программными продуктами, главными характеристиками которой являются мультимедийность, интерактивность, возможность обеспечить обратную связь между аудиторией и ее разработчиками. Также цифровые СМИ являются активными участниками коммуникационного процесса и генераторами информации. Именно поэтому коммуникативная функция цифровых СМИ является ключевой функцией.

В результате развития цифровых СМИ и глобальных трансформаций поменялся статус аудитории, конкретного потребителя информации. Потребитель становится как производителем, так и потребителем одновременного. Так, Э. Тоффлер в своем исследовании

«Третья волна» впервые в научный оборот ввел термин «просьюмер» (анг. prosumer), что означало производитель и потребитель в одном лице [4]. Данное понятие отражает направление развития деятельности цифровых СМИ. Интересно, что просьюмеры занимаются распространением информационных материалов цифровых средств массовой информации, выполняют социально-креативную функцию, выступают в роли медиакритиков информационного контента, также могут давать индивидуальную оценку данному ресурсу.

Просьюмеры играют важную роль в создании и содержательном наполнении цифровых СМИ. В частности, данная тенденция прослеживается в развитых странах, таких как США, Канаде и Великобритании. В создании контента таких информационно-новостных интернет ресурсах как Digg.com, Tremr.com, Articlebiz.com участвуют зарегистрированные пользователи. Таким образом, просьюмеры являются эффективным инструментом цифровых СМИ и являются как создателями, рецензентами, так и потребителями контента. Благодаря просьюмерам аудитория цифровых СМИ в отличие от традиционных расширяется в геометрической прогрессии, просьюмеры также имеют возможность оказывать влияние на формирование общественного мнения. В этом кроется большая опасность, так как цифровые СМИ теряют контроль над управлением аудиторией, и любая информация может привести к различным последствиям.

Трансляция истории с помощью различных медийных площадок, в частности к ним относятся: телевидение, мобильные приложения, веб-порталы и другие, которые, генерируют содержание и действуют совместно, донося его до аудитории выражается понятием «трансмедиа».

Рассмотрим концепцию социальных сетей. С появлением Интернета методы коммуникации эволюционировали от традиционного процесса «один ко многим» к интерактивной модели диалога «многие ко многим» [5]. Эти события все еще являются совершенно новыми в истории средств массовой информации, и исследователи все еще пытаются понять связанные с этим последствия.

За последние двадцать лет социальные сети стали неотъемлемой частью мира. Это изменение находит отклик, особенно у молодых людей, которые не могут думать об общении без использования онлайн-сетей, таких как Facebook, Google+, Twitter. Социальные сети широко используются и во многих отношениях имеют как положительные, так и отрицательные преимущества одновременно. Положительно, это облегчает глобальную коммуникацию за считанные секунды, соединяет изолированные районы с цивилизацией, играет жизненно

важную роль в электронной торговле и участвует в демократическом процессе [5].

Андреас М. Каплан и Майкл Хенлейн в своей работе «Пользователи мира, объединяйтесь: проблемы и возможности социальных сетей» определили социальные сети как «группу интернет-приложений, которые основаны на идеологических основах Web 2.0 и которые позволяют создавать пользовательский контент и обмениваться им» [6, с. 61]. Далее они заявили, что «традиционно потребители использовали Интернет для расходования контента: они читали, смотрели и использовали его для покупки товаров и услуг» [6, с. 63]. В соответствии с этим пониманием, существует явная разница между традиционными средствами массовой информации, такими как печать или вещание, где пользователи являются более пассивными потребителями, и социальными сетями.

Проанализируем концепцию национальной безопасности. Возникновение новых вызовов и угроз приводит к тому, что большинство специалистов и исследователей рассматривают проблемы безопасности с точки зрения военной, экономической, экологической, информационной. То есть, в основном вопросы безопасности исследуются с позиции субъектности. Бесспорным, в первую очередь, является признание военной опасности.

Рассмотрим основные теоретические подходы к осмыслению феномена «национальная безопасность». Например, по мнению российского исследователя А.И. Позднякова национальная безопасность определяется как защищенность национальных ценностей, национального достоинства от значимого ущерба [7, с. 47]. Похожая позиция прослеживается и у ряда западных исследователей. Например, У. Липпман писал: «Государство находится в состоянии безопасности, когда ему не приходится приносить в жертву свои законные интересы с целью избежать войны и когда оно в состоянии при необходимости защитить эти интересы путем войны» [8, с. 5]. Аналогичных взглядов придерживается и А. Уолферс, который в 1962 г. отмечал, что безопасность в объективном смысле определяется отсутствием угроз приобретенным ценностям, в субъективном смысле – отсутствием боязни, что эти ценности подвергнутся нападению» [9, с. 150].

Ряд исследователей стоят на стороне так называемого системно-философского подхода к определению национальной безопасности, который акцентирует внимание на сохранении целостности, устойчивости, стабильности страны, государства, общества как социальной системы при деструктивных воздействиях на нее.

Другие авторы, например О.А. Бельков, определяют национальную безопасность как состояние, тенденции развития и условия жизнедеятельности нации, гарантирующие ее выживание, свободное, независимое функционирование при сохранении фундаментальных институтов и ценностей [10].

Таким образом, национальная безопасность - это совокупность всех усилий, предпринимаемых для защиты суверенитета и заветных ценностей нации. Это повышает уровень жизни людей, а также обеспечивает свободу всех граждан от всех форм угрозы жизни и имуществу. Национальная безопасность также обеспечивает защиту от стихийных бедствий или техногенных катастроф.

Концептуальный анализ масс медиа показывает, что интернет стал политическим феноменом. Российский исследователь С. Федорченко вводит в научный оборот новое понятие «сетевой полис». По его мнению, «Сетевой полис – это совокупность зависимых от потенциальных клиентов (правлящих политических элит в обществе и связанных с ними крупных компаний) сетевых арен участия граждан, через сеть формируется политическая идентичность, политическая повестка дня, легитимация и делигитимация определенной политической системы государства и его политических режимов» [11, с. 76].

Сетевой полис необходимо рассматривать как механизм конструирования заинтересованными политическими акторами сетевой политической идентичности посредством сетевых платформ гражданского участия (рис. 1). Платформы или арены политического участия могут возникать как при участии власти, бизнес-сообщества, так и стихийно, «снизу». Интересно, что сейчас мы наблюдаем столкновение двух политико-коммуникационных трендов: 1) политические и потребительские предпочтения граждан контролируются через сетевые коммуникации современными политическими элитами и крупным капиталом; 2) за политической элитой и капиталом неустанно следят активные пользователи мобильных и социальных сетей Интернета [11, с. 73].

К сетевой арене участия относятся: сообщества социальных сетей, форумы, интернет энциклопедии, чаты в различных системах, видеохостинги, онлайн комиксы, новостные сайты, микроблоги и блоги, тлоги. Именно на сетевых аренах происходит политическая коммуникация, основанная на создании, передачи и приема политических сообщений, воздействующие на мир политики. На принципах сетевого гейткипинга базируются сетевые арены участия. Теория гейткипинга основывается на системе фильтрации сообщений, гейткипиры (модераторы, редакторы, администраторы) в

сетевых аренах выполняют роль экспертов и фильтруют информацию в определенной сфере. Гейткипиры контролируют контент, ограничивают права посредством наложения бана, могут пользователя лишить полностью прав, имеют право писать, добавлять, удалять, менять контент от имени сообщества.

Организация сетевого полиса раскрывается через политологические концепты: сетевой фронт и сетевая идентичность. Под сетевым фронтом понимают социально-культурные ценности современных и предшествующих обществ, отличающих их от других сетевых полисов. Люди, которые не представляют свою жизнь без интернет-коммуникаций называют «цифровыми жителями» [12, с.52]. Феномен сетевой идентичности исследуются недавно. Поэтому есть различия в трактовке данного понятия. Так, по мнению Л. Фадеевой, когда пользователь отождествляет себя с определенной интернет группой – это и есть сетевая идентичность. Интересно, что сетевая идентичность может усилить гражданскую идентичность, также с помощью сетевой идентичности происходит манипуляция индивидами со стороны государства. Другой российский исследователь Е.В. Летов выделяет следующие признаки сетевой идентичности: обособленность и активность индивида в интернет сообществах; индивид, обладающий отличными знаниями информационно-коммуникативных технологий и специфической киберкультурой, отождествляющий себя с сетевыми пользователями [13, с. 63].

Таким образом, особенность сетевого общества состоит в том, что благодаря коллективному потреблению информации сетевое общество становится новой формой общественной активности, когда каждый пользователь делится своим мнением с другими пользователями, влияет на их мнения, полемизирует.

### **Заключение**

Из вышеперечисленного мы можем сделать следующие выводы: во-первых, цифровые СМИ — это неотъемлемая часть современной жизни общества, которая оказывает влияние на личность, на ее эмоциональное состояние, на формирование общественного мнения. Во-вторых, цифровые СМИ, благодаря современным технологиям и активности просьюмеров могут влиять на результаты избирательных кампаний и на политическую и экономическую обстановку. Цифровые СМИ используя глобальную сеть получили возможность проводить социологические опросы, голосования в интерактивном режиме, а просьюмеры имеют возможность проводить мониторинг голосований и могут способствовать пересмотру итогов голосований выборов, опросов, референдумов. Зачастую,

такую практику используют оппозиционные СМИ в странах, где сохраняется свобода слова и СМИ. В-третьих, цифровые СМИ не могут по своим техническим характеристикам и выполняемым функциям быть приравнены к традиционным СМИ. Так как цифровые СМИ являются самостоятельными программными продуктами, главными характеристиками которой являются мультимедийность, интерактивность, возможность обеспечить обратную связь между аудиторией и ее разработчиками. Также цифровые СМИ являются активными участниками коммуникационного процесса и генераторами информации. Именно поэтому коммуникативная функция цифровых СМИ является ключевой функцией. В-четвертых, нами был представлен общий взгляд на концептуальные основы исследования цифровых средств массовой информации в аспекте национальной безопасности.

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## **ҰЛТТЫҚ ҚАУІПСІЗДІК АСПЕКТІСІНДЕ ЦИФРЛЫҚ БАҚ-ТЫ ЗЕРТТЕУДІҢ КОНЦЕПТУАЛДЫ НЕГІЗДЕРІ**

\* Қағазбаева Э.М.,<sup>1</sup> Алмырза Б.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> саяси ғылымдарының кандидаты, доцент, Абылай хан атындағы ҚазХК және ӘТУ, e-mail: Kagazbaeva.e@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> 1 магистранты, доцент, Абылай хан атындағы ҚазХК және ӘТУ, Алматы, Қазақстан, e-mail: almyrzabekarys@mail.ru

**Аңдатпа.** Мақалада бұқаралық ақпарат құралдары мен ұлттық қауіпсіздіктің негізгі концепциялары, сондай-ақ сандық БАҚ-тың ұлттық қауіпсіздікпен байланысын ашатын негізгі ұғымдар қарастырылады. Медиа кеңістік-бұл ақпараттық кеңістіктің бір бөлігі және бұқаралық ақпаратты тарату саласын білдіреді, оны қоғамға ақпарат беру өкілеттіктері мен құқықтарына ие субъектілер береді. Бұқаралық ақпарат құралдарының концептуалдық талдауы ғаламтордың саяси құбылысқа айналғанын көрсетеді.

Алайда, зиянкеш тұлғалар мен ұйымдар дәстүрлі және жаңа бұқаралық ақпарат құралдары арқылы жалған ақпарат таратумен елдің егемендігі мен ұлттық қауіпсіздігіне нұқсан келтіру үшін ақпарат таратуды қолдана алады. Авторлар сандық медиа мен ұлттық қауіпсіздіктің өзара байланысын зерттеудің концептуалдық негіздерін келесі теорияларымен нәтижелейді: әлеуметтік жауапкершілік теориясы, әлеуметтік медиа тұжырымдамасы және ұлттық қауіпсіздіктің мәнін түсінудің әртүрлі әдіснамалық тәсілдері.

**Кілт сөздер:** сандық бұқаралық ақпарат құралдары, ұлттық қауіпсіздік, жаңа медиа, просьюмерлер, желілік полис, трансмедиа.

## **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCHING DIGITAL MEDIA IN THE ASPECT OF NATIONAL SECURITY**

\* Kagazbayeva E.M.,<sup>1</sup> Almyrza B.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor, Ablai Khan KazUIRandWL, Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: Kagazbaeva.e@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> Master's student of the 1st year of Ablai Khan KazUIRandWL, Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: almyrzabekarys@mail.ru

**Annotation.** The article discusses the basic concepts of mass media and national security, as well as the basic concepts that reveal the relationship

between digital media and national security. The media space is a part of the information space and is the sphere of broadcasting of mass information, which is transmitted by subjects endowed by society with the powers and rights to convey information. Conceptual analysis of the mass media shows that the Internet has become a political phenomenon.

Nevertheless, spiteful individuals and organizations can use the distribution of information to threaten a country's sovereignty and national security by spreading false information through traditional and new mass media. The authors come to the conclusion that the conceptual foundations of the study of the relationship between digital media and national security are the following theories: the theory of social responsibility, the concept of social networks and various methodological approaches to understanding the essence of national security.

**Key words:** digital mass media, national security, new media, prosumers, network policy, transmedia.

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## **THE DIASPORA'S ROLE AND ESSENCE IN STATES' POLITICAL AGENDA**

*\*Zhabina Zh.<sup>1</sup>*

Employee of the Library of the First President of the Republic of  
Kazakhstan – Elbasy, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan  
e-mail: zhansayazh@list.ru

**Abstract.** In the modern world in the context of globalization, the causes of migration have been erased by borders, the emergence of new states and other factors that increase migration flows. The result of global migration flows is the formation of diasporas. Diasporas acquire a special role in the social and political life of the host country. However, a theoretical understanding of these communities as independent actors does not exist. This implies the relevance of the topic under study.

At present, the diasporas by the very realities of the sovereign development of independent countries are faced with the need to find their own niche in the socio-cultural environment of the receiving state, see themselves as a minority compared to the indigenous ethnic groups, go

through difficult stages of social emancipation in order to resist assimilation and maintain ties with their historical homeland and commitment national identity. At the same time, the diaspora becomes a natural bridge in building international relations of a new level, acts as the most important object and subject between countries. In this connection, the growing role and the influence of the diaspora is an extremely important phenomenon in the international arena.

**Approach:** The paper highlights the role of Diaspora in the system of international relations, studies the role of Diasporas as Diaspora groups and individuals are being recognized as major actors who can play a significant role in domestic and international politics and have the power to influence both national and foreign decisions.

**Findings:** Today Diaspora groups and individuals are being recognized as major actors who can use their influence and financial resources to contribute to local development in their homelands.

**Originality:** If we talk about contributions of the Diaspora, the nation building process is not only based on financial resources but also on social and political dialogue, advocacy and awareness to stability for development. In this regard, the Diaspora gains more voice and recognition they have begun demanding in the home country political processes and fewer studies examining the features and specifics of formation of mechanisms of interaction of state bodies with the Diaspora.

**Keywords:** Diaspora, non- state actor, migration, domestic and international politics.

### **Basic provisions**

The largest change in the post-war international system had an impact on the policies pursued by the actors in the system. These changes increase the uncertainty of the system causing the difficulty to actors to determine their position. Traditional bilateral and multilateral relations are complemented by new relationships between states. On this basis, there are new actors in international relations. Their number is striking for its diversity and their role is constantly and steadily growing in the world. Actors are any authority, any organization, any group or even any individual which play a role that is attributable in international relations. They have powerful economic, political or social power and are able to influence national and international level.

As Burlatskiy F.M. and Galkin A.A. assert “different actors play different roles: some of them occupy the forefront and are the” stars”, while others are nothing more than bit players, they all participate in the creation of a complete performance on the world stage [1, p.98]. Among the non-state actors in international relations it is accepted to allocate intergovernmental

organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations and other social forces and movements acting on the world stage.

Diasporas are widespread ethnic or national groups across different countries. People have moved from their home countries for centuries, for many reasons. Some are drawn to new places by positive factors, others find it difficult to remain where they are and migrate because of negative factors such as poverty, hunger, persecution, discrimination, civil war, unemployment. These have contributed to the movement of people. There is no country in the world which doesn't have any emigrants. Recently migrant numbers have risen rapidly in the last decade simply for education and better jobs. Today Diaspora groups and individuals are being recognized as major actors who can use their influence and financial resources to contribute to local development in their homelands.

Cohan R.O. compares the world politics as an extensive and multi-layered web of links connecting the numerous and diverse participants in international interactions, such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements and international organizations, financial groups and other private actors, including Diaspora. In his book "Global Diasporas" Cohan states that Diaspora studies have gone through four phases. According to him, first phase is from the 1960s and 1970s, the classical meaning, a description of the dispersion of Africans, Armenians and the Irish. The second phase is in the 1980s and Diaspora was described as different categories of people – 'expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities tout court'. Mid-1990s was the third phase which was marked by social constructionist critiques of 'second phase', the current phase is considered as the fourth phase [2, p.1].

### **Introduction**

A characteristic feature of the globalizing world is the intensification of migratory processes. Millions of people are leaving their homeland in search of better shares and heading to other countries. The rise in the number of international migrants reflects the increasing importance of international migration, which has become an integral part of our economies and societies. The rapid growth of immigrant communities and their institutionalization forced to talk about "the diasporaization of the world" as one of the scenarios for the development of mankind. This process is deepening and there are more and more new forms, and the role of Diasporas and their influence are intensified. The discussion that has developed in the scientific community shows how many blank spots and questions remain in the study of this changing phenomenon and how great the differences between researchers are in its understanding.

### **Diasporas as an actor in modern world politics**

Diaspora is just one of the important and little studied actors in the political life of various countries. But now against the background of globalization the world interest in Diasporas as a socio-political and ethno-cultural phenomenon is extremely increased. In the context of economic and political globalization, migration processes have begun to play a crucial role in the formation of the modern system of international relations. In this connection, the growing role and influence of the Diaspora is becoming an extremely important phenomenon in the international arena. Diaspora can contribute to the realization of the state's foreign policy objectives of its outcome. Understanding this fact is necessary in general to all countries, but especially those who today tend to occupy a leading place in the modern world politics and should be seen as a tool for promoting national interests in improving the country's foreign policy image.

The role of the Diaspora in the political life can be characterized by the state as follows:

- creates a network of economic, political and other ties which is a fairly common international practice. Often Diaspora itself creates a system of networking and the state; the historic homeland is becoming one of the links in the international chain;
- Diasporas maintain a sufficient level of elements of national identity, the identity and address the challenges of assimilation, in the framework of a different nationality of the state of the environment;
- Coordination and implementation of the Diaspora policy efforts of government agencies, directly concentrated in this field.

Diasporas have a unique role in international relations because they find themselves in between two countries, sharing in two cultures, having an emotional investment in two nations, and preserving social connections in two societies. As mobilized groups with a strong sense of identity, Diasporas can play a role both in domestic and in international politics. As far as domestic politics is concerned, they may influence both the domestic politics of their homelands and the domestic politics of their host states regarding issues that are of interest to them. In the realm of international relations, they have the power to influence both national and foreign policy decisions and the decisions of international organizations.

Over the past few decades Diasporas have become more prominent on the world stage. Many scholars claim that Diasporas are created by a forced or induced historical emigration from an original homeland and they find themselves sharing two cultures, having an investment in two nations as well as persevering social connections in two societies. They believe that they may play a significant role in domestic and international politics and have the power to influence both to national foreign decisions.

More important, many researchers who are doing research in the field of migration processes say that beyond their financial and material value, Diaspora groups bring intellectual, political, social and cultural capital links with a host state throughout the world. In addition to their domestic political involvement in the homeland and host states, Diasporas also directly influenced bilateral relations of states of concern.

Despite the above-mentioned facts some research shows that Diasporas are often involved in ethnic or international conflict. Diasporas as being geographically removed from the homeland and the source of conflict may experience the conflict and they may have contributed to the dispute between the two states. Diasporas are often involved in ethnic or international conflict promoting conflict resolution at the same time fueling the conflict [3].

### **Description of materials and methods**

It should be evident that these arguments are the real facts. Diasporas are building political and cultural bridges between two countries, contributing to

enhance the quality of life and introduce best international practice. Diasporas are often in agreement with the policies of their country of origin regarding foreign policy issues facing the homeland and they mobilize in support of such policies. There are many examples of such cooperation between Diaspora and country of origin. For example, Kotabe M. et al. (2013) examine cross-border movements of financial capital through foreign direct investment and the transnational flows of people and the different types of capital that they possess. The authors identify the role of Diasporas and how they invest in their home countries through direct and portfolio investments or through the establishment of new ventures in their homelands. Moreover, Diaspora capital is a useful development resource for migration-sending countries, many of which are among the most capital needy in the world. And Diasporas build networks which overcome various challenges such as language and foreignness that result in positive economic effects in the homeland. The authors state that diasporans play influential roles in the foreign-market entry decision-making process, often encouraging their employers to at least investigate the possibility of investing in the diasporan's country of origin and generates new jobs and increased income [4].

Diaspora organizations and their smaller or bigger impact on international politics, the role of diasporas in international relations tends to be ignored or understudied. Nauja Kleist (2008) examines how Northwestern European development aid agencies value the role of Diaspora organizations and their development activities of Diaspora organizations. The author

focuses particularly on small and medium-sized diaspora organizations that contribute to the development of home country. According to the author the promotion and establishment of networks between different diaspora organizations and other development NGOs support funds that diaspora organizations can apply to, but lack of attention to diaspora organizations as well as support programmes, characterized by low budgets [5]. However, different diaspora organizations may support different political actors in the homeland that share their own view on the conflict and which work either towards conflict resolution or towards adopting a more militaristic attitude against the enemy. Diasporas contribute to conflict resolution and to social and economic development of their homeland. UNESCO has focused on the importance of diaspora networks, the Diaspora Knowledge Networks in particular, and their potential for contributions to peace and development in their native countries [5]. Their skills, experience, connections are commitment to the well-being of their homeland. According to estimates of UN experts now every 35th inhabitant of the globe is an international migrant, and in the developed countries every tenth. June 21, 2017 was presented the results of the next, the 25th cycle of world population calculations “Prospects for the world population revision of 2017” [6].

### **Results**

Diaspora can play an important role in recovery and reconstruction of fragile states and help significantly to transform economies. Many Diaspora prefer to invest in their own countries establishing small businesses in the assumption that they might one day return and would need to a source of local income. Such establishments invest in the purchase of land and assets, transfer of technology and skills, and relatively modernized approach to management and at times may also open up regional markets through border trade.

Official estimates of the population, its sex-age composition and reproduction characteristics for the world as a whole, large regions and countries (territories) used in the United Nations (UN) system since 1950 are prepared by Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social issues of the United Nations. They are needed not only to analyze demographic trends at the global, regional and national levels, but also to calculate a number of indicators that take into account the size of the population and its individual groups, as well as forecast and model other variables associated with the population. The world population is extremely unevenly distributed across geographic regions. According to UN estimates for mid-2017, about 60% of the world’s population lived in Asia, 17% in Africa, 10% in Europe, 9% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the rest in North America and Oceania. In Asia, there are two countries with the



largest population - China (1.4 billion) and India (1.3), whose share in the world's population is 19% and 18%, respectively [6].

The change in the world population does not depend on the change in the direction and intensity of migration flows between countries and their groups and is entirely determined by the birth and death regimes. However, the population of individual countries or their groups is often largely determined by the migration component of the population's growth (loss). The increase in the contribution of migration growth to the overall population growth in recent years has been characteristic of many countries in the world.

### **The main models of the participation of diasporas in the domestic politics of the modern state.**

The needs of the diaspora associated with influencing the domestic policy of the host country, as a rule, are usually determined by the complexity of the process of adaptation of foreign ethnic communities living in new social, economic, cultural, educational, and political conditions.

These difficulties are the existence of all sorts of obstacles to ensure the rights of ethnic minorities, what are the diasporas where they have settled.

Therefore, the subject of internal political activity of diaspora organizations and communities is the protection of the civil rights and freedoms of their members in the socio-economic, political, ethno cultural, linguistic, informational and other spheres of public life. In close connection with the problem of ensuring the rights determined by cultural identity, there are rights associated with the free worship, religion, the use of attributes and symbols associated with it.

Models of participation of diasporas in political processes within host countries can be distinguished based on several the criteria:

One of them is the actual form of political participation of the community - this is either conventional participation, the nature of which is determined by the political and legal norms and institutions established in the host country and which does not go beyond this framework, or unconventional participation, allowing a certain degree of deviant behavior, protest against actions of the authorities.

There are various methods of lobbying for their interests, collective pressure, protest activity, rallies, marches, demonstrations, and other mass actions to protect the rights of the diaspora in the arsenal of means of influence on public authorities and administration.

The specifics of participation of diaspora associations in the host country is determined by the goals pursued by the community as participants in the political process. The goals of political participation are another criterion for determining the models we are considering. The main result, that the communities strive to achieve, is to obtain what they need to carry

out economic and political activities, to preserve their identity rights in the host country.

The goals are expressed in the requirements that diaspora organizations and associations make to the government and administration of the recipient country. As indicated by Alkaev A.R., the requirements of ethnic-diaspora groups are to achieve a greater degree of access to the participation in the political system of the host foreign ethnic community (up to the requirements of full equality of political rights through inclusion of citizenship in institutions), however, they are deprived of any territorial aspect [7, p.85].

Strategies for the requirements of diasporas chosen by host states serve as the third criterion for identifying patterns of diaspora participation in domestic politics.

Regardless from the premises of the formation of diasporas, whether they were immigration or as a result of territorial disintegration, such strategy can be multiculturalism, the long-term line of the state towards their gradual entry as a full and equal participant in the social life of the host country, not bearing an assimilation character, but on the contrary associated with the preservation of the ethnic, cultural identity of communities. Communities can exist as ethnic groups, the identity of which nobody concerns.

In the framework of multiculturalism, children can be encouraged to receive education in their native language, the construction of religious buildings, selective activity at the local level of government, etc.

As Malakhov B.C. notes: “In immigration states, as well as in countries with a long pluralistic tradition, there is a different attitude to the integration of immigrants than in countries oriented towards the ideal of a culturally homogeneous nation. Immigrants here are not expected to return to their “historical homeland” over time. At the same time, they are not trying to assimilate them at any cost” [8, p. 260].

Another strategy, the opposite direction of multiculturalism is assimilation, in which the diasporas are invited politically, economically, culturally, ethnically (due to mixed marriages) to dissolve in the formed or existing political nation of the host country or to exist as temporary residents of the state, separated from special status and denial of civil rights, their specific restriction.

This strategy is used by those countries that are guided by the ideal of the traditional nation-state, where sensitive to the phenomenon of immigration in general, and the presence of migrants in their own land in particular. Immigration is seen as a hindrance to national unity.

In addition, the key to the political will of the diasporas and their organizations is the type of political regime in the host country. While democratic and pluralistic political systems do not limit the diasporas' ability to represent their interests on an equal position and make demands, in a

number of transitional, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, communities of foreign ethnic minorities may encounter a number of obstacles in this area.

The diaspora behavior is formed taking into account the possible forms, goals of their activity and strategies of the host state. In these conditions, the following patterns of community behavior can be distinguished.

The first model is loyal participation, focused on preserving ethno cultural, ethno political pluralism, granting or securing the economic rights of diasporas by the host state. Communities and their organizations realize their interests in various spheres of public life with the help of peaceful, well-defined methods that do not go beyond the legislative limits. Lobbyism is the leading among them in government and host government. Promotion and representation of the interests of the communities involves the consistent implementation of the following system of measures and actions.

Firstly, the need to integrate communities around those or other political purposes, achieved through institutionalization of ideological consensus within the organization, the nomination of its leader.

Secondly, the formulation of an action program is required (the ideological evidence of the necessity and usefulness of maintaining community solidarity; the promotion of popular slogans that can mobilize the masses of the community for action; establishing close contacts with leading political figures, parties, and other organizations of the host country; the formulation of unifying all immigrants from this community of political platforms containing both attractive slogans for a given ethnic community and serving as a convenient tool for achieving foreign policy goals of the host country, and close to the historical native land).

The third step is the search for partners and allies, the formation of alliances with other political forces to succeed in parliament with laws favorable for the ethnic lobby, the effective fight against opponents, working with the media that shape public opinion regarding the diaspora and the country of origin, and putting real pressure on politicians.

The fourth step is monitoring the implementation of the community's political tasks through access to politicians, evaluating their activities and informing about the interests of the respective ethnic group, generating social expectations that are beneficial for the ethnic group.

Within the framework of the model of loyal participation, focused on maintaining pluralism and ensuring economic rights, foreign ethnic minorities seek to achieve these goals in various ways.

One of them is ensuring the participation of candidates in the elections and the victory of community-friendly candidates. This way consists of making voluntary contributions, financing election campaigns of politicians who want to take seats in the legislative assemblies of the

national and regional levels, to head the executive branch in the country or in its individual territories, etc.

Communities can contribute or form at their own expense election funds of political parties, and the main condition for such financing, which can be provided by large, medium and small ethnic groups and their organizations, is to ensure the interests of the communities after election. Representatives of diasporas can be represented not only by their compatriots, but also by people who belong to indigenous nationalities, titular peoples, etc., deputies from electoral districts who are not registered in any of these communities.

Organizations, institutions, authorities, and governing bodies of the country of origin can also finance campaigns of candidates for deputies of the host country, making the elected people agents of representative and legislative bodies that influence the diaspora and country of origin.

Another way of exerting political influence within the framework of the legislation of the host country is to put forward legislative initiatives emanating ultimately from the diasporas. The main agents of influence are ethnic associations in the parliament of the host country. According to Lozansky E.A., there were 33 members from Armenian, 63 members from Greek, 40 members from African American association in the US Congress, which began its work in 1997. There are also Latin American, Portuguese, Albanian, Indian and two Irish associations. As for the representatives of the Jewish diaspora in Congress, although they do not have a single unification, they actually represent “a kind of legislative body within the legislative body” and are “the core of pro-Israeli activity in Washington.” Thus, through representatives within the legislature, ethnic groups are able to implement their program by participating in decision-making [9, p. 177].

The Jewish diaspora remains to be global not only because it is dispersed throughout the planet and its number exceeds the population of its historical homeland - Israel. The reason for such a modern global scale of Jewry lies not only in its unique historical past. And to a greater extent in the place occupied by the Jewish diaspora of political, economic, scientific and cultural life in the countries of residence. Take, for example, statistics that characterize the role of Jews in US life. According to Forbes, 108 Jewish billionaires live in the country, or 30% of the total. The US average is 1 billionaire per 800 thousand people. For some states, the picture is even more expressive. In the richest state in California, there are 90 billionaires per 36 million inhabitants, and Jews, accounting for 2% of the population, account for 31 billionaires. In New York State (19 million inhabitants, 49 billionaires), Jews make up 5% of the population, and among them 34 billionaires, or 70% [10].

American Jews occupy leading positions in the scientific and cultural life of the country. 156 Nobel Prize winners in the field of science live in the

USA (on average 1 per almost 2 million inhabitants), 61 of them are Jews, or 1 per 87 thousand. In 2003, 40% of American professors were Jews [10].

The same leading positions are occupied by US Jews in the political and public life of the country, in government institutions, in the judicial system. In 1984–86 there were eight Jews in the US Senate (out of a hundred senators), in the House of Representatives 30 members (out of 435) were Jews; in 2005-2006 ten senators and 27 members of the House of Representatives were Jews, of the nine members of the US Supreme Court, two were Jews. Among the 50 state governors, 2 are Jews [10].

About two-thirds of all working American Jews occupy middle and top command posts in various sectors of the US economy (among the entire working population, this layer is only 46%). In the early 2000s, the income of the average Jewish family exceeded the average income in the United States. Thus, the annual income of a

Jewish family averaged 54 thousand dollars, and in the whole country - 42 thousand. Composing 1.8% of the US population, 31% of American Jews are among the most prosperous segments of the population. Only 5% of Jewish families live below the poverty line, while in the entire population of the United States 11% of such families [10].

An important role in ensuring the influence of the diaspora can also be played by its representatives, who occupy certain key leadership positions in government bodies at the national, regional and local levels. So, in the United States in the mid-1980s, more than 200 American Chinese engaged the elected posts at the state, county, and municipality levels. The participation of the Chinese community in the United States in the elections, according to several researchers, was determined by the need to ensure the trade and economic interests of the community, its needs to preserve ethnic and cultural identity. In all settlements where there are Chinese enclaves, they established clubs. There was also great interest in the Chinese diaspora on the part of American politicians who saw it as an influential electorate.

The Chinese Diaspora (Huaqiao) come from China, living in other countries. These include both Chinese citizens temporarily abroad and the descendants of Chinese emigrants who are citizens of other countries. In absolute terms, the largest Chinese diaspora in the world [11].

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, China became the main source of international migration flows. According to various estimates, the size of the world Chinese diaspora ranged from 35 to 55 million people.

The foreign communities of ethnic Chinese are not only numerous, but also have significant economic potential, cohesion, cultural and psychological community, as well as a whole system of intersecting ties that allow them to act as a single organism, regardless of where they live. The development of ties between the historical homeland and foreign

communities played an important role in the foreign policy of China. The diaspora factor is taken into account by the Beijing leadership when analyzing relations with the countries of residence of the diaspora, since the large and economically powerful Chinese community has the opportunity to influence the internal political processes of these countries. The Chinese diaspora, therefore, is considered by the political leadership of the PRC as the most important foreign policy and economic resource of this country.

### **Discussions**

Enormous role of the Armenian diaspora in the US, as the US role in Armenia. The Diaspora of Armenians has great political influence, which is reflected in the large supply of American aid (per capita to Armenia). In this sense, the Armenian diaspora acts as an intermediary between the historical homeland and the foreign state [12, p. 26]. The Armenian diasporas actively support their historical homeland. Currently, the number of American congressmen belonging to the so-called “Armenian group” is about 130 people. After the collapse of the USSR, the Armenian lobby for Armenia achieved the largest in terms of humanitarian aid among the CIS countries through government. At the end of the 1990s - beginning of the 2000s. the amount of humanitarian assistance provided by the USA to Armenia amounted to \$ 239 million. In recent years, about the Armenian forces in the US Congress did not allow a reduction in the amount of aid to Armenia [12].

The second model is loyal behavior aimed at achieving ethno cultural, ethno political pluralism, providing or ensuring the economic rights of diasporas by the host state. In this case, communities also use conventional forms of political activity, but for the sake of achieving certain rights and freedoms in the host country.

Signs of this model of political participation can be observed in Azerbaijan and Georgia, where the Russian diaspora organizations and their leaders have managed to establish generally constructive interaction with state authorities. Diasporas participated in the campaigns for the election of deputies to the legislative authorities of these republics and ensured the election of their representatives, and also gained some influence in the power structures of these countries.

The third model is protest participation, focused on achieving pluralism in the above aspects and providing economic rights for communities and their members. The model is characteristic of immigrant diasporas that have not yet received the rights and freedoms they need, but who strive for this by exerting pressure on the authorities through the mass mobilization of their members and the use of other unconventional methods. It should be borne in mind that the interest of the Mexican and African American diasporas in domestic politics and economics is due to the relatively low degree of assimilation in American society. Only a small percentage of

these groups take an active political position, and their organizations do not have common leadership with the functions of coordination of actions and, as a rule, are under the control of individual leaders, often competing with each other. Nevertheless, it seems that in the future these communities will be able to play a much more active foreign policy role, given their rapidly growing numbers.

### **The specifics of the participation of diasporas in foreign policy processes**

The influence of ethnic diasporas on the processes of formation and implementation of the foreign policy of host countries can take several forms.

Firstly, taking into account their position on international affairs, ensuring national security by certain politicians during the election campaigns, which is due to the possibility of attracting votes.

Secondly, the possibility of its representatives and spokesmen belonging to become members of the relevant parliamentary committees, whose activities in the development, adoption and implementation of laws and other regulatory legal acts are related to the foreign policy problems of the host country and ethnic homeland. Often the diaspora become advisors on foreign policy issues under the heads of state and government, ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Thirdly, by exerting direct or indirect pressure on the leadership of the host country, aimed at changing the position of the state on a particular issue in the field of international affairs.

The desire to influence the foreign policy of the host country as a whole is characteristic of those diasporas that have already managed to adapt to life in the host society and whose rights in various fields are generally ensured. As a rule, diaspora organizations act in the interests of the ethnic homeland, lobbying to render financial, diplomatic, and military assistance. It is advisable to consider the requirements of the diaspora communities regarding the foreign policy sphere using the goals of American ethnic groups as an example. Examining political processes in the United States, Lozansky E.D. notes that the first category of goals includes such basic requirements for American society as respect for human rights and a democratic form of government. The vast majority of American ethnic communities share these values, which is reflected in their support for relevant ideas in their ethnic homeland [9, p. 170].

There are various ways to influence the foreign policy of the host country.

Considering voting weights of ethnic diasporas has become a factor in the election campaigns of most presidents of the United States, starting

with Wilson W., taking into account the position of the Jewish, Irish and other communities on US foreign policy and international affairs. In the Congressional elections of 1940, the Republican Party relied on the voices of Americans of German and Italian descent who wanted to keep the United States from getting involved in a conflict that was brewing in Europe.

Other communities, such as the Polish diaspora, has seen a threat to their ethnic homeland in the “axis” countries and the Soviet Union, supported a democratic party that was more benevolent to Britain and France.

During the 1992 presidential election, Bill Clinton secured the support of the Irish community through promises to step up the peace process in Ulster.

For the first time, representatives of ethnic minorities became advisers to the head of state during the presidency of F. Roosevelt, they began to work in high positions in federal departments and represent the United States abroad. A modern example of helping the country of exodus from compatriots occupying key posts in foreign affairs agencies is the work of M. Albright as the US Secretary of State, who facilitated the entry of the Czech Republic and other states into the North Atlantic Alliance. After the formation of independent states in Central and Eastern Europe, their leaders began to actively use the help of their diasporas. Particularly active in this regard during the period of B. Clinton’s presidency were politicians from the Czech Republic and Poland, who, thanks to the support of compatriots, were accepted at the White House and were given opportunity to address the Congress.

The result was the formation of a tripartite alliance, including the administration of B. Clinton (mainly represented by Secretary of State M. Albright, natives of the Czech Republic), Eastern European governments and relevant American ethnic communities, which aimed to include the new states of the region in Western economic institutions and NATO [9, p. 93].

When speaking about the specifics of diaspora involvement in foreign policy processes, it is necessary to note the following features of the behavior of communities and their organizations.

First of all, the diaspora, acting as a political group in promoting its own interests in the authorities of the host state, in the case of lobbying for the national interests of the country of origin in the international sphere, begins to play the role of an agent of its ethnic homeland, becoming part of a large and very influential pressure group. It includes:

- diaspora political organizations as lobbyists and mediators between the host country and the state of exodus;
- members of a community or diaspora network, which are a mass support resource for the actions of these organizations;



- financial and economic institutions of the diaspora, providing community activities at the expense of their capabilities;

- the government of the country of origin, developing a strategy for the implementation of national interests in the international sphere and specifically in each host country, as well as often managing the lobbying process;

- diplomatic, reconnaissance capabilities, military, economic, financial, informational power of the country of origin, which may be required to assist the diaspora in the host country in the event of a conflict between them;

- allies in the host country represented by political and state figures (members of the government, parliament), political parties, organizations and movements.

### **Conclusion**

To sum up, when speaking about the specifics of the participation of diasporas in foreign policy processes, several features of the behavior of communities and their organizations should be noted. The Diaspora, acting as a group of interests in promoting its own interests in the authorities of the host state, in the case of lobbying for the national interests of the country of origin in the international sphere, begins to play the role of an agent of its ethnic homeland, becoming part of a large and very influential pressure group. It includes: political organizations of the diaspora as lobbyists and mediators between the host country and the state of exodus; members of a community or diaspora network, which are a mass support resource for the actions of these organizations; financial and economic institutions of the diaspora, providing community activities at the expense of their capabilities; the government of the country of origin, developing a strategy for the implementation of national interests in the international sphere and specifically in each host country, as well as often managing the lobbying process; diplomatic, reconnaissance capabilities, military, economic, financial, informational power of the country of origin, which may be required to assist the diaspora in host country in case of conflict between them; allies in the host country represented by political and state figures (members of the government, parliament), political parties, organizations and movements.

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## МЕМЛЕКЕТТЕРДІҢ САЯСИ КҮН ТӘРТІБІНДЕГІ ДИАСПОРАНЫҢ РӨЛІ МЕН МӘНІ

\*Жабина Ж.<sup>1</sup>

Қазақстан Республикасының Тұңғыш Президенті – Елбасының  
кітапханасы қызметкері, с.ғ.д., Нұр-Сұлтан, Қазақстан  
e-mail: zhansayazh@list.ru

**Аңдатпа.** Қазіргі әлемде жаһандану жағдайында көші-қон ағындарының себептеріне шекараның ашықтығы, жаңа мемлекеттердің пайда болуы және көші-қонның күшеюіне ықпал еткен басқа да факторлар қосылды. Жаһандық көші-қон ағындарының нәтижесі диаспоралардың қалыптасуына алып келді. Диаспоралар қабылдаушы елдің қоғамдық және саяси өмірінде ерекше рөл атқара бастады. Дегенмен, бұл қоғамдастықтарды дербес субъектілер ретінде рөлі теориялық тұрғыдан түсіндірілмеген, бұл өз кезегінде қарастырылып отырған тақырыптың өзектілігін айқындай түседі.

Қазіргі уақытта мемлекеттердің егеменді дамуы жағдайында диаспоралар қабылдаушы мемлекеттің әлеуметтік-мәдени ортасындағы

өз орнын іздеу қажеттілігімен бетпе-бет келеді. Бұл ретте диаспора жаңа деңгейдегі халықаралық қатынастарды құрудағы табиғи көпір болып, елдер арасындағы өзара іс-қимылдың маңызды объектісі және субъектісі ретінде рөл ойнауда. Осыған байланысты диаспоралардың рөлі мен ықпалының артуы халықаралық аренадағы өте маңызды құбылыстардың біріне айналууда.

**Тәсіл:** мақалада диаспораның халықаралық қатынастар жүйесіндегі рөлі, диаспоралардың рөлі қарастырылады, өйткені диаспораның топтары мен жеке тұлғалары ішкі және халықаралық саясатта маңызды рөл атқара алатын және ұлттық және шетелдік шешімдерге әсер ете алатын негізгі акторлер ретінде танылады.

**Қорытынды:** бүгінгі таңда диаспораның топтары мен жеке тұлғалары өз Отанында жергілікті дамуға жәрдемдесу үшін өздерінің ықпалы мен қаржылық ресурстарын пайдалана алатын негізгі актерлер ретінде танылады.

**Ерекшелік:** егер диаспораның үлесі туралы айтатын болсақ, онда ұлттық құрылыс процесі тек қаржылық ресурстарға ғана емес, сонымен бірге Әлеуметтік және саяси диалогқа, үгіт-насихат жұмыстарына және даму мүддесі үшін тұрақтылық мүдделеріне негізделген хабардарлыққа негізделген. Осыған байланысты диаспора өз еліндегі саяси процестер аясында талап ете бастаған дауыстар мен мойындауларға ие болады және мемлекеттік органдардың диаспорамен өзара әрекеттесу тетіктерін қалыптастырудың ерекшеліктері мен ерекшеліктерін қарастыратын зерттеулер аз болады.

**Тірек сөздер:** диаспора, мемлекеттік емес субъект, көші-қон, ішкі және халықаралық саясат.

## **РОЛЬ И СУТЬ ДИАСПОРЫ В ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ПОВЕСТКЕ ДНЯ ГОСУДАРСТВ**

**\*Жабина Ж.<sup>1</sup>**

д.полит.н., сотрудник Библиотеки Первого Президента РК-Елбасы  
Нур-Султан, Казахстан  
e-mail: zhansayazh@list.ru

**Аннотация.** В современном мире в условиях глобализации к причинам миграционных потоков добавилось стирание границ, появление новых государств и другие факторы, которые способствовали усилению миграции. Результатом глобальных миграционных потоков является формирование диаспор. Диаспоры приобретают особую роль в общественной и политической жизни принимающей страны. Однако теоретического понимания этих сообществ как самостоятельных субъектов не существует, что подчеркивает актуальность рассматриваемой темы.

В настоящее время диаспоры в условиях суверенного развития независимых государств сталкиваются с необходимостью поиска собственной ниши в социокультурной среде принимающего государства, считая себя меньшинством по отношению к коренным этническими группами. При этом, диаспора становится естественным мостом в выстраивании международных отношений нового уровня, выступая как важнейший объект и субъект взаимодействия между странами. В этой связи возрастание роли и влияния диаспор – крайне важное явление на международной арене.

**Подход:** В работе подчеркивается роль диаспоры в системе международных отношений, изучается роль диаспор в качестве групп и отдельных лиц диаспоры, которые признаются в качестве основных субъектов, способных играть важную роль во внутренней и международной политике и оказывать влияние как на национальные, так и на иностранные решения.

**Выводы:** в настоящее время группы и отдельные лица диаспоры признаются в качестве основных субъектов, которые могут использовать свое влияние и финансовые ресурсы для содействия местному развитию на своей родине.

**Оригинальность/ценность:** если говорить о вкладе диаспоры, то процесс национального строительства основывается не только на финансовых ресурсах, но и на социальном и политическом диалоге, пропагандистской деятельности и осведомленности в интересах стабильности в интересах развития. В этой связи диаспора получает больше голоса и признания, которые она начала требовать в рамках политических процессов в своей стране, и меньше исследований, в которых рассматриваются особенности и особенности формирования механизмов взаимодействия государственных органов с диаспорой.

**Ключевые слова:** диаспора, негосударственный субъект, миграция, внутренняя и международная политика.

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## INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: HISTORY, DETERMINANTS, POLITICAL ASPECTS AND EFFECTS

\*Salahuddin Hamidi,<sup>1</sup>

Master of Social Sciences,

Afghanistan, Kabul, salahuddinhamidi1919@gmail.com

Hesse R.<sup>2</sup>,

Dr. of philosophy, Habilit. Prof. of Pol. Sciences,

Freiburg University, Germany,

hesse\_r@gmail.com

**Annotation.** The article is devoted to the issues of migration in world politics, which plays an important role in influencing international relations. In the modern world, migration models have acquired a regional dimension, covering several sectors and social spheres. Scientists call the modern period the “era of migration”. It is now clear that migration has played a key role in global and national political cycles. The study of the migration policy of the state is especially important due to the importance and scale of migration. The article shows the factors that influenced the intensification of the migration movement, not only labor migration, but also for political and social reasons. The features of the political consciousness of migrants are revealed, the characteristic features of which are the mythologization and massification of the political consciousness of migrants as a phenomenon of the third generation. The article analyzes the phenomenon of ethnic, cultural and religious diversification of migration as one of the most important factors of the social environment, which has a direct and indirect impact on the system of state bodies, on the development of civil society institutions, on the development of organizations for the protection of the rights of migrants from various categories.

**Keywords:** Migration, refugee, labor migration, European Union, human rights.

### Basic provisions

The foundations of modern theoretical concepts of studying migration processes were laid at the end of the nineteenth century by the English scientist E. Ravenstein, who was one of the first to formulate the irregularities and manifestations, and on the example of migrations in the United Kingdom and North America (“permanent or temporary change of residence”) [1, p.173-174]:

1. The majority of migrations take place across short distances.
  2. Long-distance migrations are primarily focused on large commercial or industrial centers.
  3. Migration is a gradual process.
  4. Each migration stream has a separate counter flow
  5. Unlike the population of rural areas, city dwellers are less mobile in migratory terms.
  6. Internal migration is more active in women, while international migration is more active in men.
  7. Because the majority of migrants represent the educated population, families are less likely to migrate beyond their home country.
  8. Population migration, rather than natural expansion, drives the growth of large cities.
  9. With the development of industry and trade, migration grows.
  10. Transport development is quite important for the development of migration procedures.
  11. Most rural migrants go to large industrial and commercial centers.
  12. Determining reasons are mostly economic in migration processes.
- Some of Ernst-Georg Ravenstein's assumptions, such as those about short-distance migrations, migration counter-flows, and the relationship between migration and technological advancement, have been validated over time and are now considered to be the main prerequisites by modern scientists [2, p.200-201].

### **Introduction**

The study of migration problems received a new push only in the middle of the twentieth century. As a result of the emergence of new trends in population migration following the Second World War, serious scientific research is being done in many nations around the world. Not only are special notions that explain reasons, motives, and consequences vital for internal migration, but they are also important for international migration. The distinction between "internal" and "international" migration is important in the theoretical aspect, as is understanding, according to A. Zolberg, that international migration differs in the characteristics of development, which must be taken into account in state migration policies [3, p.24-25]. The study of migration is becoming increasingly interdisciplinary and active. Statistics, demographics, world economics, labor economics, sociology, geography, political science, ethnography, and a variety of other disciplines study population and labor migration issues. V. A. Iontsev creates a classification that combines 45 scientific directions, theories, and concepts to investigate population migration [4, p.15-17]. However, not all theories are included in the suggested classification and are equally presented.

Without defining and classifying the phenomenon, it is impossible to conduct theoretical research on migrations and to regulate them in practice. However, academics that use a variety of techniques (economic, demographic, sociological, political, historical, geographical, and legal) interpret the term “migration” differently. The authors’ points of view frequently conflict with one another. As a result, migration is seen as a factor in population expansion and as one of the components of labor resource formation from a demographic standpoint [5, p.180-183]. Within the economic and social context, migration is primarily examined through the lenses of increased unemployment, capital outflow, degradation of the country’s socio-economic position, and an increase in the number of illegal migrants.

The intricacy of migration dynamics in the twentieth century prompted a thorough examination of the fundamental ideas. Researchers are beginning to combine the terms “population mobility” and “mobility,” referring to the three types of population mobility: social, migration, and personal mobility.

It seems necessary to distinguish between two essentially different approaches to defining “population migration.” Migration is viewed as a spatial displacement and population movement in the first approach. It is based on a territorial movement that includes: spatial movements between localities that result in permanent and temporary changes of residence, as well as represent regular two-way circulation between places [6, p.19-20].

### **Description of materials and methods**

“Movement” and “relocation” are not interchangeable terms. The term of “move” denotes a change of residence or a shift in employment. The phrase “relocate” conjures up images of myself and a new home. This enables both terms to be used to define migration in both a narrow and a broad meaning. Territorial movements that occur between different locations in one or more administrative divisions, regardless of duration, regularity, or target orientation, represent global migration. This includes episodic (non-systematic business, recreational, tourist, and other visits); pendulum (movements that frequently connect places of residence and employment); and seasonal (typically associated with seasonal employment) migration. In a narrow sense, migration is a comprehensive sort of transient movement that culminates in a permanent change of residence, i.e. relocation. In the case of migration, the new residence is linked to the new place of employment, study, or other activities. The number of migratory movements throughout the world has increased as a result of globalization. As a result, new opportunities and challenges arise, which might be met at the cost of intensive cooperation at several levels: global (international), national (national), local (in the case of Germany), and also interdepartmental. New



types of migratory fluxes incorporate traditional types of migration, such as immigration and emigration.

Migration is, of course, a global phenomenon. There is no state that is unaffected by migration movements carried out by crossing the state border - international migration - or migration flows within the state - internal migration. Globalization with the world integration of markets is an important driving force behind these movements. States participate in migratory processes that are regulated. Mitigation (leaving the country) is a primary task for some countries, although the intensity of regulation manifests itself in different ways in different regions. In addition to economic factors [7, p.246].

In a borderless Europe, the European Union is increasingly playing a proactive role in areas such as migration, integration, and asylum. The so-called supranational institutions of the European Union are involved in the formation of legislation in this field, which must be implemented in the EU member states' national legislation. Migration, or the process of moving into and out of a state, is still one of the most voluminous social and political issues. The process of creating and developing the European (Economic) Community did not include the joint implementation of immigration and asylum policies in Europe. We consider red tasks of the Europe and Union member states in both sectors - migration and asylum. Despite this, EU Member States plead us to understand the need to combine their efforts to jointly solve these difficulties as part of the European integration process. Difficulties in managing migration flows at the national level, that is, independently, were the causes for this intention [7, p.65-66]. Integration in Europe The free movement in the territory of the European Union, which has no external borders, was made possible by itself. Experts confronted the difficulty that third-country nationals would be able to migrate from one country to another, while a single state would not be able to check this citizen or group of citizens.

On the one hand, migration policy covers national policy approaches to the organization and management of entry into and exit from a country, particularly (legislative) labor migration, which includes data collection and assessment, as well as more broadly leg alregulation, responsible state institutions, and non-state figures. International migration management, on the other hand, concentrates on the regulation of relationships between the “donor” country and the host country, as well as regional migration movements.

Germany was primarily a country of emigration in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, and until recently was considered non immigration when compared to the classical immigration countries of the United States, Canada, and Australia. Since the mid-1950s,

however, it has been considered non immigration. Germany has emerged as one of the most important targets in Europe and a destination for refugees.

Migration is posing serious challenges to host countries in terms of economic, humanitarian, demographic, and social policies, as well as national and global security. This enables us to declare that the subject is not limited to a single industry, but rather encompasses all facets of the state's public and political life. For example, in Spain, France, and the United States, migration processes are growing more evident as a result of the eruption of violent disputes between local residents and reigning nationals. Furthermore, the issue of immigration is frequently used as a campaign issue in the United States. The study of the migratory problem is not a new development in the field of sociological, economic, political, and cultural research. In the study's results, each science involves the interpretation of this problem in terms of its requirements and aims.

### **Results**

There are various points of view on what is required to comprehend by migration. However, it is undeniable that migration can be seen as “going beyond a national state.” [8]. The notion encompasses the transition from one state to another, as well as - in a broader sense - transcontinental migration. The most common concept used in scientific literature is that people should leave their “home country” in order to change their location. If you go beyond the framework of his fundamental notion, you'll notice that there are various points of view on how to express this concept. Migration is defined as “a somewhat long-term voluntary change of residence from one political space to another,” according to the limited plan [9, p.27], While migration refers to “all types of migration movements, including voluntary departure from the country or forced relocation as a result of wars or dictatorial regimes, and is regulated by labor migration contracts and a “wild west” mentality, in a broad sense, it refers to “all types of migration movements: Internal movements of the rural population to cities, movement beyond Other definitions describe separation from the socio- cultural environment as a decisive criterion. Based on the distance between the starting location and the destination region, local, regional, and international movements are distinguished. The fact that there is no common and uniform definition of migration for all until now is linked to the presence of many scientific disciplines engaged in study and their approaches. As a result, geographers, demographers, historians, economists, political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists are researching the causes and effects of migration. As a result, they develop their theories independently of one another, and the fact that there is essentially no interdisciplinary work can be beneficial.

In general, migration refers to the process of movement between national states in a political discourse by experts, thus we shall discuss international (inter-ethnic / supranational) migration in the future. The prevalence of problems within the migration element of asylum difficulties over numerous decades is reflected in the research literature in the Federal Republic of Germany. In this example, the topic is covered from a legal standpoint. In the 1990s, the role of such key themes other from the right to asylum, such as the reform of the German asylum system and the envisaged cooperation with other countries at the level of the United Nations, became increasingly important. Since the early 1990s, just. There is still more work to be done on the benefits and drawbacks of immigration to Germany. When we compare the studied aspect with the research done in the United States, it is worth noting that in America, on the one hand, legal and illegal migration, the right to asylum, and government legislation governing the acquisition of citizenship have long been the subject of scientific research. In addition, migration studies is a relatively new branch of science, dating from the beginning of the nineteenth century and focusing mostly on international migration. In the early twentieth century, the study of the phenomenon of immigration stood out in a distinct area in the United States, but in Europe, it only happened in the 1600s, when attention was focused on the problem of so-called guest workers (Gastarbeiterforschung) [5, p.260-261].

The major goal was to investigate the non-obvious phenomena migration. As a result of becoming more conscious of the fact that migration is not a transient phenomenon, the number of jobs that explore migration more deeply has increased. The typology, modes, and approaches are all different. As a result of my research, I've discovered a distinction between conservative and innovative migration [10, p.19]. Conservative migration is the outcome of the fact that it simply serves to preserve the life conditions and behavioral patterns that exist at the time. Significant changes in living and working situations occur as a result of innovative migration. There are a variety of reasons and motivations why citizens of one country choose to relocate to another. Citizens' objectives differ depending on whether they leave their homeland as refugees, migrants, family members of migrants, or experienced persons. In general, the driving force behind any decision is the urge to leave the environment, which a person perceives as dangerous for any reason. It can also be said that migration is "the outcome of a complex combination of feelings, hopes, expectations, and other factors that are often difficult to separate from one another." If we're talking about voluntary and forced migration, the motivation for voluntary migration is a desire to improve living conditions; the decision to resettle is in the hands of the immigrant himself; and forced migration is considered a form of forced migration.

Scientists distinguish between the causes of migration, such as political, economic, social, and environmental factors, as well as ethnic and religious factors. Interstate wars, as well as civil wars, play a unique role in the beginning of the resettlement process. In this regard, it is necessary to mention the current situation in various African republics, which is the result of a wave of illegal migration from North African countries that has swept across Europe. The destruction of large multi-ethnic empires, such as the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the abolition of Western European colonies in Africa and Asia, as well as the consolidation of new nation states, have all contributed to a large number of cases of people fleeing their homeland [4, p.18-20].

Wars do not simply endanger people's lives; they also reshape the foundations of life and encourage people to relocate to safer areas both within and outside their own country, and then return home with a desire to stay in that country.

Called intra-state conflicts, such as repression and dictatorial rule, should be included among the causes of migration, as should violations of human rights. The forced relocation of entire groups of citizens is one of the political reasons. Unemployment, poor working conditions, and a lack of career opportunities are all economic factors that contribute to the non-migration phenome. The consequences of economic problems in many countries are deteriorating trading conditions, high interest rates due to international loans and a lack of foreign investment, as well as certain in circumstances within the country. Much is dependent on a person's risk-taking, age, type, and level of education, as well as the information he has about job opportunities and working conditions in a powerful host country. Along with the search for material well-being, the country of origin plays a role.

On the one hand, migration, as a result of economic and social development, social and political ability, and environmental mental degradation, can contribute to improving economic and social conditions, while on the other hand, it can cause an increase in inequality and a new round of social and political tensions.

Host countries face a wide range of issues related to migrant economic security, reintegration into new social and political environments, and issues of tolerance (especially national and religious tolerance), respect for human rights, and national security, to name a few [5, p.180-181].

In addition, there are extremely specific, previously non-existing socio-political phenomena connected with the presence of big General migrants in the recipient country, which may consist of two or three generations in depth. Parties with anti-immigrant programs and electoral platforms, the emergence of" ethnic "spheres of employment in the legal and "shadow"

economies, and the introduction of bilingualism in educational institutions and public places are all examples of places where immigrants of a certain ethnic group live in close quarters.

Migration processes have been and continue to be an integral part of the history of mankind, as well as a systemic component of globalization. Globalization's logic is inextricably linked to migration. November 2005 was a pivotal month in the history of the United States [11, p.488-489]. In France might be considered, on the one hand, as a socio-cultural phenomena of the "third generation," and, on the other hand, as a real-life manifestation of the globalization crisis in many scenarios.

The characteristics of immigrants' political conduct are linked to the phenomenon of mass consciousness. In the context of the "period of migration," it is the massovization of political consciousness that has become one of the conditions for migrants' destructive political behavior. In a situation of vulnerability, migrants' political psychology is in a latent state, and does not play a significant role in their daily lives. A state of instability both inside and beyond the state, an unsettled family, and the expansion of social tension sharply awakens it and pushes it to the fore, obscuring other areas of consciousness.

### **Discussions**

Migrants' political consciousness is a mythological, politicized, mythological way of thinking. The mythologization and massification of migrants' political consciousness is exemplified by the phenomenon of the third generation. The essence of the phenomenon of the third generation of migrants is that it is the grandchildren of the first generation of migrants who adapted to the local community, which was much more difficult than it was for their grandparents and children, and that it is the grandchildren who became part of this community after their grandparents and fathers received citizenship, too. Due to its place, scale, ethnic, and cultural-religious diversification, migration, as one of the most important factors in the social environment, has a direct and indirect impact on the formation of the system of state bodies responsible for the control and regulation of migration flows. Furthermore, migration has an impact on the evolution of civil society institutions concerned with the self-organization of migrants and the development of organizations to protect the rights of migrants from diverse categories. Migration, as a part of the social environment that has an impact on the political system, is currently restructuring the existing political and social structures [12, p.13-17].

The German government has always seen emigration as a transient phenomenon and, as a result, has refused to assign such a status to its citizens. However, following the end of the Second World War, the Federal Republic of Germany is gradually evolving into a country of immigration, resulting in the emergence of a vast body of immigration-related laws and institutions. The beginning of the history of immigration to Germany in one

industry extends to all aspects of life in German society and has a negative impact in many ways.

After the repopulation of the Turks in the eighties of the last century, and also as a result of illegal migrants after 2015, migration has a negative connotation. So far, I have heard from refugees who have gone to Europe that there are unique organizations that help individual refugees. Indeed, observers notice that they have expensive phones and bank accounts, which are the accounts that these people utilize to get money. The Internet is teeming with fugees who have already gotten their hands on the prize. Europe, and now they must explain how they did it. The migration crisis culminated in the following events in Cologne, which occurred during the New Year's Eve festivities. The Lebanese newspaper *Orient-Le-jour*, in an analysis of what had happened, stated that these events had been met negatively by migrants who had already been living in Europe for a long time. The newspaper mentioned the opinion of a young Turk from the district of Molenbeek in particular (Brussels) [2, p.230-231], "So far, we've lived fairly comfortably," he stated of his situation. However, I did not notice that the Belgians did not sit next to me on the bus, despite the fact that there were no more empty seats... After all, many of the migrants come from countries where women, and they generally stroll with their faces hidden." And here's a comment from Suleiman Adel, a Syrian living in Norway: "For some of the people who have recently arrived in Norway, if a man reveals at least a small part of your body, it is a call to sex» [10, p.13]. There were, however, many who defended the behavior of Muslim adolescents on Christmas Eve. In particular, the Imam of Cologne's mosque at-Tawhid ordered that "women were to be lame, because they were partly undressed and perfumed".

It is important to mention that in Eastern society, it is not customary to arrest women of the same faith, according to Sharia or ADAT (customary law), and such offences are punishable. An attack on a representative of another religion, on the other hand, almost never has negative consequences for the attacker. In Egypt, for example, there have been reports of Muslim kidnappings of Coptic girls in places where Copts live. As a result, a Muslim man cannot marry Mahra (kalyma). In order to avoid embarrassment, the Coptic family tries to forget about the girl and sometimes even relocates. What happened in Cologne demonstrates that, having made the decision to invest.

### **Conclusion**

It is necessary to establish and assess the existing situation and structural types of migratory flows in order to gain a thorough understanding of the EU's migration strategy. Because there are many categories of refugees. The majority of them are not compelled to leave a dangerous location or country. They are looking for a better life or a higher-paying career. It's causing confusion amongst refugees and the government, because accurate

classification can help and control migratory flows more effectively. Furthermore, the book investigates the many types of migration in Germany throughout the postwar period, as well as the process of developing the legal framework for managing immigration flows, by underlining how various types of migration contributed to refugee crises and illegal migration.

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## **ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ КӨШІ-ҚОН: ТАРИХ, ДЕТЕРМИНАНТТАР, САЯСИ АСПЕКТІЛЕР МЕН САЛДАРЛАР**

\*Хамиди Салахутдин<sup>1</sup>

Әлеуметтік ғылымдар магистрі, Ауғанстан, Кабул университеті,  
[salahuddinhamidi1919@gmail.com](mailto:salahuddinhamidi1919@gmail.com)

Гессе Р.<sup>2</sup>,

философия докторы, с.ф.д., хабилизиттік профессор,  
Фрайбург университеті, Германия,  
[Hesse\\_r@gmail.com](mailto:Hesse_r@gmail.com)

**Аңдатпа.** Мақала халықаралық қатынастарға әсер ете отырып, қоғамда маңызды рөл атқаратын әлемдік саясаттағы көші-қон мәселелеріне арналған. Қазіргі әлемде көші-қон модельдері бірнеше секторлар мен әлеуметтік салаларды қамтитын аймақтық өлшемге ие болды. Ғалымдар қазіргі кезенді “көші-қон дәуірі” деп атайды. Көші-қон жаһандық және ұлттық саяси циклдерде шешуші рөл атқарғаны түсінікті болды. Көші-қонның маңыздылығы мен ауқымына



байланысты мемлекеттің көші-қон саясатын зерделеу ерекше маңызды. Мақалада еңбек көші-қоны ғана емес, сонымен қатар саяси және әлеуметтік себептер бойынша көші-қон қозғалысының күшеюіне әсер еткен факторлар көрсетілген. Мигранттардың саяси санасының ерекшеліктері анықталды, олардың белгілері үшінші буын феномені ретінде мигранттардың саяси санасын мифологизациялау және массациялау болып табылады.

Мақалада мемлекеттік органдар жүйесіне, азаматтық қоғам институттарының дамуына, түрлі санаттағы мигранттардың құқықтарын қорғау жөніндегі ұйымдардың дамуына тікелей және жанама әсер ететін әлеуметтік ортаның маңызды факторларының бірі ретінде көші-қонның этникалық және мәдени-діни әртараптандыру феномені талданады.

**Тірек сөздер:** көші-қон, босқын, еңбек көші-қоны, Еуропалық Одақ, адам құқықтары.

## **МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ МИГРАЦИЯ: ИСТОРИЯ, ДЕТЕРМИНАНТЫ, ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ АСПЕКТЫ И ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ**

\*Хамиди Салахуддин<sup>1</sup>

Магистр социальных наук  
Афганистан, университет Кабул,  
salahuddinhamidi1919@gmail.com

Гессе Р.<sup>2</sup>,

доктор философии, хабилированный доктор политических наук,  
профессор, Фрайбургский университет, Германия  
Hesse\_r@gmail.com

**Аннотация.** Статья посвящена вопросам миграции в мировой политике, которая играет важную роль, оказывая влияние на международные отношения. В современном мире модели миграции приобрели региональное измерение, охватывая несколько секторов и социальных сфер. Современный период ученые называют «эпохой миграции». Теперь ясно, что миграция сыграла ключевую роль в глобальных и национальных политических циклах. Изучение миграционной политики государства особенно важно ввиду важности и масштабов миграции. В статье показаны факторы, повлиявшие на интенсификацию миграционного движения, не только трудовой миграции, но и по политическим и социальным причинам. Выявлены особенности политического сознания мигрантов, характерными чертами которого являются мифологизации и массивификации политического сознания мигрантов

как феномен третьего поколения. В статье проанализирован феномен этнической и культурно-религиозной диверсификации миграция, как один из важнейших факторов социальной среды, который оказывает оказывает прямое и косвенное влияние на систему государственных органов, на развитие институтов гражданского общества, на развитие организаций по защите прав мигрантов из различных категорий.

**Ключевые слова:** Миграция, беженец, трудовая миграция, Европейский Союз, права человека.

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**CHALLENGES OF THE «ONE BELT, ONE ROAD INITIATIVE»  
IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC INSTABILITY**

*\*Zhabina Zh.<sup>1</sup>*

Employee of the Library of the First President of the Republic of  
Kazakhstan –Elbasy, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan

e-mail: zhansayazh@list.ru

*Saken G.S.<sup>2</sup>*

MA student in International Relations, Ablai Khan KazUIRandWL,  
Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: saken.gulgul@gmail.com

**Abstract.** The paper examines the development of China's «One Belt, One Road» initiative, which was formed in 2013 when the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road projects merged. These projects are both economic and political in nature, designed to promote free, orderly movement of economic factors, efficient allocation of resources, deepening of market integration, they aim to coordinate the economic policies of the countries along the One Belt and One Road routes, expand and deepen regional cooperation, forming an open, inclusive and balanced architecture of regional cooperation, in which all participants should get China takes on key tasks in these projects to ensure their implementation.

**Key words:** China, Kazakhstan, One Belt One Road, Maritime Silk Road

### **Basic provisions**

In 2013, China announced a global development strategy called «One Belt, One Road», or the «Belt and Road». The idea of this project is to create a fundamentally new format of China's international interaction, where large-scale multilateral and bilateral ties between China and other states will be established. This megaproject includes most of the countries of Eurasia, part of Africa, Australia and Oceania.

Since 2013, the «One Belt, One Road» joint construction initiative has been moving forward systematically and has already achieved notable successes in areas such as promoting political coordination, infrastructure connectivity, seamless trade, free movement of capital and rapprochement of peoples.


A number of early illustrative and exemplary results emerged. Participating countries have benefited in real ways, thereby strengthening their sense of identity and their understanding of the real level of inclusion in the initiative. Political coordination is an important guarantee for the effective joint construction of the One Belt, One Road and an important prerequisite for the implementation of various interaction and cooperation activities. The Republic of Kazakhstan is one of the most important participants of the Belt and Road project. As of April 2021, the government has invested more than \$30 billion, which was used to develop various initiatives under this project: transport infrastructure, logistics hubs, focal points, etc. [1]. More than 12.5 thousand km of roads and 3 thousand km of railways were built. Special attention was paid to seaports and airports. At the same time, Kazakhstan honestly fulfills all of its obligations. For example, within the framework of construction of a large highway between Western Europe and Western China, it was the section between China and Kazakhstan that started functioning first of all, while, for example, Russia fulfills its part of obligations much slower. According to the World Bank, Kazakhstan could receive up to \$5 billion annually from transit fees alone for goods passing through its border to other markets.

### **Introduction**

An additional incentive for Kazakhstan is that the Belt and Road project is organically combined with its domestic infrastructure development program, Nurly Zhol, which modernizes the country's transport system, builds infrastructure, and integrates remote regions into the overall logistics network. In the summer of 2019, some of the latest official relevant figures on the implementation of the Belt and Road project between Kazakhstan and China were announced at a forum in Astana (Nur-Sultan). The following can be highlighted here:

- Delivery time between China and Europe via Kazakhstan is 15 days (similar delivery via sea takes 28-42 days);
- The current number of China-Kazakhstan investment projects under the Belt and Road Initiative is 51, with a total project value of over \$27 billion;
- A China-Kazakhstan fund with a capitalization of more than \$2 billion has been established, which should improve the investment climate in Kazakhstan;
- The transnational corporations of China that are most actively involved in the Belt and Road project in Kazakhstan are CITIC Group (investment company) and CNPC (oil and gas). In particular, CNPC has paid \$42 billion in taxes, created 30,000 jobs, and supported social projects worth over \$360 million during its operations in Kazakhstan [1].

Figure 1 - Dynamics of exports from Kazakhstan to China in 1994-2020  
Note - compiled by the author on the basis of the source [2]




Thus, we can conclude that Kazakhstan occupies one of the most important places within the Belt and Road project. The leaders of the two countries, Xi Jinping and Nursultan Nazarbayev, and then Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, have expressed the enormous importance of this project for each country in every negotiation. At the same time, if we look at the dynamics of the trade balance between China and Kazakhstan before and after the start of the Belt and Road project, we see that positive trends, although present, are not so extensive. For example, the volume of Kazakhstan's exports to China fell from \$10 billion to \$7.82 billion from 2014 to 2020 (see Figure 1). (see Figure 1). At the same time, it is possible to observe a recovery

growth after exports fell from 2014 to 2015 by almost half, but it is still not possible to reach the level of 2012-2013

A similar trend can be observed in the dynamics of imports (see Figure 2), although here the recovery growth is more pronounced.

Figure 2 - Dynamics of Kazakhstan's imports from China in 1994-2020

Note - compiled by the author on the basis of the source [2]



It is important to note, however, that the drop occurred in monetary terms due to the fact that the world market saw a drop in the price of hydrocarbons, which make up the bulk of Kazakhstan's exports. As a result, it can be considered that the interest in Kazakhstan from the Chinese side is certainly present, and it is quite significant, but it can hardly be considered a «key link» in the chain of interests of China (as it is sometimes claimed in the Kazakhstani press).

Researchers' opinions on the opportunities that the Belt and Road project offers to Kazakhstan are divided. While some say that it belongs to the win-win category of projects, others rightly point out some of the threats that its implementation poses to Kazakhstan. It is difficult not to agree with the opinion that China, being the main initiator of the project, will be its main beneficiary, and the interests of other states, especially those that are inferior to China in economic and military power, will be of secondary importance [3].

### **Description of materials and methods**

At a meeting to mark the 5th anniversary of the work of promoting One Belt, One Road construction in Beijing in August 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a proposal that One Belt, One Road construction

should move from the painting style of ideas and sketches to the Chinese painting style of «gongbi», that is, he pointed to the need to move from comprehensive planning to careful detail, called for achieving high quality construction, and thereby bring benefits.

Today the route China - Kazakhstan - Europe and vice versa has become the most modern, the most convenient and the most economically developed and profitable route that meets all the requirements for the reliable and timely delivery of goods.

China's increasing geopolitical influence in the world does not suit all other states, including not only the United States (in fact, the only «superpower» according to the classification described in the first chapter), but also a number of regional powers that have certain contradictions with China. For example, India within the framework of the «One Belt, One Road» initiative has become a key ICC country, since sea routes pass through it as well, and Indian ports are being developed within the framework of this program. But India itself, its political leadership, according to a number of experts, has an ambiguous position on this project. Any experts point out that national Indian media, experts and politicians are particularly concerned about the growing influence of China in the Indian Ocean, as a significant part of the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly falling within the sphere of Chinese influence. At the same time, trying to be a «regional power», India views South Asia as a sphere of its own national interests. And these interests, in their view, can be significantly damaged by China. This is why India has responded to the Chinese initiative by developing the «Mausam Project» plan to strengthen the historic maritime ties of the Indian Ocean basin countries.

However, the Indian project is much smaller than the Chinese one, involving only cooperation in the fields of culture and tourism. At the same time, it is complemented by the Spice Road project, which reflects India's foreign policy efforts in the region. The situation is also complicated by unresolved border disputes with China, the de facto provision of political asylum, the headquarters of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile on Indian territory, and in 2011 there was another conflict with China over China's development of oil fields in the South China Sea (in disputed territories), which almost led to a military confrontation. Moreover, India has complicated relations with Pakistan, which has one of the key values in the «One Belt, One Road» initiative [4].

## **Results**

Nevertheless, India's political leadership already in 2015 entered into negotiations with China, joined the MSEI project and became one of the founders of the AIIB. Chinese experts have been studying the possibility of pairing the two projects - Mausam and MSE the policy of modern India, which is trying to keep a balance in the region between the U.S. and China,

while expanding its influence, despite attempts to conduct an independent foreign policy, still needs economic growth incentives to level the social imbalance of the country. This makes it necessary to cooperate with China on the SMP project, since participation in the project involves significant investments by Chinese companies in the country's port infrastructure. Some Asian countries, including those participating in the China Initiative, also voice the Chinese threat to their economies and national interests at the official (government) or opposition (often non-systemic) level. Thus, the victory of the opposition politician M. Mohamad in Malaysia in the presidential elections in May 2018 led to increased criticism at the official level of this country of the Chinese initiative.

### **Discussions**

The politician promised to revise the deals concluded by his predecessors within the framework of this initiative, or to terminate them altogether. The reason is cited for the country's substantial increase in foreign debt and the almost non-existent effect of its participation in the Chinese project. In August 2018, it was even announced that the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) project and the Sabah gas pipeline project under the Chinese initiative in Malaysia would be terminated. Nevertheless, during the negotiation process in August 2018, some compromises were reached in favor of Malaysia, which prevented not all controversial important projects for China in the country from being frozen.

In addition to Malaysia, Thailand, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, and Nepal have also halted or substantially revised the implementation of some projects on their territory in the last year [5].

Similarly, in Kazakhstan, as the largest Central Asian state neighboring China, which has a large territory, insignificant for such an area population, many minerals and agricultural resources, the Chinese threat, which the current government is trying to hide, smoothing over the contradictions, but which seems obvious to many, as noted by Kazakhstani political analysts is increasingly seen. As noted in the previous chapter, the growth of the country's foreign debt to China, the active access of the largest Chinese company to oil production, the purchase of agricultural land by Chinese businesses, the threat of «demographic invasion» - this is what even ordinary citizens of Kazakhstan fear. Non-systemic opposition, rigidly opposing the current political regime (its head M. Ablyazov is hiding abroad) has taken these fears on its arm, arguing that the current authorities are in every way promoting the Chinese expansion to the detriment of the national interests. A. Navalny (2014), a prominent politician from Russia's extra-systemic opposition, is of a similar opinion, believing that concessions to China's interests in the economy together with the expansion of military cooperation will only lead to a weakening of Russia, the sale of its resources on unfavorable terms, economic and demographic expansion (especially

in the east of the country), and then to Chinese territorial claims against Russia, in which Russia will have nothing to counter.

Overall, according to research by the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC, the debt risks associated with participation in the China Initiative are relevant for countries such as Pakistan, Djibouti, Maldives, Laos, Mongolia, Montenegro, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, among others. Debt risks have serious strategic implications, as countries have to fulfill obligations in favor of China in the event of default on loans. For example, Sri Lanka has already handed over to China a controlling stake and a 99-year lease on the port of Hambantota in 2017, and India and Japan have concerns that it could become a Chinese military base in the future. Similar scenarios are possible in the Maldives and Djibouti.

The European Union, the United States and other democracies have also recently been concerned about China's growing geopolitical influence in the world and in Europe in particular. As previously described, Chinese companies are actively investing in the development of port and transport infrastructure in Eastern and Southern Europe and are gaining the loyalty of these countries. At the same time, given the fact that the «Chinese model» is not a democratic model, it contradicts the ideas of freedom and democracy, «extrapolation» of this model to other countries will not lead to the effective development of countries, they will only consolidate authoritarian regimes that will act not in the interests of their people, but in the interests of China. As if to oppose the interests of «Western Civilization» to those of China, the EU plans to sign a new strategy on Asia, which implies improving transport, digital and energy connections. Nevertheless, no alternative strategy has yet been finally formed.


Many democratic politicians have made critical statements on the Chinese initiative in recent years. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that the Chinese project should not be a one-way road. The US position was voiced by Defense Secretary J. Mattis, who stressed that «in a globalized world, there are many belts and many roads. » In March 2018, during a visit to Beijing, British Prime Minister Theresa May refused to endorse it, while Australia abstained from endorsing it. As a result, Jonathan Hilman believes that One Belt, One Road can actually unite China's competitors rather than divide them [6].

Finally, there are also risks for China itself in this initiative and the projects under it. First of all, there are concerns that the initiated projects may not be implemented. Foreign experts also talk about this, arguing that many of the projects under the initiative are risky and uncertain. B. Konrad, Vice President of the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin, states that «there will be a large number of projects with unintended consequences. Risks of bad loans and high default risks are present for many of these projects. The risk to China's banking system is by definition a risk to the global banking system».



Similarly, Chinese experts are not always convinced of the feasibility of many projects. For example, Chengang Xu, a professor of economics at the Graduate School of Business in Beijing, noted that one of the main goals of the initiative is seen as an attempt by China «to delay the solution of the overproduction problem, when the country has accumulated a large amount of excess capacity and many companies have actually turned into ‘zombie companies’ (as in Japan before), especially in the steel and construction sectors». Taking all this into account, it is possible to construct a scheme describing the risks of the «One Belt, One Road» initiative both for Kazakhstan and other participants at the present stage:

Figure 3 - Risks of implementing the «One Belt, One Road» initiative at the present stage



Thus, Figure 3 shows that the risks of the initiative are also present for the countries participating in the project, and they are already evident: these are the problems associated with the debt crisis in connection with the implementation of projects, the economic and demographic expansion of China in these countries, the economy becoming dependent on China, actually turning it into sources of cheap raw materials, the transfer of non-ecological production, the strengthening of non-democratic regimes that will not act in the national interest. For China’s geopolitical adversaries, who consider the ideals of freedom and democracy to be their key interests,

the risks include an increasing loyalty of some states to China and a retreat from the ideals of democracy and a possible strengthening of China's military presence in such «friendly» countries. For China itself, the risks are associated with the economy, because in the conditions of its decline, devaluation of the yuan, there may be problems with the implementation of a number of expensive projects, and hence a large-scale economic crisis in the country, which will affect other countries involved in the «One Belt, One Road» initiative projects [7].

### **Conclusion**

Kazakhstan has great ambitions for the One Belt, One Road initiative, as it is geographically an ideal point to connect China and the West, and Kazakhstan's interest in the initiative is undeniable - the Kazakh government is already involved in the Nurlı Zhol (Shining Path) program, which is an economic stimulation plan with a budget of USD 9 billion to develop and modernize roads, railways, etc.

Kazakhstan's economy has suffered from falling oil prices since late 2013, and consequently Kazakhstan's future economic growth depends on the development of infrastructure and regional trade. The country aspires to become the largest business and transit hub in Central Asia, a bridge between Europe and Asia. Kazakhstan sees China's One Belt, One Road initiative as a means to achieve this goal.

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## **ЖАҒАНДЫҚ ЭКОНОМИКАЛЫҚ ТҰРАҚСЫЗДЫҚ ЖАҒДАЙЫНДА “БІР БЕЛДЕУ, БІР ЖОЛ” БАСТАМАСЫНЫҢ СЫН-ҚАТЕРЛЕРІ**

\*Жабина Ж.,<sup>1</sup>

Д.полит.н., Сотрудник Библиотеки Первого Президента РК-Елбасы  
Нур-Султан, Казахстан

e-mail: zhansayazh@list.ru

Сәкен Г.С.,<sup>2</sup>

Абылай хан атындағы ҚазХҚжӘТУ магистранты,  
Алматы, Қазақстан, e-mail: saken.gulgul@gmail.com

**Аңдатпа.** Мақалада Қытайдың 2013 жылы «Жібек жолының экономикалық белдеуі» және «21 ғасырдағы Теңіз Жібек жолы» жобаларын біріктіру кезінде қалыптасқан «Бір белдеу, бір жол» бастамасын дамыту қарастырылады. Бұл жобалар экономикалық және саяси сипатта болады, экономикалық факторлардың еркін, реттелген қозғалысын, ресурстарды тиімді бөлуді, нарықтық интеграцияны тереңдетуге жәрдемдесуге арналған, олар «бір белдеу және бір жол» бағыттары бойында орналасқан елдердің экономикалық саясатын үйлестіруге бағытталған. аймақтық ынтымақтастықты кеңейту және тереңдету, барлық қатысушылар алуы керек ашық, инклюзивті және теңдестірілген аймақтық ынтымақтастық архитектурасын қалыптастыру Қытай осы жобалардағы негізгі міндеттерді өз мойнына алады., олардың орындалуын қамтамасыз ету.

**Тірек сөздер:** Қытай, Қазақстан,» Бір белдеу - бір жол», теңіз Жібек жолы.

## **ВЫЗОВЫ ИНИЦИАТИВЫ «ОДИН ПОЯС, ОДИН ПУТЬ» В КОНТЕКСТЕ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЙ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ НЕСТАБИЛЬНОСТИ**

\*Жабина Ж.<sup>1</sup>

Д.полит.н., Сотрудник Библиотеки Первого Президента РК-Елбасы  
Нур-Султан, Казахстан

e-mail: zhansayazh@list.ru

Сәкен Г.С.<sup>2</sup>

Магистрант КазУМОиМЯ имени Абылай хана,  
Алматы, Казахстан, e-mail: saken.gulgul@gmail.com

**Аннотация.** В статье рассматривается развитие китайской инициативы «Один пояс, один путь», которая была сформирована в 2013 году при объединении проектов «Экономический пояс Шелкового пути» и «Морской Шелковый путь 21 века». Эти проекты носят как экономический, так и политический характер, призваны содействовать

свободному, упорядоченному перемещению экономических факторов, эффективному распределению ресурсов, углублению рыночной интеграции, они направлены на координацию экономической политики стран, расположенных вдоль маршрутов «Одного пояса и одного пути», расширение и углубление регионального сотрудничества, формирование открытой, инклюзивной и сбалансированной архитектуры регионального сотрудничества, в которой все участники должны получить Китай берет на себя ключевые задачи в этих проектах, чтобы обеспечить их реализацию.

**Ключевые слова:** Китай, Казахстан, «Один пояс - один путь», морской Шелковый путь.

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**VENEZUELAN MIGRATION TO TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO.  
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF CRIME, GANGS AND  
VIOLENT EXTREMISM.**

Dr. Raghunath Mahabir<sup>1</sup>

Lecturer and Coordinator of the National Security and Intelligence  
Program.

University of the Southern Caribbean. Trinidad and Tobago,  
mahabir@usc.edu.tt

**Annotation.** The issue of migration has gained greater importance on the political agendas of many source and destination countries. Various efforts have been taken to monitor migratory movements at the national and international level. However, based on the dearth of literature on the topic of immigration as opposed to emigration it is clear that more needs to be done to assess the specific causes for and the implications of migration and immigration. Migration has been shown to have tremendous influence on receiving nations and existing literature has demonstrated that immigration has a significant impact on the lives of the receiving country's national population, both positively and negatively.

This paper provides an analysis of the existing evidence on the relationships between the migration of Venezuelans into Trinidad and Tobago, (T&T) crime, gang violence and violent extremism. It argues that

there is a direct link between migration and crime, including gang violence. It also shows that unlike what happens in many other migrant receiving states, there is no visible nexus between Venezuelan migration and violent extremism.

Additionally, this paper further examines the reasons for the migration of Venezuelans and the impact this migration has on Trinidad and Tobago over the period 2015-2020. It then looks at the nexus between Venezuelan migrants and crime, gang violence and extremism. It reviews the broad range of policy responses to migration and then extracts the themes that emerged from interviews with actors in-country. It then offers some recommendations for community NGOs, security officials, and decision makers.

**Key words:** migration, violent extremism, radicalization, gang violence.

### **Basic provisions**

Towards the end of the second decade in the 21<sup>st</sup> century an unprecedented humanitarian crisis has resulted in the largest displacement of people in the Americas in modern history. Between January 2014 and June 2019 <sup>1</sup> over one million Venezuelans – roughly 10% of the population – have fled their homes to avoid political repression, severe food and medicine shortages, significantly diminished social services, and general economic collapse. Of these, over 80% of them have settled in Latin American and Caribbean nations [1]. According to United Nations (UN) figures, Trinidad and Tobago received more than 40,000 Venezuelans by May 2019. Because of visa requirements, Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad and Tobago were unable to register for the migrant registration process in 2019. Venezuelan nationals required a visa to enter Trinidad and Tobago since June 17, 2019. This requirement became a barrier to admission, and it may have potentially driven migrants to choose dangerous, unofficial paths into the nation (ACAPS view on Trinidad and Tobago Venezuelan refugees). Thus, an unaccounted number remains unregistered and among this group, mainly, criminal elements are ostensibly found.

Facing international pressure and amidst local domestic agitations, the government of Trinidad and Tobago only in April 2019 acknowledged Venezuelans' presence domestically. Currently, the government of Trinidad and Tobago avoids formal asylum legislation. Asylum-seekers can only receive refugee status through the Living Waters Community, the United Nations Refugee Agency's local implementing chapter in Trinidad, which coordinates the application and approval of asylum status.

This process has resulted in a discrepancy between both parties

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<sup>1</sup> In August 2020, U.N. agencies estimated 5.2 million Venezuelans had left the country.

(Trinidad and Tobago and the United Nations) because of the United Nations' approval of asylum status in a country that does not comprehensively address refugee concern. The side effects have led to reports of unlawful detention by the police and the deportation in 2019 of close to 100 refugees, actions which were condemned by the UN as illegal [2].

In June 2019, the government commenced an exercise called the 'Migrant Registration Framework', a work permit exemption policy for all Venezuelan immigrants in Trinidad to register with authorities during 2 weeks. Touted as a humanitarian outreach that provided for Venezuelans to work legally in T&T for one year, this policy was a short-term measure that served as a rudimentary counting and surveillance mechanism incognizant of migrants' daily precarities and the indeterminate situation in Venezuela [3].

Speaking in the Senate on June 25, 2019, the National Security Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, acknowledged the UNHCR's estimate of 40,000 Venezuelans and confirmed 16,523 Venezuelans registered in the process. He acknowledged there may still be some who did not register and promised that immigration laws would apply to them. He denied claims of thousands of Venezuelans living illegally in the country [4].

### **Introduction**

The influx of Venezuelans caught the government by surprise, as they were without a comprehensive migration policy to deal with this unprecedented phenomenon. In this sense, the government's response has been reactive and structured around a patchwork of emergency measures and decrees. Per Mohan [3] the state is attempting to shift the focus and tone of the Venezuela-T&T migration discourse by removing the term "refugee" from the larger discussion. Despite several official and unofficial pledges that the government is working on developing a local refugee law, T&T has yet to establish domestic legislation to operationalize the protections and guarantees offered by the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol [5]. The Migrant Registration Framework focuses entirely on labour permit exemptions for Venezuelans, implying that the state views Venezuelan immigrants as economic migrants.

This however, shows no indication of complexities of migration flows and the different motivational factors for Venezuelans' migration but instead places migrants into an orderly and manageable category. The Minister of National Security confirmed this stance, stating that 'refugees' is simply a 'buzz word'; furthermore, we are dealing with migrants' in the context of Venezuelan inflows to T&T <sup>2</sup> (Senate Deb. 24 June 2019). The one-year policy also justified the government's assertion on the Venezuela question that T&T is 'not a refugee camp' [6].

<sup>2</sup> (Senate Debates 24 June 2019) as cited by Mohan.

The state's shift from a position of non-acknowledgment of a crisis in Venezuela and migration at home to a one-year policy (now with an additional year to July 2021) brings to light changing political agendas. As a percentage of its population, Trinidad is the recipient of more Venezuelans than almost any other country. Currently, there are grave concerns about xenophobia against Venezuelans in Trinidad.<sup>3</sup>

### **Outline of Paper**

The paper develops as follows. First, it explores the reasons for the migration of Venezuelans and its impact on Trinidad and Tobago over 2015-2020. It then looks at the nexus between Venezuelan migrants and crime, gang violence and extremism. It then reviews the broad range of policy responses to migration, classifying them as normal, different, and radical. Lastly, it moves into the themes emerging from interviews with actors in-country and drawing from the themes. It concludes with broader lessons for community NGOs, security officials, and decision makers.

### **Reasons for the migration of Venezuelans to Trinidad in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.**

The escalating political, economic, and humanitarian calamity in Venezuela has forced at least 4 million people to flee the country, most of them since 2015 (UNCHR 2020) [7].<sup>4</sup> Evidence indicates that Trinidad and Tobago's highest numbers of Venezuelans going to Trinidad were during the period January 2018 to June 2019. It has also been estimated that for the period June 2019 to June 2020, no less than 10,000 Venezuelans entered into Trinidad illegally.<sup>5</sup>

The circumstances that are driving Venezuelans to flee their country en masse include a profound economic crisis marked by deteriorating scarcity of basic goods [8] and a serious health crisis stemming from both a lack of medicine, decline of health services coupled with limited capacity and capability of health institutions (Derecha Al Salud 2017) which has resulted in a rise in diseases within the Venezuelan population [9].<sup>6</sup>

Venezuela's present health crisis is rooted in the country's

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3 This information was revealed in an interview conducted on 9 January, 2020 with a Senior Immigration Officer.

4 In August 2020, U.N. agencies estimated 5.2 million Venezuelans had left the country; most have relocated to other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Migrants face obstacles maintaining employment and accessing health care, as neighbouring countries have implemented quarantines and border closures to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

5 This information was divulged in an interview conducted on 9 January, 2020 with a Senior Immigration Officer.

6 Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing power, and a collapse of social services have created a humanitarian crisis. According to a 2019-2020 household survey, the percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty increased to 96% in 2019 (80% in extreme poverty).

fundamental political crisis. The Maduro administration has been hesitant to pursue measures that could reverse the country's economic trajectory, instead blaming domestic troubles on an ill-defined "economic war." As evidenced by a recent G7 declaration on Venezuela, there is still widespread international agreement on the urgency of finding a "peaceful, negotiated, democratic solution to the crisis [10].

Another reason why many Venezuelans are fleeing are due the exorbitant levels of violence and insecurity. According to the Venezuelan Observatory of Violence (OVV), there were 81.4 violent deaths per 100,000 people in 2018, the highest rate in Latin America. That means Venezuela is the most violent country in the region. Violence is "epidemic" in 88 percent of Venezuelan municipalities, based on WHO standards, given that the number of violent deaths exceeds 10 per 100,000 citizens due to homicides. Also, citizens are often subjected to armed robbery and kidnapping. It is difficult to find reliable data on these crimes, which are usually not reported to the authorities, but estimates suggest that Venezuela has one of the highest kidnapping rates in the region.

The rise in extrajudicial executions is particularly worrying. During 2017, the government created a rapid-response unit to combat organized crime and drug trafficking, known as the Special Action Forces (FAES). The group has carried out numerous extrajudicial executions in the context of security operations in poor neighbourhoods (OHCHR) [11].

### **Description of materials and methods**

The research applied a mixed method design, specifically naturalistic inquiry, qualitative data, and statistical analysis including fieldwork, comprising 25 interviews with key sources, 80 migrant surveys, and eight focus group discussions with Venezuelan migrants which were carried out by this researcher. This researcher conducted secondary research exploring literature on existing evidence about migration, crime violent extremism and gang violence to identify risk factors to develop a framework for analysis. To gather primary data for this research, this researcher conducted eight focus group discussions and key informant interviews. Focus group discussions conducted for the purpose of this research included Venezuelans in San Fernando, (Duncan Village and Diamond Village) Princes Town, (St Charles Village and Borde Narve) Siparia (San Francique and Quarry Village) and Chaguanas (Montrose and Charlieville). Practitioners were selected for key informant interviews based their ability to provide informed commentary or insights into gang involvement, crime and violent extremism in Trinidad. These included religious leaders, local authorities, civil society workers, journalists, and academics with related expertise, officers of the Immigration Department, the Police Service, the Coast Guard, fishermen from Erin, villagers of Mayaro, Cedros and Palo Seco and one new reporter.



Collection, systematizations, and analyses of the data for this research were conducted between September of 2019 and February of 2020.

### **Impact of Venezuelan Migration to Trinidad and Tobago**

The impact of the increasing numbers of Venezuelans migrants in Trinidad and Tobago has been substantial, given its limited size and absorption capacity. The process of regularization implied that many of the Venezuelans who crossed the border with proper documentation would have been able to stay in Trinidad and Tobago legally and be able to work for one year, beginning June 2019.

There has now been an extension for another year ending June 2021. Confronted with concerns that the aforementioned extension of the process of regularization potentially places a large burden on Trinidad, analysis of who these newly regularized migrants are and what impact, if any, they might have on the Trinidad and Tobago economy was performed. Those eligible for regularization were migrants who voluntarily registered in 2019 with the Ministry of National Security. A key challenge for Trinidad's policymakers is how to manage the transition when the economy has slowed, and needs to reduce its fiscal deficits.

The large inflow of migrants from Venezuela presents economic and social challenges for Trinidad. At the end of June 2020, there were more than 60,000 Venezuelan immigrants with an intention to stay in Trinidad. Migrant integration requires appropriate short-term integration policies, a feature which the Trinidad and Tobago government has been resisting.

In open-ended interviews with Venezuelans living in Trinidad, 85% were working. Many of them who were working, (at least 44%) were doing so for the minimum wage (TT17.50 per hour). They identified as being employed in areas in the agricultural, building and construction sectors (mostly men). Close to 80 % of the females indicated that they found employment in supermarkets, bars and restaurants, night clubs and as maids or house servants. Of the total number of Venezuelans interviewed as of February 2020, only 15% indicated that they were unemployed.

In the medium-term, a particular and fundamental challenge will be to integrate migrants in the formal labour market which is still characterized by high levels of informality, adversely weighing on well-being and productivity. The integration of migrants to formal jobs would require a comprehensive strategy with actions ranging in several policy areas such as education, taxes, pensions, business regulations and labour market policies [12].

In the survey done in four main areas: San Fernando, Princes Town, Siparia and Chaguanas between September 2019 and February 2020 to count, identify and gather information on Venezuelan migrants who had entered Trinidad, it was disclosed that almost 65% of current wave of migrants are

young, (18-35) coming with a moderate level of education, indicating the propensity to contribute to the economy. No doubt, the increase in skilled labour supply could boost the growth potential of the Trinidad economy which has seen a decline in recent years [13].

A notable social impact of Venezuelan migration to Trinidad is that Trinidad men are establishing relationships with Venezuelan women. This has caused some domestic issues including break up in marriages and divorces but there is still a dearth of evidence to pronounce conclusively on this.

Additionally, the recent influx of Venezuelan migrants also have raised security concerns in this state. Both the unprecedented size of the migration flow and the speed of the increase imply substantial challenges for Trinidad's central and local governments. Considerable resources are being used to police the porous borders of Trinidad. Many Venezuelans who are caught without documents are placed in the Detention Centres in Trinidad where they must be fed and kept safely. One of the fears of the security services is that is that many Venezuelan immigrants are being recruited by criminal gangs operating in different areas throughout the country, and consequently, increasing insecurity.

#### **Venezuelan migration and Crime in Trinidad.**

Many studies have proven two simple yet significant facts concerning the relationship between migration and crime. Firstly, migrants are less likely than native locals to commit severe crimes or be imprisoned. Secondly, large rates of migration are associated with lower rates of violent crime and property crime. To put it another way, the vast majority of migrants are not 'criminals'. 'For this reason, harsh immigration policies are not effective in fighting crime. By utilizing the criminal justice system in managing mass mobility in the form of the regularization process intended at curbing/managing the sizeable influx of Venezuelan migrants into Trinidad and Tobago has resulted in the 'criminalization' of migrants. Consequently, migrants have the stigma of 'criminality' ascribed to them. In short, migrants themselves are being criminalized (Ewing, Martínez & Rumbaut 2015). Sociologists Michael Light and Ty Miller found that a higher illegal migrant population does not increase violent crime rates [14].

Several sociological theories, on the other hand, suggest that larger levels of migration into an area may raise crime rates. According to one argument, immigration promotes crime by increasing the proportion of the population with a criminal demographic profile, such as teenagers and young adults. Another hypothesis, based on social disorganization theory, contends that immigration is a powerful source of change that disturbs community social control of crime. Immigration, in particular, contributes to high rates of both residential instability and demographic heterogeneity

by increasing ethnic diversity in a community. In turn, insecurity and heterogeneity impede the creation of social bonds and shared values, both of which are required for successful informal social control of crime.

Another school of thought contends that higher crime rates develop as a result of increased economic deprivation and competitiveness in local labour markets caused by immigration. For example, if immigration increases the proportion of low-skilled employees in Trinidad, it may increase competition for few positions and raise unemployment and poverty rates for both migrants and natives. These economic pressures can exacerbate intergroup conflict, alienate people from mainstream society, and raise criminal impulse [14].

Another argument is that immigration is connected with a proliferation of illegal drug market activity, which may increase other forms of criminality, including violence. Although a significant portion of the immigration–drug market association appears to be driven by stereotyping, immigrants with lower levels of human capital could be easily pushed or pulled into illegal market opportunities, such as the drug trade, for economic reasons [15].

Whether the hypothesized relationship is positive or negative the fact is that previous theories on the immigration-crime nexus is yet to be sufficiently empirically evaluated [16].

Recently, there have been numerous newspapers articles in Trinidad and Tobago citing a nexus between Venezuelan migrants and crime. The following are a few examples:

Four Venezuelans murdered, believed by other Venezuelans, (Jan 10, 2019); Two Chinese men, one Venezuelan woman and one Guyanese man charged in sex-ring bust. (February 4, 2019); Nineteen female non-national minors rescued from human trafficking ring. (March 1, 2019); Nine Venezuelans arrested for possession of narcotics. (March 2, 2019); Five Venezuelans detainees escaped the Immigration Detention Centre. (April 15, 2019); Fifty-six Venezuelans arrested and charged for illegal entry (April 17, 2019); Six Venezuelan women attack police. (April 21, 2019) and Venezuelan National charged with Narcotics Possession (August 4, 2020) [16].

For other examples see Table 1 below.

**Table 1. Sections of Articles on Venezuelan Migrants and Crime**

Sections of Articles on Venezuelan Migrants and Crime	Source
According to Attorney General Faris Al-Rawi, T&T is grappling with economic migrants since Venezuelans began to seek refuge here and it is a fact that the country has seen an uptick in “certain of the crimes” as result of some of the migrant issues.	Trinidad Guardian, June 11, 2019.
In piloting debate on the Bail (Amendment) Bill in the Senate on Tuesday, June 11,2019 the AG argued that “It is a fact, having spoken with the Commissioner of Police today (Tuesday) that we have had a serious uptick in certain types of the crime as a result of immigrant issues. The Commissioner can speak to that for himself. But suffice it to say that the numbers of murders have been noticed to have risen as a result of some our migration issues. I am not talking only about Venezuela, I am talking about other positions”	Trinidad Newsday June 11, 2019.
Venezuela’s most murderous federal state, Delta Amacuro, the area linked with major drug trafficking, a proliferation of gangs and other illicit activities, is also one of that country’s closest points to T&T. This fact is causing major concern as recent intelligence reports indicate the presence of notorious Venezuelan gang Evander in this country. Their members have reportedly formed alliances with local gangs and are fingered in illegal activities here which have contributed to s spike in homicides over the last few weeks.	Trinidad Guardian, April 21, 2019.
The TT Police Service (TTPS) is monitoring the connections between Venezuelan criminals who have been identified in T&T and the local gangs and the TTPS and other security agencies are also monitoring the movements of Venezuelans entering Trinidad & Tobago legally as well as illegally.	Trinidad Guardian, April 23, 2019.
Despite the trauma of having his friend murdered before his own eyes, a friend of murdered Chinese businessman Xiangrong Pang does not resent TT. Pang, 41, died from chop wounds he received during a robbery at a house above his business-place Happiness Supermarket, Sixth Avenue, Barataria early on Sunday morning. Eight people, including two Venezuelans, were arrested after the murder and robbery	Trinidad Newsday, August 26, 2020.

Sources: Trinidad Guardian  
Trinidad Newsday

Undoubtedly, these kinds of reporting would have created some panic and concerns among the populace and even generated resentment against Venezuelan migrants. Based on information received from Immigration officials in August 2020, some of these concerns seemed to be justified. However, on closer examination it will be seen that the criminal element among the Venezuelan migrants is less than 15% with just 5% involved in serious crimes.

In May and June, 2019, the Government opened the registration exercise, receiving 16, 523 applications from Venezuelan migrants. Just before the exercise, a large number of Venezuelans “swarmed” to T&T - many illegally - to apply. Applicants were required to fill out forms which sought detailed information on them, including whether they had criminal records, health issues, if they had military training or served in army/police sectors, their educational and employment/skill background, how they arrived in Trinidad whether illegally, and other information. Registration cards were processed upon verification of identity and background checks from Interpol.

Of all the applicants, 5,148 applications in total had been verified by January 2020 by the Venezuelan authorities, Interpol and local authorities and had been recommended for ministerial approval. In July 2020 information made available about the other 11, 375 who applied indicated that at least 15 % of them had criminal records, with 5 % of them being involved in serious crime. In February of 2020, 3,091 cards had been processed and printed and relevant applicants have been contacted to collect them.” By the end of 2019, 112 Venezuelan migrants in TT were refused regularization, as they were found to have criminal records for serious offences. They were then sent back home.<sup>7</sup>

Based on the group discussions and interviews and from information received from Immigration Officials, **Table 2** illustrates the number of Venezuelan charged (not convicted) for different offences in the four focused areas for the period April 2018-March 2020.

**Table 2. Offences for which Venezuelans were charged during the period April 2018-March 2020 in focused areas**

2. (a) San Fernando

Offence	Males	Females
Breach of Immigration Regulations	11	7
Possession of Firearms	02	00
Armed Robbery	02	01
Drug Trafficking (Marijuana)	01	00
Drug Trafficking (cocaine)	02	00
Intent to Defraud,	01	00
Escape Lawful custody	02	00
Possession of ammo	03	00
Prostitution	00	12

<sup>7</sup> These details were revealed during an interview with an Immigration Official On 20 June, 2020 in Port of Spain.

The major offences identified in the four groups were breach of immigration rules, meaning mostly entering Trinidad illegally and in other cases, not reporting to the Immigration personnel as required. Other crimes included prostitution, possession of firearms and drug trafficking. Of the four focused areas, Chaguanas and San Fernando housed the majority of criminal elements with Siparia and Princes Town having lower levels of criminality. In further discussions it was identified that it was easier to get work, especially in the agricultural and construction sectors in Princes Town and Siparia. By all accounts at least 60% of these migrants were working to send back money to their families back in Venezuela and thus they could not afford to get arrested or sent back home. The other 40% indicated that they had their families with them in Trinidad and were trying their best to earn money legally to pay rent and take care of themselves.

In data provided by Immigration authorities re-convicted male and female Venezuelans for the period January 12, 2018 to June 27, 2019, (See Table 3) the following were the specific offences: Breach of Immigration Regulations, Possession of Firearms, Armed Robbery, Drug Trafficking (Marijuana), Drug Trafficking (Cocaine), Intent to Defraud, Escape Lawful custody and Possession of ammunition. All convicted Venezuelan females in prison in Trinidad during the same period were there for the offence of failing to report to the respective Immigration Officer.

**Table 3. Convicted Venezuelan Males and Females in Prison in Trinidad for the period 12 January 2018 to 27 June 2019 (a) Convicted Venezuelan Males in Prison in Trinidad for the period 12 January 2018 to 27 June 2019**

Offence	Number of Persons
Breach of Immigration Regulations	30
Possession of Firearms	11
Armed Robbery	04
Drug Trafficking (Marijuana)	03
Drug Trafficking (Cocaine)	01
Intent to Defraud	01
Escape Lawful custody	02
Possession of ammo	01
Total number of convicted Male Venezuelans	53

In interviews with Immigration and Intelligence officers, close to 95% of the Venezuelans held at the detention centres and in prison were charged with the lesser crimes of illegal entry into Trinidad, having false passports, prostitution and domestic violence. The other 5% of Venezuelans, held for drug and human trafficking, possession of firearms and in two cases for murder. It was noted that of this 5% none of them registered in Trinidad and

more than likely there were not in Trinidad to settle but rather to conduct their illegal business, work and return to Venezuela. The majority of convictions were from the Port of Spain and Point Fortin Areas.

There appears to be a direct link to Venezuelan migration and crime in Trinidad. The fact is some migrants committed crimes and were either imprisoned or fined. When taken as a percentage of the entire population of migrants in Trinidad using the 40,000 figures, it is less than 15% of migrants involved in crime. Of this 15%, close to 10% of migrants committed offences related to immigration regulations and prostitution i.e. nonviolent crime. The other 5 % are the ones involved in serious crime (drug trafficking, possession of firearms etc). More so, except for a few cases in San Fernando the majority of crimes committed by Venezuelans in Trinidad (at least 80% of violent crime including drug trafficking and possession of firearms) were committed by those living in the Port of Spain and Point Fortin areas.

### **Venezuelan migrants and Gangs Gang Violence in Trinidad and Tobago**

According to the UNDP (2012), a gang is any long-lasting, street-oriented group that engages in illicit behavior as part of their group identity. In this paper, a gang is defined as a collection of people, young or elderly, who do illegal acts for intrinsic or extrinsic gain.

The Trinidad police has argued that gang members are responsible for the majority of violent crimes occurring in Trinidad and Tobago, that the largest number of gangs are in various police divisions namely Port of Spain Division, Western Division and Northern Division and that the most reported crimes occur within the urbanite areas of Port of Spain and San Fernando.

In early May 2019, a Venezuelan criminal gang migrated to Trinidad and Tobago and on May 18, 2019 Trinidadian authorities arrested a leader of the large Venezuelan gang known as “Evander”. The gang leader, identified as “El Culon”, was detained with seven other Venezuelans. Intelligence officials suggested that the members of the gang were in Trinidad illegally, looking for jobs in construction while at the same time engaging in drug and arms traffic [2].<sup>8</sup> It must also be noted that military conscription is mandatory in Venezuela (since 1978) and this would contribute to a well-trained Venezuelan criminal network.

<sup>8</sup> The Evander gang, or the Deltano Liberation Front, hails from the state of Delta Amacuro, where it controls a portion of the criminal markets at one of Venezuela’s main ports for both illegal and legal goods. The gang’s activities have caught the attention of Venezuelan authorities. In March 2019, the group’s leader, Evander Barrada, was killed by the armed forces and members of the criminal investigation unit (Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas – CICPC) of Venezuela’s national police. However, this has not stopped the Evander gang from continuing to operate and spread. See Venezuela Gang Muscles Into Trinidad and Tobago, Others May Follow. Analysis written by Venezuela Investigative Unit (May 20, 2019).

Trinidad's main appeal to the group was its prime location as a transit point for drugs to the rest of the Caribbean, as well as to markets in the United States and Europe. Such dynamics were not only attractive for the Evander gang, but also for local drug trafficking networks in Trinidad looking for new allies.

In addition, it was argued that the workforce in Trinidad was in recent times saturated with desperate Venezuelans, representing an opportunity for local gangs to recruit them. Law enforcement officers stated that several hundred members of Evander, which reportedly has more than 650 members, were in Trinidad illegally and were responsible for several violent crimes in Venezuela, including high profile kidnappings and murders.

Evander members in Trinidad also embedded themselves with local gangs and have also sought jobs on construction sites across the country. In interviews with both police and immigration personnel, it was indicated that Venezuelan gang members as well as unemployed Venezuelan migrants were affiliating themselves with gangs in Port of Spain, especially with two main ones that cite Islam as their religion as well as in Point Fortin and to a certain extent in Chaguanas. The officers also pointed to the gang's involvement in the trafficking of narcotics and firearms in Trinidad.

Venezuelan gangs have established organized crime activities in Trinidad & Tobago. They are 'prostituting' on the orders and under the authority of Venezuela's organized crime. According to Criminologist Darius Figueira, these Venezuelan gangs make alliances with local gangs and are not scared to die [4].<sup>9</sup>

Intelligence sources revealed recently that at least three Venezuelan nationals shot and killed in March 2019 in T&T were in some way connected to the Evander gang [10].<sup>10</sup>

There appears to be a direct link between some of the Venezuelan migrants and gang membership and activity. Aside from the Evander gang, it appears that other small gangs have found their way to Trinidad and have been able to provide local gangs with firearms, drugs, and ammunition. These gangs have been able to attract some of the migrants who have been unable to find decent employment and those searching for quick money. However, there appears to be considerable confrontation between

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9 Trinidad Guardian, April 17, 2019.

10 The Evander gang began its criminal history at La Pica prison in northern Monagas state near Venezuela's Caribbean coast. The gang still has influence in that area and may be linked to "pranes," or prison crime bosses, operating there, according to local sources. From Monagas, the gang expanded into the nearby state of Delta Amacuro, where it took control of the canals that connect it to the Caribbean Sea, from which boats can cross into Trinidad and Tobago. The group formerly led by Barrada extorts boats that carry desperate Venezuelan migrants to the neighbouring island, and is involved in ferrying drugs and arms as well. The group also rustles cattle in Delta Amacuro.



Venezuelan gangs and local gangs. This has emerged in particular because the Trinidadian “middlemen” who would have gone to Venezuela and been responsible for transporting and selling firearms and drugs to local gangs and other recognized persons are now being side-lined, and their tasks are now being done by Venezuelans. Thereby resulting in local gangs attacking and killing some Venezuelan gang members.

### **Venezuelan Migration and Violent Extremism Framework for Analysis**

The Trinidad and Tobago government has consistently refused to accept Venezuelans under the category of refugee. A migrant is a person who chooses to move, and a refugee is someone who has been forced from their home. It has been established that the most common intersection between migrants and violent extremism is that migrants are fleeing from it.

### **Results**

The threat of violent extremism by Venezuelans in Trinidad and Tobago is low. This low threat emerges from the genuine disdain expressed by them for extremists and for the radical policies under the current Venezuelan government who caused their displacement and exposed them to brutal violence. In any case, the few extremist groups in Trinidad have either not been successful in recruiting Venezuelan migrants or they have not reached out to them significantly.

Also, in Trinidad, the identified extremists mostly belong to the Islamic faith, one in which the migrants have no interest in as indicated during the interviews. Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad have a strong interest in cooperating against a shared threat and aspire to a sense of security they did not have in their country. That this desire is shared among many persons in the local community, combined with common religious beliefs (mostly Roman Catholicism and Pentecostalism), contribute to a strong bond between many Trinidadians and migrants.

Venezuelans who came from the Tucupita region spoke about not only economic deprivation, illnesses and unemployment but also of police brutality and home invasions by Venezuelan gangs. Instead of becoming radicalized and violent in their home country these migrants chose to leave their homes for Trinidad.

While the threat is low, applying the findings against the factors identified in the framework for analysis does reveal some concerns with respect to gang membership and violence but hardly any concerns with violent extremism

### 1. Trinidad's administrative and legal policies:

While not willing to consider the Venezuelans, who have fled their country as refugees, Trinidad's expressed commitment towards integrating refugees into society will be a key step in achieving development, humanitarian and security objectives alike. The refugees' ability to live, work and register life events directly influence all aspects of refugee life, including how Trinidad perceive and receive them. The one-year extension of all registered migrants to June 2021 is quite promising. In the survey over 85% of the migrants indicated they accepted and had no problems with Trinidad's administrative and legal policies. The other 15% main grievance was their inability to register as refugees but indicated they were glad for being able to register as migrants and be able to work. 90% of them also stated that they trusted the justice system in Trinidad.

### 2. Political and militant organizing:

Close to 100% of Venezuelan migrants surveyed indicated they have no interest in political and militant organizing in Trinidad. While around 40% said that they will be willing to join any march against President Maduro, even so, some were hesitant claiming that if they protested in Trinidad, they were still afraid for their family lives in Venezuela. Only 10% indicated they had any interest with the local and national politics.

### 3. Security:

Many respondents (95%) expressed satisfaction with the state of security in Trinidad and indicated that as long as they operated within the law, they had nothing to worry about. 80% agreed that many of the women were stigmatized as prostitutes and some of them were also treated harshly by Trinidadians but they all acknowledged that Trinidad was much safer for them than Venezuela.

### 4. Shelter:

While respondents indicated that they had access to basic necessities including shelter, food, water and health for children, concerns about living conditions were varied. 30% of the respondents in San Fernando said their rents were quite high; 22% in Chaguanas said their rents were high; another 20% in Siparia said their rents were high and just 12 % in Princes Town saw their rent as high. Overall, 88% indicated that they were comfortable or were planning to move to other locations where they would be comfortable. Issues of overcrowded apartments and houses were identified by 12% of them in two areas (San Fernando and Chaguanas) but were not seen as a major problem (See Table 4 below).

**Table 4. The focus group discussions with refugees and key informant interviews that occurred**

4. (a) Focus group discussions in Princes Town.

Category of respondents	Number of respondents and gender	Age Range
Agricultural workers/ farm labourers	10 (all males)	18-40
Domestic workers/waitresses/workers in pubs/ groceries	12 (10 females and 2 males)	22-50
Construction workers	8 (all males)	18-35
*Skilled workers and others	4 (3females and 1 male)	25-45

\*Some of the skilled personnel identified during the research included nurses, teachers, musicians and IT personnel

4. (b): Focus group discussions in San Fernando

Category of respondents	Number of respondents and gender	Age Range
Agricultural workers/ farm labourers	6 (all males)	18-40
Domestic workers/waitresses/workers in pubs/ groceries	14 (13 females and 1 male)	22-50
Construction workers	5 (all males)	18-35
*Skilled workers and others	4 (3females and 1 male)	25-45

\*Some of the skilled personnel identified during the research included nurses, teachers, musicians and IT personnel

4. (c): Focus group discussions in Siparia.

Category of respondents	Number of respondents and gender	Age Range
Agricultural workers/ farm labourers	8 (2 females and 6males)	20-40
Domestic workers/waitresses/workers in pubs/ groceries	14 (10 females and 4 males)	22-50
Construction workers	10 (all males)	18-45
*Skilled workers and others	5 (3 females and 2 male)	25-45

\*Some of the skilled personnel identified during the research included nurses, teachers, musicians and IT personnel

The focus group discussions with refugees and key informant interviews occurred as follows:

Table 4 (d): Focus group discussions in Chaguanas

Category of respondents	Number of respondents and gender	Age Range
Agricultural workers/ farm laborers	8 (1 females and 7 males)	18-40
Domestic workers/waitresses/ workers in pubs/ groceries	12 (10 females and 2 males)	22-50
Construction workers	8 (all males)	18-35
*Skilled workers and others	4 (3females and 1 male)	25-45

\*Some of the skilled personnel identified during the research included nurses, teachers, musicians and IT personnel

#### 5. Local economic conditions and resilience:

85% of all Venezuelans interviewed responded that as long as they found work, they would be able to survive and another 40% stated that they were able to send back some money to Venezuela to help their families within four months. 15% of those interviewed said they were either unemployed or were working only part-time and were not as comfortable as they would have liked. They acknowledged though that there were opportunities for them in Trinidad and were sure they would improve their conditions soon.

#### 6. Conditions for youth:

Children had no access to basic education. Concerns about quality and accessibility to primary levels were high. While 30% of youth indicated a frustration about lack of access to jobs or livelihood opportunities as they would have liked it, they also stated that they were willing to do some menial tasks in the meantime. 50% of them indicated they were able to get jobs soon after coming to Trinidad (within a month) and another 20% indicated they were at home only because they needed to take care of their other siblings. In two areas in particular, Princes Town and San Fernando some youths (close to 10%) affiliated themselves with churches and were recipients of sufficient aid including food, clothing and even part time jobs with the churches.

#### 7. Protracted displacement:

The UNHCR defines protracted displacement as displacement for five years or more. While there is no indication as to how early economic and socio-political conditions could improve in Venezuela, close to 90% of Venezuelans interviewed stated that they intend to return to Venezuela within five years, if not to stay, at least to spend time with family and then return to Trinidad. Owing to the distance between both countries and Trinidad's porous borders more than 50 % of respondents indicated as well they would be able to return to Venezuela without much difficulty if the

need arises. At least 7% of the respondents had also been able to return to Venezuela at least once.

#### 8. P/CVE programming:

Successful P/CVE programs comprehensively address the ‘root causes’ of extremism as opposed to extremism as a standalone feature. Current programs in Trinidad are reportedly engaging civil society, youth, and religious leaders among others. While extremist groups have long demonstrated their ability to recruit or target people based on highly specific and adaptable practices, there is no evidence of any Venezuelan migrant joining extremist groups in Trinidad. The majority of the known extremists in Trinidad claim to be Muslims and in the interviews and discussions in all four focused areas, not once did this researcher find any Venezuelan Muslim or any Venezuelan who held extremist views i.e. anyone who was advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives.

#### **Discussions**

Research within the migrant Venezuelan population in Trinidad has not found any case of violent extremist views nor anyone with a history of violent extremism or even terrorist activity. Based on evidence on the ground, there are no mitigating factors to encourage migrants to become radicalized or extremist. The P/CVE efforts in Trinidad over the last few years seem to be by all accounts successful in that extremism has not been seen or displayed since the departure of several extremists to Syria and Iraq from 2012-2014. Interviews with intelligence sources also indicate that there has been a lull of activity by the few known extremists in Trinidad since early 2018.

#### **Policy responses to Venezuelan Migration by the T&T government:**

The migration of Venezuelans into Trinidad is a reality for the government and people of Trinidad. Realizing the positive economic effect of migration in the medium-term requires putting in place in the short-term appropriate integration policies. Such policies carry with them economic costs, which accounts for additional expenditure in areas such as social programs, education, health, humanitarian aid, or housing assistance programs for the next three or five years. In the medium-term, higher output growth triggered by migration would imply higher economic revenues, gradually offsetting the initial negative fiscal impact.

Migration from Venezuela is likely to keep increasing, as international experience shows that, the arrival of first migrants is followed by a process of families’ reunification. More than 70% of recent arrivals have left close

relatives in Venezuela [17]. The intensifying economic crisis in Venezuela may therefore also imply greater migration towards Trinidad in the future.

Although the majority of Venezuelan migrants leave for economic reasons, the current inflow also indicates characteristics of a refugee crisis (World Bank 2018). This includes a quick acceleration in arrivals (traditional economic migration tends to be slower) and a relatively high proportion of people arriving in difficult socio-economic conditions.

Depending on how the government reacts and creates policies to deal with this influx of migrants would determine if the migrants are able to be better off or not; if more migrants would be willing to come to Trinidad in the future and if the country as a whole would benefit from this migration or not among other issues. In looking at these responses, we categorized them under three headings, namely normal, different or radical.

Drawing on ongoing research on development led approaches to address migration, we then offer our preliminary thinking on key issues for managing the effects of the Venezuelan crisis as it impacts on Trinidad and Tobago. Initial priorities include regularizing the legal status of Venezuelans, forging a regional response, and improving and expanding local service delivery to meet their needs.

#### ***Normal Policy Response***

A normal policy response to Venezuelan migrants was seen in three areas: regularization with minimal benefits, provision of health care and labour market access.

The government ran a two-week registration in May/June 2019. Successful applicants received six-month work permits that could be renewed once, at the discretion of the immigration office. Also, they were given permission to remain in Trinidad for a year. Permit holders have no pathway to permanent residency, though the government has extended them to another one year ending June 2021 [4].

It is recommended that the Trinidad and Tobago government undertakes another migrant registration and seriously consider working with the UN to establish a sound refugee policy so that many Venezuelans can be welcome as such with all due rights and privileges [5].<sup>11</sup>

#### **Health Care**

Trinidad has given all Venezuelan migrants access to all health institutions and has health care systems that aim to guarantee care to anyone who needs it. However, universal access is not always a reality on

11 IOM and UNHCR reduced their estimate from 40,000 to 21,000 Venezuelans living in Trinidad and Tobago following the census, as the government put out its first estimate of Venezuelans in the country, but other reliable sources confidentially suggested to the authors that there may be as many as 60,000 or 80,000 Venezuelans in the country. The lack of accurate information makes it impossible to even hazard an educated guess on the real number.

the ground. Despite the legislation and regulations that make these systems universal, they are often under-resourced and overwhelmed, limiting their ability to offer care.

### **Labour Market Access**

The majority of employable Venezuelan adults in Trinidad and Tobago are already working. Unfortunately, in some cases work authorization does not always ensure access to the labour market as several cases were noted where Venezuelans' credentials were not recognized by Trinidad and Tobago employers and industry groups. As a result, these migrants have been unable to practice in the fields for which they have been trained. The resulting unemployment or underemployment is a loss for both Trinidad and Tobago and the migrants themselves.

### ***Different Policy Responses***

#### **Education**

A different policy response from other countries has been seen in the field of education and in accepting migrants of another language. Trinidad and Tobago is the one country that requires a child to have a regular immigration status to enrol in school, which means that most Venezuelan migrant children in the country are not enrolled in school. Nonetheless, organizations in Trinidad and Tobago have come up with unique solutions in the face of this challenging situation. Living Water Community, has taken steps to provide educational alternatives for Venezuelan children.

In September 2019, a coalition of international organizations (UNHCR and the UN Children's Fund, UNICEF) and local NGOs (Living Water Community and TTV Solidarity Network) launched an online high school program, which is complemented by some in-person support, for Venezuelan migrants age 15 and over [18]. Students who complete the program earn a high school diploma certified by Venezuela's Ministry of Education. The program is free, but in order to enrol, students must prove Venezuelan nationality by providing a birth certificate, identity document, and certified transcript.

There is an online option for younger students as well, which does not have any documentary requirements for enrolment. This program, for children ages 5 through 17, follows Trinidad and Tobago's education curriculum and results in a certification from the Caribbean Examinations Council. This program is offered in English only, though it does offer support for students whose first language is not English. By the end of October 2019, 888 children were enrolled in these two online platforms [19].

#### **Language Barriers**

Overcoming language barriers is a common struggle for many migrants around the world. In this sense, integration is somewhat easier for most Venezuelan migrants in Spanish-speaking countries. However, in

Trinidad where English is the main language, these barriers are significant. Nonetheless, Trinidad has allowed these migrants with a different language to come in almost unrestricted, at least up to July 2020.

**Radical Policy Response.**

Trinidad’s radical policy is seen in the treatment of illegal migrants by the use of deportation and non- recognition of refugee status for many of them. Trinidad has taken the tougher and radical approach to address illegal immigrants and has deported considerable numbers of asylum seekers. As late as August 2020, close to eighty Venezuelans who had been registered with UNHCR and with the Government of Trinidad and Tobago have been informed of impending deportation [9].<sup>12</sup>

**Table 5. Key Informant Interviews**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Mode of Interview</b>
Immigration Division	Face-to-face
Immigration Division	Face-to-face
Coast Guard	Face-to-face
Coast Guard	Face-to-face
Trinidad and Tobago Police Service	Face-to-face
Trinidad and Tobago Police Service	Face-to-face
Trinidad and Tobago Police Service	Face-to-face
Academia -USC	Face-to-face
Academia -UT	Phone
Fisherman	Face-to-face
Fisherman	Face-to-face
Religious Leader	Face-to-face
Religious Leader	Face-to-face
Religious Leader	Face-to-face
News reporter. Trinidad Express	Phone
Lawyer	Face-to-face

**Emerging Themes and Recommendations for Trinidad**

In the various interviews and group discussions with Venezuelan migrants and after a review of literature on Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad, several themes emerged. These themes centred around entry requirements, legislation for migrants and policy related matters, labour market integration, access to finances, access to health and educational institutions, and the role that the US and UN can play in assisting migrants.

1. Reviewing entry requirements. One option is to keep entry requirements low so migrants have an incentive to use legal entry channels. Another option is to impose more stringent requirements but create exceptions that allow those with family or work ties to the host country, and those in particularly vulnerable situations, to enter more easily. It is

<sup>12</sup> Details revealed in an interview conducted with an Immigration Officer. September, 2020. Port of Spain.



recommended that the Trinidad and Tobago government avoid knee-jerk reactions to Venezuelan migration and review both its immigration policies and its border controls with a humanitarian view of helping the migrants feel safe and secure in Trinidad.

2. Provision of Legal Status. Trinidad needs to find a way to provide legal status to its immigrants and can use the best practices of neighbouring countries to develop its policy.

3. Strengthening the asylum system, while maintaining other, more nimble legal pathways. Given the strong humanitarian dimension of recent flows, Trinidad could opt to strengthen its asylum system but without it having to serve as the principal path for recent arrivals to legalize their status.

4. Improving access to education through flexible enrolment practices and ongoing support. It is recommended that the Trinidad and Tobago government develop the necessary policy to ensure all children in Trinidad receive at least a primary school education.

5. Overcoming health-care barriers through clear policies on access and financing. It is recommended that Trinidad devote more resources to its health sector so that the health needs of the migrants there can be facilitated.

6. Unlocking migrants' skills to boost labour market integration and local economies. To effectively leverage this potential, Trinidad will need to create agile and transparent ways for immigrants to get professional and technical degrees earned in their home countries validated and recognized by employers. Creating expedited credential recognition pathways for applicants could also help fill labour market gaps.

7. Strengthen existing social services and local infrastructure. Venezuelan migrants require access to social services, including education and health care, and oftentimes cannot afford private institutions. To the extent possible, support from the international community should focus on improving the quality and capacity of existing national systems to serve both hosts and migrants.

8. The United States and the UN can play a productive leadership role. The United States has stepped up its engagement and leadership during this crisis and is the largest donor to the humanitarian response. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has made available US\$1.6 million to the people of Trinidad and Tobago to assist Venezuelans fleeing their homeland (US Embassy in Trinidad & Tobago 2019).

In relation to the UN, it was the hope of many migrants that the UNHCR will continue and intensify their work with the Living Waters Community to assist them both with food and education as well as with helping some of them achieve refugee status.

### **Conclusion. The Way Forward**

In latest figures received by Immigration Officials, 22,000 Venezuelans have applied for refugee status. Of the 16,523 persons who were registered under the Migrant Registration Framework information has now been received from Venezuela which indicate that close to 3,100 of these persons have criminal records with over four hundred of them involved in serious crimes like prostitution, drug trafficking, human trafficking, possession of illegal firearms and ammunition and kidnapping. The other 2700 were charged in Venezuela for minor offences including petty theft, property damage, child neglect, and even traffic violations [14].<sup>13</sup> The Trinidad and Tobago government has to decide how it will be dealing with these migrants to ensure they will not continue with their bad practices in Trinidad.

Currently, (August 2021) the national containment measures to reduce the transmission of COVID-19, including lockdowns and movement restrictions, are severely impacting on migrants' livelihood opportunities, especially in the informal sector. Vulnerable migrants who lost income are at risk of increased food insecurity and malnutrition, as household assets are depleted and households' purchasing power is reduced. There is the likelihood that price increases and supply chain disruptions will contribute to decreased access to food and dietary diversity. The Trinidad and Tobago government, in ensuring that they develop a vibrant migrant policy to deal with the migration influx in a humane way, must also develop policies and infrastructure to assist the migrants in this special time of need.

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## **ВЕНЕСУЭЛАЛЫҚТАРДЫҢ ТРИНИДАД ПЕН ТОБАГОҒА КӨШУІ. ҚЫЛМЫС, БАНДАЛАР ЖӘНЕ ЗОРЛЫҚ- ЗОМБЫЛЫҚ ЭКСТРЕМИЗМІН ТҮСІНУ**

Рагунат Махабир,

Ұлттық қауіпсіздік және барлау бағдарламасының дәріскері және  
үйлестірушісі,

Кариб теңізінің оңтүстік университеті. Тринидад және Тобаго.  
mahabir@usc.edu.tt

**Аңдатпа.** Көші-қон мәселесі шығу және тағайындалу жағынан көптеген елдердің саяси күн тәртібінде маңызды бола түсуде. Ұлттық және халықаралық деңгейлерде көші-қон ағындарын бақылау үшін түрлі күш-жігер жұмсалды. Алайда, иммиграция туралы әдебиеттің жетіспеушілігіне сүйене отырып, эмиграциядан айырмашылығы, көші-қон мен иммиграцияның нақты себептері мен салдарын бағалау үшін көп нәрсе жасау керек екені белгілі болды. Көші-қон қабылдаушы елдерге үлкен әсер ететіндігі дәлелденді және қолданыстағы әдебиеттер иммиграция қабылдаушы ел халқының өміріне жағымды да, жағымсыз да әсер ететіндігін көрсетеді.

Бұл құжатта венесуэлалықтардың Тринидад пен Тобагоға қоныс аударуы, қылмыс (Т&Т), бандитизм және зорлық-зомбылық экстремизмі арасындағы байланыс туралы қолда бар мәліметтерге талдау жасалған. Онда көші-қон мен қылмыс, оның ішінде бандалық зорлық-зомбылық арасында тікелей байланыс бар деп айтылады. Бұл сонымен қатар көптеген басқа мигранттарды қабылдайтын мемлекеттерден айырмашылығы, венесуэлалық көші-қон мен зорлық-зомбылық экстремизмі арасында ешқандай байланыс жоқ екенін көрсетеді.

Сонымен қатар, бұл құжат венесуэлалықтардың көші-қонының себептерін және 2015-2020 жылдардағы Тринидад пен Тобагоға осы көші-қонның әсерін одан әрі қарастырады. Содан кейін ол венесуэлалық мигранттар мен қылмыс, бандитизм және экстремизм арасындағы байланысты қарастырады. Онда көші-қонға қарсы көптеген саяси шаралар қарастырылады, содан кейін елдегі актерлермен әңгімелесу нәтижесінде туындаған тақырыптар анықталады. Содан кейін ол үкіметтік емес ұйымдарға, қауіпсіздік қызметкерлеріне және шешім қабылдаушыларға бірнеше ұсыныстар ұсынады.

**Тірек сөздер:** көші-қон, зорлық-зомбылық экстремизмі, радикалдану, бандитизм.

## МИГРАЦИЯ ВЕНЕСУЭЛЬЦЕВ В ТРИНИДАД И ТОБАГО. К ПОНИМАНИЮ ПРЕСТУПНОСТИ, БАНД И НАСИЛЬСТВЕННОГО ЭКСТРЕМИЗМА

Рагхунат Махабир<sup>1</sup>

Лектор и координатор Программы национальной безопасности и  
разведки

Университет Южной части Карибского моря. Тринидад и Тобаго,  
mahabir@usc.edu.tt

**Аннотация.** Проблема миграции приобретает все большее значение в политических повестках дня многих стран происхождения и назначения. Были предприняты различные усилия для мониторинга миграционных потоков на национальном и международном уровнях. Однако, исходя из недостатка литературы по теме иммиграции в отличие от эмиграции, становится ясно, что необходимо сделать больше для оценки конкретных причин и последствий миграции и иммиграции. Доказано, что миграция оказывает огромное влияние на принимающие страны, и существующая литература демонстрирует, что иммиграция оказывает значительное влияние на жизнь населения принимающей страны, как положительное, так и отрицательное.

В статье представлен анализ существующих данных о взаимосвязи между миграцией венесуэльцев в Тринидад и Тобаго, преступностью (Т&Т), бандитизмом и насильственным экстремизмом. Утверждается, что существует прямая связь между миграцией и преступностью, включая бандитское насилие. Но также показано, что в отличие от происходящего во многих других принимающих мигрантов государствах, здесь нет видимой связи между венесуэльской миграцией и насильственным экстремизмом.

Кроме того, в этом документе дополнительно рассматриваются причины миграции венесуэльцев и влияние этой миграции на Тринидад и Тобаго в период 2015-2020 годов. Затем рассматривается связь между венесуэльскими мигрантами и преступностью, бандитизмом и экстремизмом. Анализируется широкий спектр политических мер по борьбе с миграцией, а затем выделяются темы, возникшие в результате бесед с действующими лицами в стране. Предлагаются некоторые рекомендации для общественных НПО, сотрудников служб безопасности и лиц, принимающих решения.

**Ключевые слова:** миграция, насильственный экстремизм, радикализация, бандитизм.

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**ШАГИ И ВКЛАД В РЕАЛИЗАЦИЮ ЦУР В ГЕРМАНИИ (НА  
ПРИМЕРЕ КОМПАНИИ «GERRY WEBER»)**

**\*Вандангийн А.<sup>1</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>доктор исторических наук, профессор,  
г. Улан-Батор, Монголия, Vandangijn\_a@gmail.com

**Аннотация.** Цели устойчивого развития (ЦУР) до 2030 г., разработанные и объявленные ООН в 2015 г., включают, как известно, 17 взаимосвязанных целей, охватывающих жизненно важные сферы человеческой деятельности и жизни. Германия с самого начала привержена амбициозной реализации целей устойчивого развития. Германия предпринимает некоторые первые важные шаги по ее осуществлению на национальном уровне. В этом контексте большую роль играет институциональные рамки политики устойчивого развития в Германии. Показаны идеи, практики и реальные шаги по реализации в Германии целей устойчивого развития. Отмечена важная роль Германии и перспективы, которые Германия может внести в достижение ЦУР. Показано, что в отличие от других стран Европейского Союза, Германию отличает четкое, прогрессивное, инновационное и открытое видение ЦУР. Кроме того, Германию отличает высокий уровень жизни населения и эффективная система защиты окружающей среды являясь примером для других государств ЕС. Самые важные направления целей устойчивого развития крепко вжились в немецкое общество и его политическую систему. Это касается финансовой стабильности, социальной сплоченности, институциональных основ, обеспечивающих развитие политики по достижению целей устойчивого развития. Поэтому от Германии ожидается еще более высокий уровень устойчивого развития, что показано на примере компании «Gerry Weber».

**Ключевые слова:** ООН, цели устойчивого развития, Германия, Gerry Weber, стратегия ЦУР.

### **Основные положения**

В 2015 году Организация Объединенных Наций опубликовала цели в области устойчивого развития (далее ЦУР) по их достижению до 2030 года. Они охватывают 17 целей, включающих 169 социальных, экологических и экономических целей, которые взаимно обуславливают друг друга. Эти 17 целей можно соотнести с пятью основными целевыми направлениями: Люди, Планета, Процветание, Мир, Партнерство [1, с.21]. Цель состоит в том, чтобы сосредоточить внимание на достижении равенства людей, защите климата и природных ресурсов, содействии процветанию и миру для всех и установление глобальных партнерских отношений, что, в целом, представляет современные угрозы и вызовы в мировой политике и международных отношениях. Всем государствам (развивающимся странам, развивающимся рынкам, развитым государствам), гражданским обществам, а также частным секторам предлагается решать эти вопросы.

Страновой срез по достижению ЦУР по данным «Chapters of the Sustainable Development Report 2021» представлен следующим образом:

1. Дания (85,2)
2. Швеция (85,0)
3. Финляндия (82,8)
4. Франция (81,5)
5. Австрия (81,1)
6. Германия (81,1)
77. Kazakhstan (68.7)
100. Mongolia (64.7) [2].

Дания, занимающая 1 место по исследуемой тематике, достигла, например, повышения на 2,2 % по сокращению пребывания на больничном листе сотрудников различных ведомств и организаций, что свидетельствует об уровне системы здравоохранения в стране и соответствует цели 3 «Хорошее здоровье и благополучие» ЦУР ООН.

Дания осуществляет программу «Ghana Water Initiative», направленную на обеспечение доступа к базовой питьевой воде и улучшение качества жизни в населённых пунктах Ганы за счёт создания рабочих мест и подготовки специалистов для работы на станциях водоснабжения в соответствии с целью 6 «Чистая вода и санитария».

Наш выбор Германии, занимающей 6 позицию указанного среза, обусловлен прагматичным и эффективным подходом страны по достижению ЦУР.

Немецкая компания «Gerry Weber», производитель и поставщик модной одежды, основанная в 1973 г., разработала свои стратегические

цели устойчивого развития, включающего 5 направлений в контексте качества и уровня развития моды и стиля [3]. Компания понимает устойчивость как важную инвестицию в будущее бренда. Цель устойчивого развития для компании - создать моду, которая безопасна в социальном, медицинском и экологическом отношении. И наша задача на примере компании «Gerry Weber», хорошо известной в Монголии и Казахстане, проанализировать предпринимаемые меры по достижению ЦУР и их результативность. Компании в сфере индустрии моды редко подвергаются анализу на предмет достижения ЦУР, так как кажется, что эта сфера не предпринимает никаких мер по достижению ЦУР. Уже с 2015 года компания отказывается от натурального меха и ангоры, используя устойчивое сырье, то есть использование сертифицированных и переработанных материалов, что повышает прозрачность цепочки поставок и способствует принципу круговой экономики.

На примере компании «Gerry Weber» мы хотим показать и проанализировать мероприятия в этом направлении.

### **Введение**

По выбросам CO<sub>2</sub> в 2019 г. Германия занимала 1 место, т.е. с минимальным количеством 2-3%, Япония – 3-4%, РФ – 5%, Индия – 6-7%, США – 12+-13%, Китай – 80% [4, с.221].

Производство электроэнергии в Германии в 2019 году посредством использования возобновляемых источников и атомной энергетики составил 31,1%, а бурого и каменного угля – 7,2% и 11,6% соответственно. В сфере производства электроэнергии в Германии работают около 700 тыс. человек, а в сфере возобновляемых источников - 304 400 сотрудников, т.е. 43% всех работающих в сфере выработки электроэнергии.

Компания понимает устойчивость как важную инвестицию в будущее бренда. Цель устойчивого развития для компании - создать моду, которая безопасна в социальном, медицинском и экологическом отношении.

Международная корпорация «Gerry Weber», понимая ответственность за реализации целей устойчивого развития, определила четыре направления и задачи [3]:

Направление 1. Достойный труд и экономический рост [5], с.17].

Данное направление реализует задачи: улучшение условий труда среди сотрудников поставщиков на основе «Кодекса корпоративной этики» (Code of Conduct) для 2300 сотрудников в Германии и по всему миру, реализация концепции мобильности сотрудников, улучшение управления здравоохранением сотрудников, соблюдение баланса



семьи и работы благодаря гибкому графику работы, соблюдение концепции мобильной работы и корпоративного детского сада для детей сотрудников в Германии и по всему миру (Kids World).

Направление 2. Устойчивое потребление и производство, которое является одним из основных в ЦУР ООН, так оно касается вопросов культуры производства и потребления. Для компании это направление включает расширение использования органически выращенного хлопка и других материалов, которые позволяют контролировать все этапы производства, активная защита животных путем отказа от натурального меха и ангорской шерсти, использование шерсти из проверенных источников с учетом благосостояния животных и экологического управления. Реализация этих задач осуществляется в соответствии со стандартом OEKO-TEX 100 (международная система тестирования и сертификации изделий из текстильных материалов, устанавливающая ограничения на использование некоторых химических веществ) и Европейского регламента по химическим веществам REACH (Регистрация, оценка, авторизация и ограничение химических веществ), а также отказ от использования хлора в производстве джинсовой ткани в Европе.

Направление 3 «Меры по защите климата» включает ежегодное увеличение экономии электроэнергии, увеличение процента использования зеленой энергии, стремление к нейтралитету CO<sub>2</sub> (выбросов углекислого газа), введение электромобилей в автопарке компании [6, с.22].

Направление 4 «Партнерские отношения для достижения целей» фокусирует свое внимание на соблюдение и совершенствование социальных и трудовых стандартов в цепочке поставок и интеграцию людей с ограниченными возможностями на рынок труда путем сотрудничества с Gütersloh GmbH (компания по поставке газа).

### **Описание материалов и методов**

Общенаучные методы как отбор литературы и ее систематизация позволили создать первый уровень для анализа вклада Германии в достижение целей устойчивого развития. Анализ как один из основных общелогических методов использован для определения результативности мероприятий компании в сфере ЦУР. Отбор данных, включающих официальные статистические данные и показатели, как например, из источников «German Council for Sustainable Development», «National Statement, Federal Republic of Germany», «Chapters of the Sustainable Development Report 2021», «Sustainable Development Report 2019. Transformation to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals» и другие, составили следующий уровень методологических подходов.

В исследовании мы использовали количественный и качественный методы для анализа отобранных данных. В исследовании встречается сравнительный метод. Источниками послужили различные их виды: отчеты комиссий, комитетов, обзоры, монографии, научно-образовательные Интернет-ресурсы.

### **Результаты**

Компания «Gerry Weber», производитель и поставщик модной одежды, основанная в 1973 г., на основе выработанных направлений разработала свои стратегические цели устойчивого развития, в контексте качества и уровня развития моды и стиля, включающих 5 стратегических целей:

**Стратегическая цель 1.** «I wear. I care», означающее, что мода должна быть не только красива, но и устойчива, а также уважительное обращение с ресурсами, людьми, животными и растениями. Компания работает с такими надежными партнерами как bioRe®, OEKO-TEX®, amfori и GOTS.

Компания несет ответственность за строгий и тщательный мониторинг проверки материалов и производственных мощностей, что находит выражение в следующих показателях:

1. Увеличение доли сертифицированного хлопка до 100% от общего объема к 2025 году. В 2021 г. этот показатель достиг 42%.

2. Увеличение доли сертифицированной целлюлозы до 50% к 2025 году. В 2021 г. этот показатель достиг 10%

3. Увеличение доли сертифицированного переработанного кашемира до 100% к 2024 году.

4. Увеличение доли сертифицированной переработанной шерсти до 30% от общего объема к 2025 году.

5. Увеличение доли сертифицированных переработанных волокон до 15% к 2025 году.

Компания производит закуп материалов (тканей и фурнитуры) у поставщиков по всему миру. Компания делает ставку на долгосрочные партнерские отношения и доверительное сотрудничество с партнерами. Основа этого сотрудничества - уважение прав человека, а также соблюдение признанных экологических и социальных стандартов. Партнеры компании должны подписывать 2 документа «Кодекс корпоративной этики» (Code of Conduct) и «Соглашение о социальном соблюдении норм» (Social Compliance Agreement).

Кроме того, компания проводит анализ рисков, связанный с правами человека.

**Стратегическая цель 2 «Join & Stay»** означает, что потребители бренда должны быть в восторге от товаров и чтобы количество потребителей росло.

Компания выработала девиз «WE ARE GERRY», который означает, что компания и потребитель вместе развивает культуру производства и потребления, основанную на ценностях целей устойчивого развития. К ним добавляются такие компоненты как производительность, уверенность, ответственность и удовольствие от работы, которые находятся на переднем плане.

**Стратегическая цель 3. We care for people.** Разработанная комплексная и инновационная Концепция мобильной работы направлена на достижение максимальной гибкости, индивидуальной совместимости и баланса между работой и личной жизнью. В среднем 40% сотрудников находятся на рабочем месте, многие из них работают несколько дней в неделю через мобильную связь. Это означает доверие компании своим сотрудникам и указывает на уровень их собственной ответственности.

Гибкий график работы благодаря Всеобъемлющей концепции рабочего времени существует в компании с 2011 года. Целевая группа «Cогopa», созданная в феврале 2020 года, обеспечила максимальную безопасность для сотрудников во время пандемии. Создание центра тестирования и вакцинации способствовало очень низкому уровню заражения и безопасному пребыванию на рабочем месте.

Реализация цели повысило удовлетворенность сотрудников компании в качестве работодателя и предусматривается повышение этого показателя до 2023 года еще на 50 %, а активизация развития и повышения квалификации персонала к 2022 году должна повыситься на 50%.

Таким образом, компания несет ответственность за собственных сотрудников и сотрудников поставщиков, соблюдая права человека в контексте запрета детского труда, принудительного труда, бесчеловечной практики.

Эта цель состоит и в том, чтобы свести к минимуму воздействие деятельности кампании на окружающую среду. Для этого принимаются меры по экономному производству ресурсов и сокращению выбросов углекислого газа. Кроме того, компания работает над реализацией принципа круговой экономики и осуществляет комплексное управление энергетикой и окружающей средой. Например, в недавнем прошлом введена экологически нейтральная доставка в пределах Германии. Другой важный фактор заключается в предоставлении возможности клиентам компании вернуть свое старое оборудование для переработки.

**Стратегическая цель 4. We care for Planet.** Цель состоит в том, чтобы свести к минимуму воздействие деятельности на окружающую среду. Она включает такие позиции как экономное производство

ресурсов, сокращение выбросов CO<sub>2</sub>, комплексное управление энергетикой и окружающей средой. Цели:

Достижение нейтралитета выбросов углекислого газа компании к 2023 году. В настоящее время уровень нейтралитета составляет 45%.

Использование 100% электроэнергии компании «Око» до 2025 года. В настоящее время этот показатель составляет 60%.

Снижение внешнего запаса электроэнергии на 15% (эталонный 2021 год) к 2030 году.

Сокращение объема отходов, не подлежащих переработке, на 20% по сравнению с продажами к 2030 г.

Компания обеспечивает инклюзивность, разнообразие, равенство и защиту прав женщин.

**Стратегическая цель 5. We care for you.** Данная цель включает две подпрограммы «Простые модные лайфхаки» (Simple fashion hacks) и Устойчивый гардероб (Sustainable wardrobe). Их название говорит само за себя.

### **Обсуждение**

В середине ноября 2021 г. в Глазго (COP26), завершилась Конференция сторон Рамочной конвенции ООН об изменении климата, в которой принимали участие почти 200 государств. Был принят итоговый документ «Климатический пакт Глазго» (Glasgow Climate Pact). Основной посыл главного документа Глазго сокращение выбросов углекислого газа, что позволит затормозить глобальное потепление на  $2,4^{\circ}\text{C}$ , но не достаточно, по мнению многих экспертов, для достижения целей Парижского соглашения 2016 г. Принимавшие в работе конференции в Глазго около 200 стран вносят свой вклад в достижение целей устойчивого развития. Одним из ярких примеров является компания «Gerry Weber», которая из 17 ЦУР реализует 11:

3. Обеспечение здорового образа жизни и содействие благополучию для всех в любом возрасте

5. Обеспечение гендерного равенства и расширение прав и возможностей всех женщин и девочек

7. Обеспечение доступа к недорогим, надежным, устойчивым и современным источникам энергии для всех

8. Содействие неуклонному, всеохватному и устойчивому экономическому росту, полной и производительной занятости и достойной работе для всех

9. Создание прочной инфраструктуры, содействие обеспечению всеохватной и устойчивой индустриализации и внедрению инноваций

10. Снижение уровня неравенства внутри стран и между ними

12. Обеспечение рациональных моделей потребления и производства

13. Принятие срочных мер по борьбе с изменением климата и его последствиями

14. Сохранение и рациональное использование океанов, морей и морских ресурсов в интересах устойчивого развития

15. Защита, восстановление экосистем суши и содействие их рациональному использованию, рациональное управление лесами, борьба с опустыниванием, прекращение и обращение вспять процесса деградации земель и прекращение процесса утраты биологического разнообразия

17. Укрепление средств достижения устойчивого развития и активизация работы механизмов глобального партнерства в интересах устойчивого развития.

Представляется, что оставшиеся 6 целей компания будет также осуществлять в соответствии с корректировкой и дополнениями к планам. Но на данный момент то, что она делает, вызывает одобрение.

### **Заключение.**

Германию отличает высокий уровень жизни населения и эффективная система защиты окружающей среды являясь примером для других государств ЕС. Самые важные направления целей устойчивого развития крепко вжились в немецкое общество и его политическую систему. Это касается финансовой стабильности, социальной сплоченности, институциональных основ, обеспечивающих развитие политики по достижению целей устойчивого развития [7-8]. Вместе с тем, процессы глобализации оказывают определенное негативное влияние на достижение ЦУР [9].

Компания «Gerry Weber», разработав и утвердив план с направлениями, подпрограммами и задачами реализует комплекс мероприятий по достижению ЦУР. Кроме того, компания акцентирует внимание на консультативной роли по определению показателей и развития по вопросам устойчивого развития в контексте метода простого реагирования. Компания поддерживает двусторонние и многосторонние консультации заинтересованных министерств по возможным показателям в контексте, а также производит обмен опытом между землями Германии, участвуя в ежегодных совещаниях с Федеральным Правительством и землями по вопросам устойчивого развития и организуя новые совещания со статистическими управлениями земель и ФСУ по вопросам устойчивого развития. Положительный результат реализации ЦУР заключается в сочетании действий политических сил, организаций и компаний, граждан в осознании необходимости принятия мер по ЦУР, без которых могут произойти серьезные и необратимые изменения на всей планете, свидетелями которых мы являемся.

В условиях коронавирусной инфекции компании удалось защитить и минимизировать уровень заболеваемости сотрудников. Поэтому от Германии ожидается еще более высокий уровень устойчивого развития.

Таким образом, на основе анализа статистических данных международной компании «Gerry Weber» мы проследили и показали результативность ее мероприятий по достижению целей устойчивого развития. Опыт компании «Gerry Weber» может стать примером для многих компаний, работающих не только в сфере индустрии моды, но и других сферах всех видов промышленности, сельского хозяйства, энергетики и других сфер экономики.

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## ГЕРМАНИЯДА ТДМ ІСКЕ АСЫРУҒА ҚАДАМДАР ЖӘНЕ ҮЛЕС (“GERRY WEBER” КОМПАНИЯСЫНЫҢ МЫСАЛЫ)

\*Вандангийн А.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>тарих ғылымдарының докторы, профессор,  
Улан-Батор қаласы, Моңғолия, Vandangijn\_a@gmail.com

**Андатпа.** 2015 жылы БҰҰ әзірлеген және жариялаған 2030 жылға дейінгі Тұрақты даму мақсаттары (ОДМ) адам қызметі мен өмірінің өмірлік маңызды салаларын қамтитын өзара байланысты 17 мақсатты қамтитыны белгілі. Германия басынан бастап тұрақты даму мақсаттарын өршіл жүзеге асыруды ұстанады. Германия оны ұлттық деңгейде жүзеге асыру үшін алғашқы маңызды қадамдар жасауда. Бұл тұрғыда Германиядағы тұрақты даму саясатының институционалдық шеңбері үлкен рөл атқарады. Германияда тұрақты даму мақсаттарын іске асыру бойынша идеялар, практикалар және нақты қадамдар көрсетілген. Германияның маңызды рөлі және Германияның ОДМ-ға қол жеткізуге қосатын перспективалары атап өтілді. Еуропалық Одақтың басқа елдерінен айырмашылығы, Германия айқын, прогрессивті, инновациялық және ашық хаттармен ерекшеленеді.

Сонымен қатар, Германия ЕО-ның басқа мемлекеттеріне үлгі бола отырып, халықтың жоғары өмір сүру деңгейімен және қоршаған ортаны қорғаудың тиімді жүйесімен ерекшеленеді. Орнықты даму мақсаттарының ең маңызды бағыттары неміс қоғамы мен оның саяси жүйесіне нық сіңісіп кетті. Бұл тұрақты даму мақсаттарына қол жеткізу жөніндегі саясатты дамытуды қамтамасыз ететін қаржылық тұрақтылыққа, әлеуметтік тұтастыққа, институционалдық негіздерге қатысты. Сондықтан Германиядан тұрақты дамудың одан да жоғары деңгейі күтіледі, бұл «Gerry Weber» компаниясының мысалында көрсетілген.

**Тірек сөздер:** БҰҰ, Тұрақты даму мақсаттары, Германия, Gerry Weber, ТДМ стратегиясы.

### STEPS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION THE SDGs IN GERMANY (CASE OF “GERRY WEBER” COMPANY)

\*Vandangiyn A.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor,  
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, Vandangiyn\_a@gmail.com<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract.** The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) until 2030, developed and announced by the UN in 2015, include, as is known, 17 interrelated goals covering vital areas of human activity and life. Germany has been committed from the very beginning to the ambitious implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. Germany is taking some first important steps towards its implementation at the national level. In this context, the institutional framework of sustainable development policy in Germany plays an important role. The ideas, practices and real steps to implement the Sustainable Development Goals in Germany are shown. The important role of Germany and the prospects that Germany can contribute to the achievement of the SDGs were noted. It is shown that, unlike other countries of the European Union, Germany is distinguished by a clear, progressive, innovative and postcard vision of the SDGs. In addition, Germany is distinguished by a high standard of living of the population and an effective system of environmental protection, being an example for other EU states. The most important areas of the Sustainable Development Goals are firmly rooted in German society and its political system. This concerns financial stability, social cohesion, and institutional frameworks that ensure the development of policies to achieve sustainable development goals. Therefore, an even higher level of sustainable development is expected from Germany, which is shown by the example of the company “Gerry Weber”.

**Keywords:** UN, Sustainable Development Goals, Germany, Gerry Weber, SDG’ Strategy.

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## IDENTITY FACTOR IN ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB SPRING

\*Muminov N.A.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ph.D., Associate professor of Ablai Khan KazUIRandWL, Almaty,  
Kazakhstan, e-mail: muminov.n@ablaikhan.kz

**Abstract.** The anti-regime uprising movement, the so-called Arab Spring, which began in December 2010 in Tunisia and quickly spread to the entire Arab World, has had a transformative impact on the current regional order. In Israel, the Arab Spring movement has been perceived as a threat to national security rather than as an opportunity. Many studies have argued that Israel's perception of the Arab Spring movement as a threat to its national security stems from the transformation in the regional distribution of power and the increased insecurity in the regional environment. As an alternative to these arguments, it will be argued in this study that Israel's response to the Arab Spring movement from the point of national security is due to Israel's identity. In this study, Israel's response to the Arab Spring will be discussed in three sections. The first section will examine the Israeli identity formation in relation to the Arab states in the pre-Arab Spring period. The following section will focus on the main political developments affecting Israeli-Arab relations before and during the Arab Spring. The final section before the conclusion will reveal to what extent political developments during the Arab Spring have constituted the Israeli security concerns.

**Keywords:** Israeli identity, Arab Spring, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism, Security

### Basic provisions

The anti-regime uprising movement, known as the Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia in December 2010 and soon spread across the Arab world, has created a transformative effect on the current regional order [1-2]. While the Arab Spring was welcomed by Western states in the hope that it would have an impact on democratization in authoritarian states [3-5], it was perceived as a threat to national security rather than an opportunity in Israel [6-8]. Israeli leaders chose to call the riots "Arab winter" and "Islamic winter". Compared to European 1989 national revolutions, the riots of the Western states compared to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. For Israel, democracy would not come to Arab countries after the regime was changed after the riots [9-10].

## **Introduction**

Israel's perception of the regional transformation brought about by the Arab Spring as a threat to its security has made Israeli foreign policy again the focus of the Realist approach. In this context, many studies have tried to explain Israel's reaction to the Arab Spring from a Realist perspective. For example, Philipp O. Amour, Amichai Magen and Efraim Inbar examined Israel's response to the Arab Spring within the framework of regional anarchy, balance of power and survival notions.

Amour argued that the transformation brought about by the Arab Spring uprising to the Middle East regional order worsened the regional anarchy and exacerbated insecurity and conflict in Israel. According to him, the political developments since 2011 have initiated changes in the regional balance of power that will result in Israel's detriment. Regional insecurity has heightened Israel's potential concerns and sensitivity to its priority over the balance of power in the Middle East.

Similarly, Magen stated that as a result of the uprisings in Arab countries, the overthrow of authoritarian governments and the replacement by Islamist governments were perceived as a threat to Israel's national security. According to him, Israel's foreign policy towards the Arab Spring stems from its hostile environment that poses a threat to its security. Therefore, the notion of survival has made security the primary focus of Israeli foreign policy.

Inbar, on the other hand, stated that the Arab Spring worsened the regional balance of power that worked in favor of Israel. According to Inbar, Israel was more concerned about the rise of radical Islamists as a result of the regime change brought about by the Arab Spring in its immediate neighbors such as Egypt, Jordan and Syria, for its security. In addition, Israel was worried that the political changes brought by the Arab Spring would weaken the pro-Western Arab countries and increase the influence of Iran, which is the supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist organizations in the region.

According to these studies, as a result of the Arab Spring, Israel increased its defense expenditures and preferred to pursue a foreign policy that rejects the notions of openness and reconciliation that would promote peace and cooperation with Arabs and Palestinians [6, p.298]. In addition, Israel pursued the aim of "non-entanglement" in the developments in Arab countries unless the red lines are crossed [7, p.63].

Studies evaluating Israel's response to the Arab Spring in terms of security have not highlighted the importance of identities. When they talk about the rise of radical Islamism after the uprising, they have overlooked that these are identity politics. This study aims to provide an alternative approach to Realist studies by examining Israel's response to the Arab

Spring in terms of identities. Despite the realists' arguments that the security concerns in Israel stem from the changes in the regional power balance brought by the Arab Spring, I will argue that in this study, as an alternative to these arguments, Israel's response to the political developments brought by the Arab Spring is due to the change in Israeli identity or the structure of regional identities.

In the study, Israel's response to the Arab Spring will be discussed under three sections. First, the formation of Israeli identity before the Arab Spring will be considered in the context of its relations with Arab states. Secondly, the focus will be on important political developments affecting Israeli-Arab relations before and during the Arab Spring. And finally, before the conclusion, it will be revealed to what extent the political developments during the Arab Spring pose a security concern for Israel.

### **Description of materials and methods**

This study uses discourse analysis method to explain the social construction of the Israeli state identity and its influence on Israeli foreign policy towards the Arab countries using the primary sources of data obtained from the Israeli and American archives. The study used a constructivist approach in International Relations, which emphasizes the role of identities in constituting the interests that states pursue in their foreign policies as its conceptual framework. The study begins by investigating the role of the Holocaust narrative in the construction of the Israeli state identity and then shows how it has created the sense of victimhood and the fear of annihilation among the Israeli policymakers and the public in the result of domestic and international developments.

### **Israeli Identity: Fear of Destruction and Status Quo**

Theoretically, state identities have both subjective (“*I*”) [11, p.271] and intersubjective (“*me*”) dimensions [12, p.142]. In other words, state identities have national and international sources. So, what is Israel's identity? While the majority of studies examining Israeli identity construction give more weight to intrastate or national elements [13-18], very few focus on the international dimension [19-20]. Existing studies have failed to draw attention to the interrelatedness of both national and international sources of Israeli identity for understanding its foreign policy. This study tries to fill this gap by revealing the relationship between these dimensions in the formation of Israeli identity.

There are many components that make up the Israeli identity at the national and international level. However, in terms of the scope and subject of the study, two more striking aspects emerge. The first is the traumatic Holocaust collective memory, known as the crux of antisemitism or hatred of Jews, which has persisted for centuries [19, p.521]. The other is the “peripheral state” identity formed in the context of Israel's position in the

region and its relationship with its states [20, p. 48].

These two dimensions of Israeli identity began to be built almost at the same time. The trauma of the Holocaust did not exist in the Israeli collective memory before 1960. Under the influence of the Eichmann Case in 1961, a Holocaust trauma was “nationalized” and placed in the collective memory [21, p.96]. On the other hand, Israel, which remained isolated by being surrounded by enemy Arab states after the 1956 War, started to develop close relations with non-Arab peripheral states that shared the idea of a common threat to get out of isolation. This relationship has built Israel’s “peripheral state” or “moderate state” identity.

While the Holocaust built the perception of victimhood and the fear of destruction in the Israeli identity, the identity of the “peripheral state” reinforced the belief in status quo based on preserving the current order. Israel has made a distinction between regional states and trans-state regional actors, depending on the criteria arising from these two components. On the one hand, the “core states” that do not recognize the State of Israel and pose an existential threat by destroying it, and on the other hand, the “periphery states” that recognize the State of Israel, share the common threat idea and focus on preserving the existing order. Israel has tried to balance the threat from the “core” states by forming an informal military alliance with the “periphery” states [22, p.47].

### **The Arab Spring and the Breakdown of the Structure of Identities**

In the period until the Arab Spring, Israel tried to maintain the current situation by normalizing its relations with the moderate axis states by balancing against the potential threat from the radical axis. However, with the effect of the Arab Spring, the existing regional order began to transform [1-2]. The transformation of the current order started with the fall of authoritarian regimes in moderate states and their replacement by Islamists.

### **Results**

October-December 2010, as a result of the Arab Spring uprising that began in December, authoritarian regimes fell in moderate axis states such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Islamist parties came to power instead. The arrival of Islamist parties in the “moderate axis” states has begun to worry Israel [23, p. 87]. Because the fall of moderate regimes has meant that Israel is again surrounded by anti-Israeli states, becoming isolated and threatening its security [9, p.127].

Israel’s concern about the regional transformation brought about by the Arab Spring was very high in the period between the overthrow of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and his replacement by the Muslim Brotherhood in February 2011, and the military coup and the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013. Israel was more worried about the

regime change in Egypt than the regime change in “moderate axis” states such as Tunisia and Libya [8, p.121].

### **Discussions**

Why did Israel perceive the Islamist parties that came to power through democratic elections after the uprising as a threat to its security? Firstly, the parties that came to power were fed with anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic anti-Semitism. During the uprising, anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish slogans proliferated in the squares, in the media and on social networks. There were also attacks on Jewish synagogues and diplomatic institutions. In January-February 2011, a synagogue in Tunisia was burned down by insurgents. Jewish cemeteries were destroyed. In September 2011, rioters in Egypt attacked the Israeli Embassy in Cairo [24, p. 44].

Secondly, the attitudes of the Islamist parties that came to power after the uprising towards Israel were negative or radical. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood, which came to power in Egypt, refrained from establishing direct relations with Israel, stated that it would review the 1979 Camp David Agreement and normalize its relations with Iran [24, p.131].

### **Israel's Security Concerns**

As during the Arab Spring uprisings, the Islamist parties that came to power after the uprising adopted anti-Israel, anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist attitudes. For Israel, the Islamists who came to power after the Arab Spring were no different from Iran. Like Iran, they were radical Islamists who did not recognize Israel. For Israel, this meant the rise of the “radical axis” in the region where radical Islamists are located, the termination of peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the isolation of Israel with the weakening of the “moderate axis”, and the increase in attacks with the rise of terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah [7, p.69].

Israel tried not to get involved in Syria for a while, where the uprisings turned into a civil war, and preferred to remain a spectator. However, as the war in Syria approached the Israeli borders in 2013, Israel began to intervene in the civil war in Syria. Israel's intervention was more likely to prevent Iran and Hezbollah, which it supports, from strengthening its position in Syria, rather than the Assad regime. Although Israel thinks that the Assad regime poses a threat to itself, it is not very keen on his fall. Because Israel cannot foresee what kind of regime will emerge after Assad and is particularly worried about the formation of an Islamist regime. In this respect, it can be said that Israel is in favor of the survival of the old Assad regime, which it knows very well from a new regime [25, p.329].

As a result, Israel's interpretation of the Arab Spring as a threat to its security stemmed from the change of identities rather than the regional

balance of power. Because the coming to power of the Islamist parties as a result of the Arab Spring meant that the “balance of identities” between the “moderate axis” and the “radical axis” that provided the regional order for Israel was disrupted.

### **Conclusion**

In this study, Israel’s response to the Arab Spring was evaluated in terms of identity and security. It has been tried to answer the question of how the Arab Spring movement, which created a regional transformative effect, was perceived as a security threat for Israel. As an alternative to realists’ explanations of anarchy, balance of power and security, it has been argued that Israel’s pessimistic response to the Arab Spring stems from identities. In order to reveal this, the Holocaust and environmental state components of the Israeli identity, both national and international, were examined. It has been revealed what kind of perceptions and beliefs these components have built in the Israeli identity and how they have changed over time.

With this change, since the 1990s, Israel began to distinguish the regional states as “moderate axis” and “radical axis”, and tried to maintain the current situation by forming informal allied relations with those on the radical axis, whom it perceived as a potential threat, with those on the moderate axis, which it identified with itself. However, as a result of the anti-regime Arab Spring uprising that started in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to other regional states, the old regimes fell in many states and the new government came to power. The Arab Spring has shaken the balance between the moderate axis and radical axis states. The moderate axis states, especially the coming to power of Islamist parties in Egypt, were perceived as a threat to Israel’s security. Because while the identities of the new regimes and the state were redefined, they became antisemitic and anti-Israeli. After Egypt, Israel began to worry about the coming to power of Islamist parties in Jordan and other moderate states. Because the regime changes isolated Israel; most importantly, it has meant that Iran and radical groups such as Iran-backed Hezbollah and Hamas will strengthen and Israel will be exposed to attacks. However, since the middle of 2014, the failure of Islamist parties in many countries, especially in Egypt, and the suppression of uprisings have reduced Israel’s security concerns.

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## **ИЗРАИЛЬДІҢ АРАБ КӨКТЕМІНЕ ҚАТЫСТЫ СЫРТҚЫ САЯСАТЫНДАҒЫ БІРЕГЕЙЛІК ФАКТОРЫ**

**\*Муминов Н.А.<sup>1</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Абылай хан атындағы ҚазХҚЖӘТУ, PhD докторы,  
қауымдастырылған профессор, Алматы, Қазақстан, e-mail:  
muminov.n@ablaikhan.kz

**Аңдатпа.** 2010 жылы желтоқсанда Тунисте басталып, бүкіл араб әлеміне тараған «араб көктемі» деп аталатын режимге қарсы көтеріліс аймақтық тәртіпті трансформациялық тұрғыдан өзгертті. Израильде «араб көктемі» көтерілісі мүмкіндік ретінде емес, ұлттық қауіпсіздікке қатер ретінде қабылданады. Көптеген зерттеулер Израильдің «Араб көктемі» көтерілісін өзінің ұлттық қауіпсіздігіне қатер ретінде қабылдауы күштің аймақтық бөлінуіндегі өзгерістер мен аймақтық ортадағы қауіпсіздіктің күшеюінен туындайтынын алға тартты. Бұл аргументтерге балама ретінде осы зерттеуде Израильдің араб көктемі көтерілісін ұлттық қауіпсіздік тұрғысынан бағалауы Израильдің мемлекеттік бірегейлігіне байланысты екені талқыланатын болады. Бұл зерттеуде Израильдің араб көктеміне реакциясы үш бөлім аясында талқыланады. Бірінші бөлімде араб көктеміне дейінгі кезеңде араб мемлекеттеріне қатысты Израиль бірегейлігінің қалыптасуы қарастырылады. Келесі бөлімде араб көктеміне дейін және кезінде Израиль-араб қарым-қатынастарына әсер ететін негізгі саяси оқиғаларға назар аударылады. Қорытындыға дейінгі соңғы бөлім араб көктемі кезіндегі саяси оқиғалардың Израильдің қауіпсіздік мәселелерін қаншалықты алаңдатқанын көрсетеді.

**Тірек сөздер:** Израиль бірегейлігі, араб көктемі, панарабизм, панисламизм, қауіпсіздік.



## **ФАКТОР ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ ВО ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКЕ ИЗРАИЛЯ В ОТНОШЕНИИ АРАБСКОЙ ВЕСНЫ**

**\*Муминов Н.А.<sup>1</sup>**

Доктор PhD, ассоциированный профессор КазУМОиМЯ имени  
Абылай хана, Алматы, Казахстан, e-mail: muminov.n@ablaikhan.kz

**Аннотация.** Восстание против режима, так называемая «арабская весна», начавшаяся в декабре 2010 года в Тунисе и быстро распространившаяся на весь арабский мир, оказало преобразующее воздействие на нынешний региональный порядок. В Израиле движение арабской весны воспринимается как угроза национальной безопасности, а не как возможность. Многие исследования утверждают, что восприятие Израилем движения «арабской весны» как угрозы своей национальной безопасности проистекает из трансформации регионального распределения власти и повышенной небезопасности в региональной среде. В качестве альтернативы этим аргументам в этом исследовании будет утверждаться, что реакция Израиля на движение арабской весны с точки зрения национальной безопасности обусловлена государственной идентичностью Израиля. В этом исследовании реакция Израиля на «арабскую весну» будет обсуждаться в трех разделах. В первом разделе исследуется формирование израильской идентичности по отношению к арабским государствам в период до арабской весны. Следующий раздел будет посвящен основным политическим событиям, влияющим на израильско-арабские отношения до и во время «арабской весны». Последний раздел перед заключением покажет, в какой степени политические события во время «арабской весны» вызвали озабоченность Израиля по поводу безопасности.

**Ключевые слова:** израильская идентичность, арабская весна, панарабизм, панисламизм, безопасность.

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## **CAUSES OF MODERN UPHEAVALS IN THE ARAB WORLD**

*\*Kurpebayeva G.<sup>1</sup>*

<sup>1</sup>Teacher of Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations and World Languages, Doctor PhD,  
Almaty, Kazakhstan, gaziza-k@mail.ru

**Abstract.** The article examines the causes of the “Arab Spring” and the factors influencing the escalation of the political crisis in Arab countries. As a result of the deep socio-political crisis in 2011-2013, a change of political regimes took place in some countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Despite the prerequisites for the destabilization of authoritarian regimes, their forced change has led to a crisis in some Arab States. The Middle East and North Africa took part in the forced revolutionary transformation of political regimes called the Arab Spring. The growth of protests in the region is due to internal and external reasons, and in each country they depend on the specific socio-political, economic, religious situation and the peculiarities of the historical development of states. The aftermath of these protests has led to destabilization in some countries in the Middle East. The purpose of this article is a comparative analysis of the main parameters of the Arab Spring revolution.

**Keywords:** North Africa and the Middle East, Arab Spring, socio-political crisis, democracy, political regime, Arab society.

### **Basic provisions**

The relevance of the article is determined by the tensions in the Middle East and the growing political uncertainty in the region and in individual countries. The Arab world is the ethnic core of the Middle East. Mass protest movements that swept the region of the Middle East and North Africa in 2010–2011, affected a number of countries, and made an impression not only on the development of the entire region, but also on a global scale.

Since the beginning of 2011, some states in the Arab world have undergone changes through the forcing of political regimes. In connection with the revolutionary political transformations, the crisis in the countries, the threat of escalation, as well as the intervention of foreign states and international organizations have become more relevant when considering the parameters of the Arab Spring revolution. Therefore, the factors that led to instability require a comprehensive study of the transformation of political regimes in the Arab world. For this, it is necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of the political consequences of the Arab Spring process.

At the moment, states such as Egypt, Libya, Syria are experiencing the consequences of the riots that began in early 2011. A direct consequence of the “Arab Spring” in North Africa was the spread of its influence to other countries of the Greater Middle East, and the destabilization of the situation in a number of countries in the region.

### **Introduction**

The events in the Middle East in 2011-2012, dubbed the “Arab Spring”, came as a complete surprise to most domestic and foreign experts. The Arab Spring is a series of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011-2012, which led to internal political, economic and social problems, as well as the influence of external factors in the Middle East, with the collapse of the ruling regime. and, in some cases, a civil war. A phenomenon that is still characterized by shaking in this area[1]. The revolutionary processes in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa were conditionally called the “Arab Spring”. E.G. Ponomareva believes that the “Arab Spring” is an improved form of the West’s struggle for geopolitical dominance [2]. Regarding the methods of instilling democracy, the revolutions of 2011-2013 demonstrated the ineffectiveness of elections in the Arab States. As a result of the overthrow of the former authoritarian regimes, there is no one to replace the old government, since the democratic forces are weak and split by internecine conflicts, and their public support is low. As a result, after the revolutions in the Arab countries, there was a systemic crisis. E. Stepanova, investigating the causes of the Arab revolutions, adheres to the opinion about the fundamental role of social discontent in the escalation of conflicts. Analyzing the situation in Egypt, the author points out a sharp gap, even by Middle Eastern standards, between the ordinary population and the managers, who are highly corrupt, belong to the pro-Western ruling political and economic elites and are well integrated into the world economy [3]. A well-known politician and orientalist E.M. Primakov regarded the phenomenon of the “Arab Spring” as a revolutionary wave that spontaneously struck the Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes in early 2011 [4]. For French political scientist and orientalist Francois Burg, the “Arab Spring” is a series of popular uprisings in the Arab world that began with the “Tunisian Spring” in January 2011 [5].

In the scientific community, the phenomenon of the “Arab Spring”, with all the influence of an external factor, is perceived as a product of internal development. At the same time, some authors have suggested that these events were inspired by Western, primarily American circles, through non-governmental human rights organizations, PR structures, the Internet, and are analogs of color revolutions. It should be emphasized that most Middle Eastern experts and authors of publications on this problem

support the paradigm of political realism, relying on the fact that nation-states, being a homogeneous substance, conduct a policy based on objective reasons based on their national interests. Authors such as Korotayev and Zinkina cite a fairly strong argument that the cause of the social explosion was the economic and demographic problems of the countries of the region [6]. Nayef Al-Shammari also explains the revolutions in the Middle East by internal political and ethnic problems and the struggle for power[7]. Denis Beauchard, adviser to the French Institute of International Relations on the Middle East, also writes about the internal causes of the social explosion, “for a long time Egypt had to confront social problems, economic development did not keep pace with rapid demographic growth, and the situation when 40 percent of the population live on two dollars a day has become truly explosive”[8].

### **Description of materials and methods**

#### **Prerequisites of the political processes of the “Arab Spring”**

North Africa, like the entire Middle East, is at the stage of catching up with industrial development. Egypt and Libya are forced to integrate into political transformations that have begun outside their borders and have caused a process of democratization around the world, which means a transition to market relations, a weakening of state participation in the economy and the formation of democratic institutions. The following components of modernization have become relevant for Egypt and Libya. Firstly, catching up with socio-economic development and overcoming backwardness that prevents innovative institutional changes. Secondly, the transformation of the social sphere: stimulating productive labor, increasing employment, providing the population with affordable education and healthcare. Thirdly, at the stage of transition from an agrarian form to an industrial one, developing countries had to solve the problem of limited own funds for large capital investments. Fourth, taking into account global trends in economics and politics, a choice has been made between a “closed” and an “open” development model. The “closed” model promotes stronger mobilization of internal resources and identifies external causes of the country’s lag. The “open” model is more prone to borrowing, its transparency is supported by foreign investment.

Socio-economic development, overcoming backwardness and transformation of the social sphere in the republican period of Egypt and Libya occupy an important place, were implemented in different ways. The decisive factor here was not only following the chosen socio-economic strategy, but also solving the problem of limited own resources for modernization - the choice of a national development model. Egypt was

more integrated into the processes of globalization, and Libya followed the path of regionalization.

In Egypt, the nationalism of the regime of G.A. Nasser was combined with the ideas of “Arab socialism”. President A. Sadat built his political course, fully oriented to the West. H. Mubarak pursued a multi-vector policy, taking into account various centers of world influence. By the end of the twentieth century, the results of globalization in Egypt became noticeable. In the economic aspect, it is, first of all, market expansion based on competition caused by the policy of liberalization of foreign economic activity. An important role is played by the exchange of resources carried out through global supply chains, primarily through financial and information networks. In the political sphere, the number of political actors and the degree of their interdependence were increasing. Thus, the carriers of globalization are penetrating into the political space of Egypt: transnational corporations, transnational banks, the Internet community, various international coordinating organizations. In this sense, globalization reflects a qualitatively new stage of border permeability. Many researchers claim that by the end of the reign of H. Mubarak, Egypt was in a state of economic stagnation, poverty, inequality, corruption and unemployment. As a result, the local private sector did not seek to invest in the national economy, reforms were complicated by a lack of finance, a shortage of qualified managerial personnel and a lack of technology[9].

Among the main problems that have engulfed Egyptian society, experts highlight the widening gap between rich and poor, the increased level of corruption and the lack of a competitive political system in which people can really fight for power. The main internal destabilizing factors that constitute the basis for destabilizing the situation were the food and demographic problem[10]. These two areas of threats to national security are closely related to each other. Providing the country with food is one of the priority issues in Egypt. Despite the fact that the minimum set of food products is subsidized by the state, there is a low dynamics of development of the agricultural sector in the country. In fact, today Egypt imports up to 60% of the necessary food. The dynamics of rising food prices caused a deterioration in the situation of low-income segments of the population, which in turn served as the basis for social instability.

The situation related to the provision of food is aggravated by the consequences of demographic problems. Every year the population in the country increases by 1.1-1.2 million people. According to scientists, 96-100 million people will live in Egypt in 2025, 115-120 million in 2065. The rapid increase in the number and reduction of mortality of the population places a heavy burden on the entire complex of economic, social and environmental problems. The peak of population growth occurred in 1985-

1987. It follows from this that the largest number of young people aged 20 to 25 years falls on 2010-2011. The labor market is not able to absorb all graduates of schools and universities. The percentage of unemployed among graduates of secondary schools exceeded 31%, and universities -11.8%. This problem has been not only social, but also political for many years. It is young people who do not have reliable prospects of finding a worthy place in life, practically applying the knowledge they have received, who have become one of the main sources of replenishment of the ranks of radical Islamic organizations, including terrorist ones. A rapid increase in the proportion of young people can undermine existing political coalitions, generating instability. Large cohorts of young people are often attracted to new ideas or heterodox religions that challenge old forms of power. In addition, young people are relatively easily mobilized to participate in social or political conflicts [11]. In addition to the above, discontent was also caused by the current tough corrupt regime that has been ruling since 1981, the state of emergency imposed, and election fraud. The situation was aggravated by the preparation of H. Mubarak's son Gamal as a successor to the post of president.

As for Libya, the conditions of political destabilization were contradictory. The country was successfully developing economically, having the largest oil and gas reserves in Africa, which provided the Gaddafi regime with significant influence on the entire continent. For 20 years, the economy has been developing at a rapid pace. Therefore, Libya was an investor in other African states, provided up to 15% of the revenue of the budget of the African Union, covered the debts of other countries, providing them with loans for the purchase of its oil. Due to rapid demographic growth (youth reaches 40-50% of the population of Libya), unemployment has increased [12]. Let's clarify that there were jobs in industry and agriculture, but they were no longer satisfied with the increased claims of young people. They were occupied by immigrants, mostly from Egypt, and, importantly, there were many Coptic Christians among them. Despite the serious social assistance of the state (cheap housing was built on a large scale, education and medical care were easily accessible), the indignation of young Libyans was growing. As in Egypt, the issues of bribery, police brutality, and information secrecy were painfully perceived, which intensified the desire to protest. Constant interactions between Egyptian and Libyan societies, their historical and cultural ties are important. However, having similar ethno-confessional and socio-cultural parameters and geopolitical determinants of development, Egypt and Libya differ in the long-term conditions of political processes. In some aspects they are opposite. In other aspects, the political strategies of Egypt and Libya had a partial contrast: different economic strategies were used in the two countries. The population of Egypt had an

extremely low standard of living, and in Libya, before the overthrow of Gaddafi, an increased level of income was provided.

### **Results**

The dominant political course of M. Gaddafi was “Islamic socialism” and direct democracy. “Islamic Socialism” was intended to unite the developing Arab countries and free them from the ideological expansion of both the West and the Soviet bloc. Direct democracy or “direct democracy”, rejecting parliamentarism, assumed direct rule of the people through a system of people’s committees and people’s congresses. In 1977, the Libyan Arab Republic was renamed the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Jamahiriya in Arabic - the power of the people). However, the mode of M. Gaddafi, denying all forms of democracy existing in the modern world, dictated their policies to the “people’s committees”. The acquisition of legislative functions by the General People’s Congress from the Revolutionary Command Council actually meant the transfer of legislative power under the control of M. Gaddafi. The reorganization of ministries into secretariats, the office of the chairman of the Council of Ministers - into the Supreme People’s Committee transferred executive power to the personal jurisdiction of the Libyan leader. Gaddafi largely managed to achieve his goals. First of all, it concerned approaching the ideal of a socially homogeneous society by increasing the level of income per capita. The Libyan leader managed to implement his slogan: “Wealth in the hands of the people!”. The difference between rich and poor strata has been reduced. The structure of the economy has been transformed – the population has received a personal interest in the final product, being its owner. The attitude to labor and production has been changed. The broad masses were attracted to participate in public administration for the first time. Being the poorest Arab country in the 1950s, Libya under the rule of M. Gaddafi achieved impressive economic progress, raising the standard of living of the population, strengthening the public sector. In foreign policy, the Gaddafi regime was adamant: opposed the West, against Israel; supported the strengthening of Libyan nationalism and the unification of the Arab world around Libya. Anti-imperialist policies were carried out, which led to isolation and clashes with Western countries.

For a long time, the doctrine of Arab unity prevailed in the ideological sphere, uniting the countries of North Africa and the Middle East on a secular-ethnic basis, contributing to the development of people’s liberation, anti-imperialist movements. But this doctrine has experienced a deep crisis since the early 1970s, both due to internal reasons and the opposition of Western countries. In Egypt and Libya, two main ideological trends were constantly competing – secular nationalism, inspired by Western political

thought, and “Muslim nationalism”, based on Islam as a symbol of resistance to the West<sup>1</sup>. The long colonial rule of the West led to the fact that the role of Islam in the countries of North Africa was significantly limited. After gaining independence, Islam became a source of State identity, ideology and values. In the last third of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the XXI century. The influence of Islam in the political process of the studied states has steadily grown. Islam in various ideological and political interpretations has become an integral part of the political course of the ruling elites. The Islamic factor in the political processes of Arab countries is studied by many experts. Islam has an influence on political institutions, political actors and the socio-cultural sphere in Arab countries[13].

As for Libya’s foreign policy, when Muammar Gaddafi came to power in 1969, he took an anti-Western position. Immediately after the coup, in October, 1969, the Permanent Representative of Tripoli at the 24th session of the UN General Assembly made a statement about Libya’s desire to cease the existence of all Western military bases on its land. London and Washington were informed of the termination of all relevant agreements. Naturally, neither the US nor the UK were very dissatisfied with the policy of the new head of state. Already in 1970, all banks were nationalized, in 1973 Libya, along with Algeria and Iraq, established its control over oil production, as a result, the entire oil industry was nationalized. Libya’s relations with France were not easy either. Since gaining independence in 1951, Libya has consistently stood in the way of France’s interests in North Africa. After Muammar Gaddafi came to power, the confrontation only escalated. Libyan troops fought with Chad, extremists from Morocco and Algeria were armed and trained with Libyan money. The confrontation reached its climax on September 19, 1989, when Libyans blew up a French airline UTA with 170 passengers on board in the sky over Niger. As a result, in April 1992, the UN Security Council, at the request of the United States and Great Britain, imposed international sanctions against Libya. International sanctions had a negative impact on the economic situation in the country, a number of social projects were curtailed. Only in 2003, after the American occupation of Iraq, Muammar Gaddafi changed his policy, recognized the fact of terrorism. He announced the rejection of the development of weapons of mass destruction, admitted international experts to the country and expressed a desire to settle the issue of compensation for victims of terrorist attacks, despite the declared “non-involvement” of Libya in them. In October 2004, Libya was completely freed from international sanctions.

### **Discussions**

As for Syria, it should be noted that the discontent in Syria, which resulted in a full-scale confrontation and civil war, were caused by unresolved



social problems and were of a religious and ethno-national nature. Thus, the main problem was the principle of the distribution of positions in the state apparatus in accordance with religious affiliation (Sunnis, who make up the majority of the country's population, had limited rights to fill positions in public authorities, unlike Alawites (the religious direction of Shiites), on which the former president of the republic Hafez al-Assad relied, as well as the Kurdish problem. The protesters' demands were reduced to the abolition of the state of emergency (introduced back in 1963), the liquidation of secret prisons, the resignation of provincial governors, and the conduct of trials of those responsible for the deaths of civilians. Nevertheless, B. Assad proved himself to be a flexible politician, in particular, a week after the beginning of the speeches, the Assad government promised the Syrians to lift the state of emergency (the decree on cancellation was signed on April 20, 2011), censorship, allow opposition political parties, reform the judicial system, create conditions for free elections. In addition, on February 26, a referendum was held in Syria on the draft of a new constitution, the main innovation of which was the abolition of the leadership role of the Baath Party and the equality of all political parties was established. These decisions have become unprecedented for the entire Middle East region, and if the plan had been implemented in full and in a timely manner, Syria might have managed to avoid a revolution and turn into a democratic state. One of the indirect causes of popular discontent, according to some Western experts, was also an unprecedented drought that affected more than half of the Syrian lands in the period from 2006 to 2011 due to mismanagement and irrational use of land resources by the government. According to the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in 2009 about 800 thousand people in Syria lost their livelihood, in 2010 their number was already 1 million people. These reasons led to a mass exodus of the country's rural population to the cities. In particular, more than 200 thousand people moved to the city of Aleppo alone (the second most economically important city in the country) during this period, while it should also take into account the large number of Iraqi refugees who flooded the country after the US-Iraq war in 2003, which in turn contributed to the armed conflict [14]. Key attention during the formation of foreign policy in Syria was paid to relations with Israel, Turkey and Iran, as well as Russia. Under President Bashar al-Assad, Iran's role in the region has increased markedly, which, according to a number of monarchs of the Persian Gulf and the leaders of a number of other Arab countries where Sunnis are in power, poses a threat to the formation of the so-called "Shiite arc" or "Shiite crescent". As for military cooperation, one of the key stages here was the signing in 2006 by Iranian Defense Minister M. Najjar and his Syrian counterpart H. Turkamni defense agreements. In 2011 Iran is providing \$23 million in aid to Syria

for the construction of a military base in Latakia. After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, Iran continued to provide not only political support to the official authorities of Syria, but also financial, diplomatic and military assistance in the form of arms supplies and the provision of elite detachments of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to protect the country's leadership.

Under Bashar al-Assad, the main enemies of Syria were still Israel and the United States. After the Iraq War in 2003, Washington intensified accusations against Damascus of interfering in the Iraqi conflict and supporting regional terrorist groups<sup>2</sup> European countries, Israel and the United States accused Damascus of sponsoring terrorist groups Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. At the same time, despite the open support of these Islamic organizations, Bashar did not deny the possibility of a peaceful dialogue with Israel. Despite such statements, in 2002 the United States included Syria in the "axis of evil". And in 2004. The United States has imposed economic sanctions against Syria. Today, Western countries are actively providing assistance to the Syrian opposition, constantly strengthening economic sanctions, applying a set of political, diplomatic, financial and economic measures, as well as forms of information and propaganda pressure on the government of the republic. The external opposition to Damascus in the Middle East is openly led by the Saudi royal family and the Emir of Qatar, while they have received the support of most Arab countries, they are supported by Lebanese liberal circles, Turkey, the United States and EU countries. From the very beginning of his rule, Bashar al-Assad failed to build constructive partnerships with Western countries.

### **Conclusion**

Summing up the analysis of the internal policy of B. It can be concluded that Assad's reforms were not consistent, and some initiatives were subsequently revised. The changes carried out by the President (the abolition of the state of emergency, the adoption of a new constitution that abolished the leading role of the Baath Party in the country, etc.) were carried out belatedly and did not lead to stabilization of the situation in the SAR [15]. The general weakness, the "clumsiness" of the authoritarian regime's construction, the alienation between the authorities and the people, the inability of the authorities to consolidate their supporters also affected. As a result, Syria plunged into a civil war, which took partly the form of an inter-confessional confrontation between Sunnis and Alawites. Moreover, radical Islamist groups, represented mainly by foreign Sunni militants, began to gain more and more weight in the ranks of the Syrian armed opposition.

In foreign policy, B. Assad gave priority to the development of bilateral relations with Iran and Russia. The President also sought to

maintain partnership relations with Turkey, but Turkey itself, after the start of the uprising in Syria, revised its position and supported the opposition. During his presidency, Bashar al-Assad failed to build constructive relations with Israel and the United States. At the same time, the US policy towards Syria is characterized by rigidity and a clear desire to overthrow the ruling regime.

Thus, the events of the “Arab Spring” had a significant impact on the shifts in the balance of power in the Middle East. This is due to changes in political regimes, the strengthening of terrorist organizations and the emergence of new conflicts in the region, such as the civil war in Syria and Yemen.

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## АРАБ ӘЛЕМІНДЕГІ ҚАЗІРГІ ТӨҢКЕРІСТЕРДІҢ СЕБЕПТЕРІ

\*Қурпебаева Г.К.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Абылай хан атындағы қазақ халықаралық қатынастар және әлем тілдері Университетінің оқытушысы, PhD докторы, Алматы, Қазақстан, [gaziza-k@mail.ru](mailto:gaziza-k@mail.ru)

**Андатпа.** Мақалада «Араб көктемінің» алғышарттары және араб елдеріндегі саяси дағдарыстың ушығуына әсер ететін факторлар қарастырылады. 2011-2013 жылдардағы терең әлеуметтік-саяси дағдарыстың нәтижесінде Солтүстік Африка мен Таяу Шығыстың кейбір елдерінде саяси режимдердің өзгеруі орын алды. Авторитарлық режимдердің тұрақсыздануының алғышарттарына қарамастан, олардың мәжбүрлі өзгеруі кейбір араб мемлекеттерінде дағдарысқа әкелді. Таяу Шығыс пен Солтүстік Африка Араб көктемі деп аталатын саяси режимдердің мәжбүрлі революциялық өзгеруіне қатысты. Аймақтағы наразылықтардың өсуі ішкі және сыртқы себептерге және әр елде олар нақты әлеуметтік-саяси, экономикалық, діни жағдайға және мемлекеттердің тарихи даму ерекшеліктеріне байланысты болды. Бұл наразылықтардың салдары Таяу Шығыстың кейбір елдерінде тұрақсыздыққа әкелді. Мақаланың мақсаты - араб көктемі революциясының негізгі параметрлерін салыстырмалы талдау.

**Түйін сөздер:** Солтүстік Африка және Таяу Шығыс, Араб көктемі, әлеуметтік-саяси дағдарыс, демократия, саяси режим, араб қоғамы.

## ПРИЧИНЫ СОВРЕМЕННЫХ ПЕРЕВОРОТОВ В АРАБСКОМ МИРЕ

\*Курпебаева Г.К.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Преподаватель, доктор PhD, Казахский университет международных отношений и мировых языков имени Абылай хана Алматы, Казахстан, gaziza-k@mail.ru

**Аннотация.** В статье рассматриваются причины «арабской весны», и факторы, влияющие на эскалацию политического кризиса в арабских странах. В результате глубокого социально-политического кризиса в 2011–2013 годах в некоторых странах Северной Африки и Ближнего Востока произошла смена политических режимов. Несмотря на предпосылки дестабилизации авторитарных режимов, их вынужденная смена привела к кризису в некоторых арабских государствах. Ближний Восток и Северная Африка приняли участие в вынужденной революционной трансформации политических режимов, называемой арабской весной. Рост протестов в регионе обусловлен внутренними и внешними причинами, и в каждой стране они зависят от конкретной социально-политической, экономической, религиозной ситуации и особенностей исторического развития государств. Последствия этих протестов привели к дестабилизации в некоторых странах Ближнего Востока. Целью данной статьи является сравнительный анализ основных параметров революции арабской весны.

**Ключевые слова:** Северная Африка и Ближний Восток, арабская весна, социально-политический кризис, демократия, политический режим, арабское общество.

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РАЗДЕЛ III. МЕЖДИСЦИПЛИНАРНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ  
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**WHEN WONDER WOMAN MEETS TAKESHI KITANO:  
ANALYSING LEADERSHIP PREFERENCES ON THE BASE OF  
HOLLYWOOD AND JAPANESE MOVIES**

\*Frigerio A.,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> PhD, Dean of the School of Politics and Law, Almaty Management  
University, f.alberto@almu.edu.kz

Galagan M.,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> PhD candidate, Assistant to the Dean of the School of Politics and Law,  
Almaty Management University, margarita.galagan93@gmail.com

**Abstract:** In academia there is a growing attention toward the figure of the leader. Numerous studies have already been conducted to determine leadership preferences in diverse cultures and contexts. The universalism or particularism of leadership preferences is, however, still open to debate. This article offers an original contribution to such discussion by analysing and comparing how US and Japanese movies have represented on the screen the concept of leadership.

Methodologically, the article concludes that the film is designed specifically to achieve a specific goal, and therefore certain characteristics of its main characters are deliberately designed to please such an audience, and it can be considered that the film is a dynamic work of art that can be read through various lenses, depending on the background of the audience (cultural, social, educational), it can be considered a dynamic work of art that can be read through various lenses.

In the article, the authors scientifically substantiate the fact that in Hollywood films personal loyalty and outstanding communication skills are considered as a support for a leading person, and the script depicted in Japanese films looks versatile and dynamic.

**Keywords:** leadership preferences, movies, USA, Japan, comparative analysis.

**Basic provisions**

“Leadership” is one of the most popular – and, often, misused – concept nowadays. In the higher-education system worldwide, there is a growing

attention toward the formation of the so called “leaders of tomorrow”: people whose abilities and personalities are so outstanding to successfully motivate others in achieving their most complex goals. Although there is a widespread tendency to associate certain common values and features (e.g. a strong charisma, advanced decision-making abilities and exceptional critical-thinking skills) to the globally-idealized figure of the leader, there is still a certain misconception on the extent to which leadership preferences are a cultural-universal or cultural-relativism phenomenon. In other terms, are the leadership preferences the same in all countries of the world or, instead, there are some important differences associated to the considered cultural framework? The roots of such debate are intertwined with the wider discussion over the impact of globalization in “flattening” world society or producing only a superficial perception of homogenization [1-2]. This study offers a preliminary answer to such question by critically analysing and comparing the ideal figures of leaders emerging from US and Japanese movies.

The believe that movies have a pedagogical and educational utility beyond their entertaining values is, nowadays, widespread in academia [3-5]. The value in analysing sources of popular culture like movies is twofold. On one side, popular culture tends to ‘endorse prevailing power structures’ [6, p. 1]. In other terms, the majority of blockbuster movies mostly mirror prevalent social perceptions instead of articulating alternative perspectives. After all, as claimed by Richard Barsam and Dave Monahan, ‘the film industry, for the most part, seeks to entertain, not to provoke, its customers’ [7, p. 10]. Even if the narrated stories are fictional, the actions and decisions taken by their protagonists reflect diverse assumptions of contemporary society. As a result, through a critical analysis of movies is possible to uncover underling aspects of leadership theory and practice [8]. On the other side, movies directly shape people’s perceptions about reality by immersing the viewers in their fictional plots. As suggested by Jutta Weldes, popular culture produces discourses whose meanings contribute to the creation of public images. As such, movies do not only reflect the dominant view of leadership in a certain society, but they also actively contribute to its creation [9].

Methodologically, the analysis of movies as a source for understanding leadership features has already been successfully used by other authors [8, 10]. Still, there are also authors like Jim Gritton who has stressed the flaws of this method in relation, for instance, to gender equality [11]. Therefore, using film to study leadership preferences seems a valuable method to gain a general understanding of the examined phenomenon, but it looks like an imperfect medium to provide detailed conclusive statements.



## **Introduction**

The focus on US and Japanese movies is justified by the willingness to verify the universality of desirable leadership skills and values: the cultural framework and the cinematographic style characterizing the American and Japanese film industry are so diverse that cross-cultural differences on leadership preferences would inevitably come into view. Still, this study does not intend, and neither pretend, to provide any sort of generalization between “Western” and “Eastern” cultural values on leadership. Moreover, although this study offers an overview of the positive features of leadership expressed by the American and Japanese cinematographic industry, it does not examine how other factors like gender, age, area of reference (e.g. academia, business, politics or military) affect leadership preferences and neither provides an assessment over the tensions in the leadership styles that might be observed in a single culture. Further studies in this regard are, therefore, necessary to gain a holistic interpretation of the phenomenon of leadership preferences.

This study focuses exclusively the attention on movies released in the last 20 years in order to provide a comprehensive examination of contemporary leadership preferences. A total of 10 movies has been selected for this study: 5 Hollywood movies and 5 Japanese movies. Such movies have been randomly selected from a wider selection of recommended movies related to leadership which were found in academic articles, IMDB users’ suggestions, or simple Google research results using key-words as “leadership and movies”, “leadership and Hollywood movies”, and “leadership and Japanese movies”. The final list of analysed movies is the following (ordered by the year of release): *Brother* (2000), *Remember the Titans* (2000), *Thirteen Days* (2000), *We Were Soldiers* (2002), *Zen* (2009), *13 Assassins* (2010), *The Wolf of Wall Street* (2013), *Wood Job* (2014), *Wonder Woman* (2017), *Oz Land* (2018).

## **Description of materials and methods**

### **Movie Analysis: Hollywood Movies**

*Remember the Titans* (2000) is a drama-sport movie inspired by a true story. The plot is set in the 1970s and it turns around the determination of coach Herman Boone (Denzel Washington) to create an integrated and successful high-school football team (the Titans) regardless the highly discriminatory surrounding framework. His leadership style is severe, but fair and inspirational. This feature clearly emerges in the scene where he forces students to an early-morning run to the Gettysburg cemetery where he provides a highly motivational speech: ‘This is where they fought the battle of Gettysburg. Fifty thousand men died right here on this field, fighting the same fight that we are still fighting among ourselves today... You listen, and you take a lesson from the dead. If we don’t come together

right now on this hallowed ground, we too will be destroyed, just like they were. I don't care if you like each other or not, but you will respect each other. And maybe... I don't know, maybe we'll learn to play this game like men' [12]. Since the beginning of the movie, coach Boone's vision is clear: only through a sincere cooperation and hard-work the students' team will be able to accomplish its objective. As a result, the coach sets clear expectations (e.g. punctuality for the trainings, gaining good grades in all subjects, and learning more about other teammates) to accomplish his mission and he uses self-confidence, dedication to work and a strong determination to overcome any obstacle as his main tools of power. Thanks to such characteristic, coach Boone is able to succeed both in spreading a spirit of equality in the whole city of Alexandria (Virginia) as well as in creating an undefeatable football team. Interestingly, the movie shows also an alternative style of leadership impersonated by the assistant coach Bill Yoast. Differently from coach Boone, coach Yoast counts more on nurturing trustworthy personal relations with the team members and he uses empathy as his main strategy for success. Still, he is also one of the first one (with his daughter) to recognize the efficiency of coach Boone's approach in such difficult context.

*Thirteen Days* (2000) is an historical-political movie set during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The movie focuses the attention on the difficulties faced by US President John F. Kennedy (Bruce Greenwood) in front of a complex scenario characterized by uncertainties – the leading question is: what are the real intentions of Soviet Union? – and fears that a misstep could lead to a nuclear war between the USA and USSR. From a leadership standpoint, the film emphasizes the ability of US President Kennedy (and his personal staff) to make reasoned decisions under intense pressure. Differently from other members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council and notwithstanding the dramatic situation, the US President is shown as a figure capable of maintaining emotional control and a responsible attitude. Multiple options are simultaneously considered in order to identify the best available solution and the possible consequences of each of them are openly debated before taking a decision. Through the leadership ability of the US President and the negotiating capacity of his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, the situation is finally solved by reaching a secret agreement with the Soviet ambassador.

*We Were Soldiers* (2002) is set during the Vietnam War and it narrates about a group of American troops who are ambushed in the Ia Drang Valley. Trapped and outnumbered, the US soldiers succeed in avoiding a catastrophic outcome only thanks to their bravery and the wise leadership of their commander. In this regard, the figure of Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore (Mel Gibson) plays a key role in this story. One of the leitmotifs of this movie is that, under Moore's guide, none of his men will be ever

left behind. This phrase is explicitly expressed by Moore in a scene of the movie before the beginning of the mission: ‘...when we go into battle, I will be the first to set foot on the field, and I will be the last to step off, and I will leave no one behind. Dead or alive, we will all come home together’ [13]. Such statement is also graphically represented with the iconic scenes of him being the first to get off the helicopter on the battle field as well as the last to get back once the battle is over. This symbolic act reveals a high responsibility toward his platoon, an intent to inspire a shared vision of teamworking and a clear intention to professionally behave as a reference model. Moore focus on the development of trustworthy relations with people around him is repeated in multiple other scenes (e.g. during the pray before the battle, speaking with war reporter Joe Galloway or talking with chopper pilots). Moreover, in the film Moore reveals two other important leadership skills: an uncommon ability to understand the circumstances despite the uncertainties as well as a strong decisional capacity under pressure. The first of these features emerges when Moore is able to anticipate the risk of an ambush. The second one occurs when Moore calls for a “Broken Arrow” (a code phrase which implies an immediate massive air attack against enemy positions in a circumstance of extreme emergency). All these skills reveal a strong leadership and a passionate dedication to his work.

*The Wolf of Wall Street* (2013) is a movie that turns around the figure of Jordan Belfort (Leonardo DiCaprio) a controversial stockbroker of New York involved in multiple financial crimes. Interestingly, Belfort is the antithesis of an ethical leader: his entire life is based on sex, drugs and frauds. This movie, nevertheless, tends to glorify certain personal characteristics and skills of the protagonist as features of an immoral, but effective leader. In particular, the attention is posed on three aspects. First, Belfort’s power of persuasion. In one scene, Belfort shows to his employees how to manage a phone call with a client. Notwithstanding a first resistance from the side of the potential customer, Belfort successfully accomplishes his sale by using an aggressive pitch and diverse communication tricks. In such a way, Belfort establishes a “best practice” to be taken as model by his employees. Second, Belfort’s motivational power. In a famous scene, Belfort shows an extraordinary capacity to trigger his audience by providing a highly stimulating and powerful speech: ‘I want you to deal with your problems by becoming rich!’ [14]. A similar circumstance also occurs toward the end of the movie, when Belfort is supposed to communicate that he is leaving his own company, but suddenly he changes his mind provoking an enthusiastic and passionate reaction among his employees. Third, Belfort’s determination. Despite the numerous challenges faced in the course of his career (e.g. losing his job after the Black Friday and a series of other missteps) Belfort is a transformational leader who is able to adapt to the new circumstances in order to realize his vision of success. As a

result, despite his decadent lifestyle, Belfort has nevertheless the capacity to pass several challenges thanks to his charisma, dedication and achievement-oriented style.

*Wonder Woman* (2017) is a superhero film where the protagonist (Gal Gadot) is an Amazon princess who will try to stop Ares' plans to destroy humanity. Bravery, determination and commitment to her cause (saving humankind) are features repeatedly shown during the whole movie and pushed to the extreme in the scene where she launches herself alone in the "no man's land" (an expression used to indicate the unoccupied space between two trenches during the World War I). By pushing forward the limits of possible, such gesture inspires the Allied soldiers to join her on the battlefield. At the same time, *Wonder Woman* reveals a great empathy toward the whole humankind. This characteristic is revealed in multiple lines and further accentuated at the end of the movie, when she reveals her mission: 'Only love can save this world. So, I stay. I fight, and I give... for the world I know can be' [15]. A last note. Differently from the previous movie, morality is here represented as a key feature of leadership. Among the moral principles critically examined during the movie there are, for example, importance of telling the truth (figuratively represented by the Lasso of Hestia) and the necessity to do the right thing regardless the possible risks (a factor raised by *Wonder Woman* when she affirms that she 'cannot stand by while innocent lives are lost'). The underline lesson is that only by following a virtuous approach a true leader can find his/her path in this world.

### **Movie Analysis: Japanese Movies**

*Brother* (2000) is a criminal-drama movie. After a war between yakuza clans the main character, Aniki (Takeshi Kitano), faces a difficult choice: submit to the winners or die. Still, he opts for an independent life by hiding himself in Los Angeles. Since the storyline develops in the USA, it shows the cultural difference between the Japanese and American society. In Los Angeles, Aniki appears to locals as a strange and mysterious person. Hence, he develops his double leadership style. On one side, he is a highly determined and action-oriented person who shows no fear. In a scene where he could get killed, he answers with overwhelming confidence to the mafia henchmen to just try it. He is a severe and strict leader. None has the opportunity to remain unpunished if he/she encroached on the pride of him or his clan. For example, he hurts the eye of a stranger when he calls him Chinese. At the same time, he is a meticulous thinker who foresees dangerous situations and preventively plans possible solutions. For instance, he hides a weapon in advance during negotiations with other criminals. On the other side, Aniki is a self-confident philosopher who spends a lot of time just wisely thinking while smoking cigarettes. Thanks to his charisma – his

confident silences, calmness, and fearlessness – many people from different culture decide to follow him. In an emblematic scene, he asks his friend to shoot him as for him death is just a game. These peculiarities lead him to the same final as many famous brave loners.

*Zen* (2009) is a film, set in the XIII century, about a Japanese monk called Dogen (Kantarou Nakamura) and his path of learning and spreading a new religious thought (Zen Buddhism). From the beginning of the movie, the protagonist reveals a reformatory leadership style: he is a humble, but highly determined person whose goal is to reverse some acknowledged Buddhist practices. Dogen's style of leadership shows a servant attitude toward others. This feature is clearly understandable from two scenes. First, when he does not allow his friend to kill a little child who stole his food and, actually, impart him a lesson: a ruler has the task to create a better world where children could live in better conditions. Second, when he bravely explains to the violent ruler Tokiyori that 'no one who has employed weapons to subjugate his people can rule forever' [16]. Even in front of death, Dogen's calm manner does not change and, in the end, his moral speeches peacefully manage the whole situation. In other parts of the movies, Dogen uses empathy as a tool for persuading and inspiring people around him. Visually, such feature is revealed in the scene where, while holding dead child in his hands, a teardrop falls from one of his eyes. Likewise, when one of the monks decides to leave the monastery after committing a perverted action, Dogen does not blame him and, instead, he is just sad for his leaving. This ability to understand people's emotions make the protagonist a highly charismatic person. Another important feature is his fairness. He always wants to help people regardless their social status. He provides a place for an ill repute woman when she tries to find help and no one else in the monastery wants even to look at her. After that, this lady finds her life goal and supports Dogen's teach after his death. Thanks to these features, the challenge to widespread a new direction in Buddhism is accomplished.

The film *13 Assassins* (2010) is a thriller sets in Japan during shogunate times (1844). The story turns around Shinzaemon (Kōji Yakusho), a samurai whose objective is to defeat Naritsugu – the evil brother of the shogun. In such attempt, Shinzaemon shows bravery, but also reasoning and self-control: 'Do you know the secret to fishing?... Wait till the fish swallows the hook... Reel it when it swallows. It's simple... But if you reel in too soon, the fish will escape with the bait' [17]. Moreover, he reveals advanced time management skills. Before starting an attack, for example, he wisely considers the appropriate time without taking impulsive decisions. At the same time, he reveals some atypical characteristics for a samurai: he protects people instead of serving only his lord and he has a charismatic impact on his followers: they call him "teacher" (while he refers to them as "brothers") and they are ready to sacrifice their life for him. This fact is best seen in the

scene where he and his fighters bravely and confidently face a much larger enemy army. The climax is reached in the final scenes of the movie, when the protagonist faces death with pride and honor, while the antagonist tries (unsuccessfully) to cowardly avoid it.

*Wood Job!* (2014) is a comedy about a young man, Yuki Hirano (Shota Sometani), who decides to try a forestry training program after failing his university entrance exams. His mentor seems a rude man who hates urban youths, especially weak ones. He is a straightforward and severe person who is not afraid and neither ashamed to yell, insult and terrorize his apprentices. Many recruits cannot stand this attitude and leave the camp. Even the main character has a similar thought but decides to stay revealing a strong determination notwithstanding the numerous difficulties which arise during his internship. Subsequently, in the second part of the movie, both the trainee and the trainer reveal different leadership skills. Despite a long series of failures, the protagonist is so committed to succeed that, in the end, he understands what does it mean to become a professional lumberjack and what kind of positive impact he can provide to the surrounding society with such job. Likewise, the figure of the mentor evolves during the movie and he finally turns out to be a charismatic, reasonable and responsible man. A scene of the movie suggests that he could have gotten rich by cutting down the entire forest. Instead, he continues to plant new trees to sustainably preserve the forest and cut them down only when it is necessary. He worries about what will happen to the next generations if the entire forest is cut down. Interestingly, the relationship of these (anti-)heroes turns into friendship at the end of the movie. None of the co-workers want the trainee to participate in a competition for a local festival, but the trainer defends himself with confidence and, at least, he participates to the event with his mentor. Such moment strengthens the personal relation between these two characters so much that, in the final scene, the previously rude mentor shows a “sensitive soul” by crying when Yuki is about to leave due to the end of his internship.

*Oz Land* (2018) is a comedy where events unfold in a children’s amusement park (“Oz land”). In this movie, the figure of leader is not the park’s boss, but his project manager Yoshiko Ozuka (Hidetoshi Nishijima). Yoshiko shows diverse leadership features along the whole movie. First, he creates a family atmosphere in his workplace by trying to actively involve every employee in their duties. His capacity to succeed in that is enhanced by his genuine caring for his staff. For example, he picks up by car his new co-worker when he knows that she lives far away from work. By supporting a teamwork framework, he makes the relationship between colleagues very close. He is sincere, simple, funny, easy going, and loves to connect with those surrounding him. Second, he gives to his team interesting and exceptional assignments for educative purposes. The first task he generally gives to his new employees, for instance, is to collect trash, place a sheepfold and take

care of the dogs. When the new employee asks him the reason for giving her such tasks, he replies with a childish and sincere mockery that like this is more interesting. Third, he is a loyal and dedicated person who is ready to do everything in his possibility to make the park's visitors happy. His persuasive skills help him in such task. For instance, he is able to convince his employees to work extra-hours without encountering indignant reactions by simply convincing them about the importance of making children happy. As last point, he shows bravery when he calmly manages a situation of risk (a fake-bomb) without spreading panic among the visitors of the park.

## **Results**

### **Critical Analysis of the Leadership Skills**

Two recurrent leadership features mostly emerge from the analysis of Hollywood movies (Table 1). They are dedication, as the capacity to be completely committed to a task or purpose, and impactful communication, as the ability to generate positive emotional reactions in the listeners. Such result seems to reflect an individualistic style of leadership where the “front-runner” represents the model of reference who has a key role in straightforwardly inspiring the “followers”. This is clearly the outcome of movies like *The Wolf of Wall Street* (2013) and *Wonder Woman* (2017) and it is also a characteristic of *Remember the Titans* (2000) and *We Were Soldiers* (2002), even if these last movies add also a more human-relations oriented direction in their stories. In the film *Thirteen Days* (2000) such aspects are also smoothly reproduced. However, in this case, they do not stand as the most relevant features.

The binary attention toward both “the self” and “the others” is also reflected by further highly represented characteristics. On one side, in Hollywood movies, a leader is a person who can: adapt his/her strategies according to the faced circumstances; operate successfully in situations of uncertainty and/or risk; take prompt, but reasoned decisions even in the most challenging scenarios; stay focused on his/her goals despite the adversities; take responsibilities in virtue of his/her top decision-making position; visualize a clear future of success and create a distinct path for its realization. On the other side, a leader is also viewed as a person who is able to: inspire devotion in others; sense and understand people's emotions; and push his/her co-workers to results formerly perceived as unreachable. As a result, adaptability, capacity to work under pressure, charisma, decisiveness, determination, empathy, capacity to push the limits of possible, responsibility and vision of success are also viewed as preferential leadership skills. Overall, these results tend to mirror former studies on the perception of effective leadership in the USA [18-19].

A final note about Hollywood movies. From the analysis of these films emerge a series of leadership features and skills that seem related

to specifically-defined circumstances like, for example, the bravery of the warrior in *Wonder Woman* (2017) or the persuasive skills of the seller in *The Wolf of Wall Street* (2013). In this regard, only through the analysis of a higher number of movies it would be possible to determine the extent to which such features represent general or context-related leadership features.

**Table 1.** Leadership Features in Hollywood Movies.

HOLLYWOOD MOVIES	MAIN LEADERSHIP FEATURES
<i>Remember the Titans</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adaptability</li> <li>• Dedication</li> <li>• Determination</li> <li>• Empathy</li> <li>• Fair behaviour</li> <li>• Impactful communication</li> <li>• Rigorous habits</li> <li>• Vision of success</li> </ul>
<i>Thirteen Days</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity to work under pressure</li> <li>• Critical thinking</li> <li>• Decisiveness</li> <li>• Multiple-options assessment</li> <li>• Responsibility</li> <li>• Self-control</li> <li>• Teamworking</li> <li>• Time management</li> </ul>
<i>We Were Soldier</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity to work under pressure</li> <li>• Charisma</li> <li>• Decisiveness</li> <li>• Dedication</li> <li>• Empathy</li> <li>• Impactful communication</li> <li>• Importance of personal relations</li> <li>• Responsibility</li> </ul>
<i>The Wolf of Wall Street</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adaptability</li> <li>• Charisma</li> <li>• Dedication</li> <li>• Determination</li> <li>• Impactful communication</li> <li>• Persuasive skills</li> <li>• Pushing the limits of possible</li> <li>• Vision of success</li> </ul>
<i>Wonder Woman</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bravery</li> <li>• Dedication</li> <li>• Determination</li> <li>• Empathy</li> <li>• Inspiration for others</li> <li>• Morality</li> <li>• Pushing the limits of possible</li> <li>• Responsibility</li> </ul>

**Source:** created by authors



## Discussions

Overall, the examined Japanese movies reveals three main features about leadership (Table 2). The first leadership feature is bravery, as the moral strength that allows the protagonists to overcome fear and act for the “justa causa”. It develops in two different forms: “offensive bravery” and “defensive bravery”. The first form is directly seen in movies like *Brother* (2000) and *13 Assassins* (2010) where leaders, notwithstanding the related risks, preventively take the initiative to succeed in their missions. In contrast, the second form appears more as a virtue – in *Zen* (2009) and *Oz Land* (2018) – to keep calm in front of peril and uncertainty. In any case, this ability to act as a “hero” seems intertwined with other personal traits such as dedication and determination. In other terms, the honorable reason – at least for those concerned – behind the action is the spring that justifies the untiring efforts for achieving it.

The second prevalent feature, charisma, is the capacity of influencing others through personal charms. Through charisma people gains new followers and supporters. In *Brother* (2000) and *13 Assassins* (2010) this characteristic is strictly associated with the personal confidence of the protagonists, while in other movies it tends to be connected with other features, respectively persuasion and empathy in *Zen* (2009) and professionalism in *Wood Job!* (2014).

The third main feature is teamworking – a group of people harmoniously working together to achieve the desired results. This characteristic is widely manifested in multiple Japanese films: the ability to jointly face a huge army in *13 Assassins* (2010), the family-framework of *Brother* (2000) or the cooperation for the success of the park in *Oz Land* (2018). Unsurprisingly (considered the published literature) a rooted management-familyism system characterized the relations within the team: ‘the supervisor benevolently guides the subordinate who, in turn, must reciprocate with complete obedience and absolute loyalty’ [18, p. 63].

On the whole, these findings somehow reflect the results of the study conducted by Dorfman and House, which defined charismatic and team-oriented leadership as the most dominant dimensions of Japanese effective leadership [20]. Partially, these movies seem also to expose the “Seven Spirit of Matsushita” which are still commonly viewed as guiding principles of contemporary Japanese society even though they were created in 1933. The idea to offer a service that would improve public’s well-being is, for example, visible in *Zen* (2009), *13 Assassins* (2010), *Wood Job!* (2014) and *Oz Land* (2018) [21, p. 71-72]. Likewise, fairness and honesty are features that emerge in *Zen* (2009) and *Wood Job!* (2014). As already specified above teamwork for the common cause is a characteristic of (at least) three movies and the focus on constantly striving for improvement is clearly visible in *Wood Job!* (2014). About the last three “spirits of Matsushita” – courtesy

and humility; accordance with natural laws; and gratitude for blessings – they are well represented in *Zen* (2009), while they are narrowly considered in the other examined movies.

**Table 2.** Leadership Features in Japanese Movies.

JAPANESE MOVIES	MAIN LEADERSHIP FEATURES
<i>Brother</i> (2000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Action orientation</li> <li>• Bravery</li> <li>• Charisma</li> <li>• Confidence</li> <li>• Determination</li> <li>• Foreseeing ability</li> <li>• Self-control</li> <li>• Teamworking</li> </ul>
<i>Zen</i> (2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bravery</li> <li>• Charisma</li> <li>• Determination</li> <li>• Directness</li> <li>• Empathy</li> <li>• Fair behaviour</li> <li>• Persuasive skills</li> <li>• Self-control</li> </ul>
<i>13 Assassins</i> (2010)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bravery</li> <li>• Charisma</li> <li>• Confidence</li> <li>• Dedication</li> <li>• Initiative</li> <li>• Self-control</li> <li>• Teamworking</li> <li>• Time management</li> </ul>
<i>Wood Job!</i> (2014)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Active learning</li> <li>• Charisma</li> <li>• Determination</li> <li>• Fair behavior</li> <li>• Professionalism</li> <li>• Responsibility</li> <li>• Sensitiveness</li> <li>• Straightforwardness</li> </ul>
<i>Oz Land</i> (2018)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bravery</li> <li>• Care</li> <li>• Creativity</li> <li>• Dedication</li> <li>• Loyalty</li> <li>• Persuasive skills</li> <li>• Positive thinking</li> <li>• Teamworking</li> </ul>

**Source:** created by authors

### **Conclusion: Comparing the Results on Leadership from Hollywood and Japanese Movies**

In Hollywood movies personal commitment and outstanding communication skills are viewed as pillars for a leading figure, while the scenario depicted in Japanese movies seems more multifaceted and dynamic. Bravery, charisma and teamwork are recurrent features of Japanese leaders. However, the manner in which these common features interact with less common characteristics (e.g. dedication, determination, confidence, persuasion, empathy, professionalism, and others) tend to change in each individual case.

This study reveals how the figure of the leader as a guiding reference for the followers – due to his/her dedication, determination and charisma – is, nowadays, viewed as a cross-cultural phenomenon. An explanation to that is provided by Fukushige and Spicer: ‘as a result of internationalisation and widespread management education which reflects Western values and practices, Japanese values may well have converged with Western’ [22, p. 511]. At the same time, some differences between the two countries are still visible: for example, Hollywood movies show a particular emphasis on the power of communication, while Japanese movies tend to stress more the importance of teamworking for attaining the expected results.

So, the preliminary conclusion of this study is that leadership preferences in diverse countries seem to be affected by a process of homogenization toward Western values but, even so, they still reflect peculiar aspects of the social-cultural context under examination. These conclusions do not necessarily contradict each other: ‘the existence of cultural specifics is not the same as rejection of universality, and the existence of universality is not equivalent to not acknowledge differences’.

From a methodological perspective, there are several limitations to this study. Plausibly, the two most relevant ones are: first, that a movie is specifically developed to reach a certain target and, therefore, certain characteristics of its protagonists are intentionally construct to appeal such audience. Second, a movie is a dynamic artwork that could be read through diverse lenses according to the background (cultural, social, educational) of the viewers. Hence, multiple interpretations can be collected about the same film. Nevertheless, this exploratory study shows that the analysis of movies for understanding leadership preferences is a valuable and alternative approach to the matter. Still, as future investigation, it would be preferable to extend the number of movies under assessment, divide them in diverse categories (e.g. political, business, military) to get a better understanding of the diverse leadership styles that might characterized a single culture, and take into account pre-established features already

identified in other leadership models (Bass and Avolio's eight leadership styles or House's four styles) in order to provide more standardized results.

### **List of movies**

1. Assassins (Jûsan-nin no shikaku, directed by Miike, T., 2010).
1. Brother (directed by Kitano, T., 2000).
2. Oz Land (directed by Hatano, T., 2018).
3. Remember the Titans (directed by Yakin, B., 2000).
4. The Wolf of Wall Street (directed by Scorsese, M., 2013).
5. Thirteen Days (directed by Donaldson, R., 2000).
6. We Were Soldiers (directed by Wallace, R., 2002).
7. Wonder Woman (directed by Jenkins, P., 2017).
8. Wood Job (Kamusari nânâ nichijô, directed by Yaguchi, S., 2014).
9. Zen (directed by Takahashi, B., 2009).

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**«ҒАЖАП ӘЙЕЛ» ТАКЕШИ КИТАНОМЕН КЕЗДЕСЕДІ:  
ГОЛЛИВУД ЖӘНЕ ЖАПОН ФИЛЬМДЕРІНЕ НЕГІЗДЕЛГЕН  
КӨШБАСШЫЛЫҚ ҚАЛАУЛАРЫН ТАЛДАУ**

\*Фриджеро А.,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Алматы Менеджмент Университетінің Саясат және құқық мектебінің  
деканы, доктор PhD, Алматы, Қазақстан,  
[f.alberto@almu.edu.kz](mailto:f.alberto@almu.edu.kz)

Галаган М.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Алматы Менеджмент Университетінің Саясат және құқық мектебінің  
деканының орынбасары, докторант PhD,  
Алматы, Қазақстан,  
[margarita.galagan93@gmail.com](mailto:margarita.galagan93@gmail.com)

**Андатпа.** Академиялық ортада көшбасшылық феноменіне назар аударылады. Әртүрлі мәдениеттер мен контексттердегі көшбасшылық

қалауларды анықтау үшін көптеген зерттеулер жүргізілді. Дегенмен, көшбасшылардың қалауларының әмбебаптығы немесе парциализмі әлі де пікірталас мәселесі болып табылады. Бұл мақалада американдық және жапондық фильмдердегі көшбасшылық концепциясы экранда қалай көрсетілгенін талдап, салыстыра отырып, осы мәселеге өзіндік көзқарас ұсынылады.

Әдіснамалық тұрғыдан мақалада фильм белгілі бір мақсатқа жету үшін арнайы жасалған, сондықтан оның басты кейіпкерлерінің белгілі бір сипаттамалары мұндай аудиторияны қуанту үшін әдейі жасалған деп тұжырымдасап, фильм-бұл көрермендердің фонына (мәдени, әлеуметтік, білім беру) байланысты әртүрлі линзалар арқылы оқуға болатын динамикалық өнер туындысы деп есептеуге болады.

Мақалада авторлар Голливуд фильмдерінде жеке адалдық пен көрнекті қарым-қатынас дағдылары жетекші тұлға үшін тірек ретінде қарастырылатынын ал жапон фильмдерінде бейнеленген сценарий жан-жақты және динамикалық көрінетінін ғылыми негіздеген.

**Тірек сөздер:** көшбасшылық қалаулар, фильмдер, АҚШ, Жапония, салыстырмалы талдау.

### **«ЧУДО-ЖЕНЩИНА» ВСТРЕЧАЕТ ТАКЕШИ КИТАНО: АНАЛИЗ ЛИДЕРСКИХ ПРЕДПОЧТЕНИЙ НА ОСНОВЕ ГОЛЛИВУДСКИХ И ЯПОНСКИХ ФИЛЬМОВ**

\*Фриджеро А.,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> доктор PhD, декан Школы политики и права, Алматы Менеджмент  
Университет, f.alberto@almu.edu.kz

Галаган М.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> докторант PhD, ассистент декана Школы политики и права, Алматы  
Менеджмент Университет, margarita.galagan93@gmail.com

**Аннотация:** В академической среде проявляется внимание к феномену лидерства. Были проведены многочисленные исследования для определения лидерских предпочтений в различных культурах и контекстах. Однако универсализм или партикуляризм предпочтений лидеров все еще остается предметом дискуссий. Данная статья предлагает оригинальный подход на эту проблему, анализируя и сравнивая, как в американских и японских фильмах, представлена на экране концепция лидерства.

Методологически в статье делается вывод о том, что фильм разработан специально для достижения определенной цели, и поэтому определенные характеристики его главных героев намеренно разработаны, чтобы понравиться такой аудитории, и можно считать,

что фильм является динамичным произведением искусства, которое можно читать через различные линзы, в зависимости от фона аудитории (культурный, социальный, образовательный), его можно считать динамичным произведением искусства, которое можно читать через различные линзы.

В статье авторы научно обосновали, что в голливудских фильмах личная честность и выдающиеся коммуникативные навыки рассматриваются как опора для ведущей личности, а сценарий, изображенный в японских фильмах, выглядит многогранно и динамично.

**Ключевые слова:** лидерские предпочтения, фильмы, США, Япония, сравнительный анализ.

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050022, г. Алматы, ул. Муратбаева, 200  
Тел.: +7 (727) 292-03-84, 292-03-85, вн. 21-19  
E-mail: kazumo@ablaikhan.kz, ablaikhan@list.ru